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Preface
Vulnerability is not often associated with virtue. Yet, to be vulnerable
is central to human experience. Etymologically, ‘being vulnerable’
means capable of being wounded (from its Latin root, vulnus or
wound). Thus vulnerability, as the capacity to be hurt, is distinct
from the state of actually being harmed or suffering pain. Instead of
communicating the actual experience of pain or harm, the term
communicates the possibility of such experience, and self-awareness
of its possibility. One can know of one’s own capacity to be wounded
directly, by experiencing suffering, but may also know it in signiﬁcant
ways in the anticipation of harm, in its likelihood. To this extent,
vulnerability concerns not only the present moment, but also the
future. Vulnerability is a part of the human condition that is con-
cerned with living as temporal creatures who undergo change and
transformations of various sorts and who live with an awareness of
the likelihood of change. At times these changes are joyful or satisfy-
ing, at times painful or needful. A self-conscious and aware person
understands the meaning of his or her life in terms of a larger
temporal whole, of which vulnerability forms one part.
Narrative is a central mode of expression through which human
beings ﬁnd and create meaning about the experiences and patterns in
their lives. Such patterns are sometimes discovered or felt to be
‘found’ at the phenomenological level, but often only after the fact.
Current incidents or experiences, whether positive or negative, often
take on a different kind of meaning in human retelling of the events
later; what was confusing or chaotic at the moment may later display
a kind of sense or meaning. At the experiential level, this meaning is
often found by making connections between events, persons, and
larger purposes that were not before apparent. While the meaning
of an immediate experience of happiness seems not to require explan-
ation (in its pleasure and seeming ‘ﬁt’ with our expectations of
happiness), suffering seems to demand explanation. When people
experience pain of their own, or witness it in others—especially in
extreme cases—there is an experiential demand to understand its
meaning, even when such meaning seems to be unavailable or difﬁ-
cult to discern. Such meaning is often developed through narratives,
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
stories told about painful events, whether historical or mediated
ﬁctions. The historical existence of real suffering makes signiﬁcant
its performance in tragedy or other forms of Ł. But Ł also
reﬂects back on how we come to understand real human experience.
Indeed, such experiences are reﬂected on by whole communities, and
not only individuals, for the suffering of others, or its possibility, is
also central to human experience. Not only my own, but also others’
suffering, is constitutive of my own vulnerability.
The contention of this book is that Greek epic, tragedy, and
philosophy have important insights to offer about the nature of
human vulnerability and how human beings might better come to
terms with their own vulnerability. While studies of Greek paradigms
of heroism and virtue often focus on strength of character, prowess in
war, or the achievement of honour for oneself or one’s ºØ, there is
another side to Greek thought that extols the recognition and proper
acceptance of vulnerability. A number of Greek authors address the
question of the political value of vulnerability. Homer takes on the
dark side of war and does not shy away from descriptions of human
suffering along with glory. Sophocles creates a supreme tension
between the expectation of order and control, and the reality of
convoluted and unexpected human experience. Philosophers seek to
not only offer moral and political solutions to suffering, but also set
out the limits of such solutions and even extol the virtues of acknow-
ledging and accommodating human limit.
The range of works that might be chosen to display Greek engage-
ment with vulnerability is nearly inexhaustible. Thus, my aim here
has not been to develop anything like a comprehensive theory of
‘Greek culture’. Neither is the development of a ‘theory of tragedy’ the
primary aim—indeed, two works of Sophocles would hardly sufﬁce to
develop such a theory. Instead, the larger purpose of the book is to
analyse and interpret several important Greek works of epic, tragedy,
and philosophy in order better to develop a philosophical under-
standing of vulnerability and its role in the life of the larger commu-
nity. I have chosen literary and philosophical works in which the
imagery of wounding is prominent, or in which the question of
vulnerability’s relationship to ethical-political life is confronted di-
rectly. Physical wounds in these works are often accompanied by
deeper questions about the meaning of suffering, mortality, or other
forms of human frailty. The focus on works in which physical wounds
are prominent features of the story thus serves as a trope for delving
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more deeply into psychological, ethical, and interpersonal vulnerabil-
ities and their place in the community.
The overarching thesis concerns itself with the central philosoph-
ical questions: (1) Why is awareness and acceptance of human vul-
nerability important to the thriving of both individuals and
communities? (2) How does narrative allow human beings better to
become aware of and respond to their own vulnerability? I argue that
awareness of one’s own and others’ capacity to be wounded, and the
proper response to it, are a central part of virtue for successful
communities. Not only individuals, but also political communities,
must come to terms with and respond appropriately to the vulner-
ability that exists within. Indeed, vulnerability strengthens interper-
sonal bonds within a community, and is closely intertwined with a
number of different facets of ethical life. I thus suggest that rather
than treating vulnerability as something to be avoided, vulnerability is
a necessary component of living a rich and authentic human life in
community.
A good deal of scholarship in philosophy focuses on the virtues,
that is, human excellence. This attention to the virtues makes good
sense, for certainly philosophers and even epic writers and tragedians
seek to articulate the ways in which human beings can successfully
pursue lives of happiness and ethical living. Careful attention to the
virtues that allow the best aspects of human beings to emerge—or that
assist us in combatting the worst—naturally focuses on human
strengths and political resourcefulness. Nonetheless, the reality of
human life often bumps up against the idealism of philosophy. The
meaning of acute human suffering is difﬁcult to discern. Moreover, in
the course of everyday encounters with others, the question as to the
proper responsiveness to others’ vulnerability arises. I offer this work
on vulnerability not as an objection to the necessity of cultivating
individual and political excellence, but rather as complementary. To
be aware of and responsive to the vulnerabilities of oneself and others
is just as important as our care for human excellence and strength.
Indeed, the success of the political community already depends upon
its own recognition and appropriation of vulnerability in its midst.
The appropriate response to vulnerability is thus a key part of virtue.
My work builds on the scholarship of a few other key ﬁgures who
have taken on the topic of human weakness. Martha Nussbaum’s
book, The Fragility of Goodness, remains a formative work on moral
luck in Greek tragedy and philosophy. Her insights into the role of
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chance and contingency in ethical living are valuable. However, I take
issue with her contention that Plato argues for a life of self-sufﬁciency
and freedom from contingency. As I will argue in the middle chapters
of this book, Plato displays considerable sensitivity to human vulner-
ability. Socratic questioning seems even to depend on a care for
human weakness along with love of the good. MacIntyre’s Dependent
Rational Animals similarly argues that vulnerability and even disabil-
ity are normal features of ordinary life. His attention to the links
between human persons and animals, and especially our embodied
dependencies, relies to a large extent on a thoughtful analysis of
Aristotelian epistemology, as well as contemporary biology. His
work on Aristotle’s theory of perception and the imagination espe-
cially plays an important role in the ﬁnal chapter. Numerous other
commentators have focused on the meaning of suffering in Greek
tragedy and Homeric epic, both at the textual and performative levels.
Still, suffering and vulnerability are not quite identical, and I hope
that my own insights here build upon those of my predecessors.
In Chapter 1, I examine the descriptions of wounding in Homer’s
Iliad for its insights into vulnerability and its meaning. Homer pre-
sents wounds and their signifying of mortality as central to the
possibility of a meaningful, teleological narrative about human life.
In contrast to the wounds suffered by the gods, human wounds
increase the bonds of relationships within the community. While
neither pain nor death are desirable in themselves, their anticipation
and the narrative accounts offered in light of their existence contri-
bute to political goods. Thus, the limitedness of human beings provides
for the possibility of teleological meaning that the gods cannot pos-
sess. Achilles initially resists the vulnerability of both himself and the
other Greeks, but is brought to face its reality through two key events:
the death of Patroklos and the ﬁnal encounter with Priam, in which
Achilles agrees to return Hektor’s body. In the Iliad, awareness of
vulnerability to death, injury, and even the inevitable ‘forward
motion’ of time provide for the possibility of a meaningful individual
human narrative. Narrative also links the meaning of individual lives
and deaths to a larger set of patterns and meanings within the Greek
story. Achilles’meeting with Priam even allows Achilles to enter more
deeply into the universality of human suffering and so to extend his
community even beyond that of the Greeks.
Chapter 2 turns to Sophocles’ Oedipus the King and Oedipus at
Colonus. In the ﬁrst play, vulnerability to ignorance constitutes a
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danger to the community, as Oedipus’ self-assurance about his own
righteousness contributes to his city’s and family’s downfall. Oedipus
initially refuses to accommodate weakness and vulnerability to un-
controllable forces into his vision of human life, and his refusal has
grave consequences for those whom he rules and those whom he
loves. However, Theseus in Oedipus at Colonus suggests an alterna-
tive approach to vulnerability, as Theseus displays compassionate
hospitality for the stranger. The ﬁgure of Oedipus as a 	
 in
Colonus reconciles the split between his identity as a polluted man
and as a political protector. His incorporation and elevation to pro-
tector of Athens displays the Athenian ideal of the ºØ as the
dwelling of ‘all together’, in which receptivity to the outsider and
even to weakness becomes constitutive of the city’s good.
In Chapter 3, I examine Sophocles’ Philoctetes and build further on
the notion that the excluded and polluted one is central to the city’s
good. Here, Sophocles develops a picture of Philoctetes as one who is
not only physically, but also emotionally, wounded. His presence at
an ‘in between’ space on Lemnos, literally at the margins of society,
further develops a picture of human vulnerability, especially the
suffering born from social exclusion. The ﬁgure of Neoptolemus
and his internal struggles also develops two political virtues in the
play: ﬁrst, pity as a political virtue and, second, the virtue of being able
to accommodate unjust harm properly. Neoptolemus learns from
Philoctetes both the importance of pity and a form of political
citizenship that accommodates truthfulness and care for the weak,
in place of mere political efﬁcacy. Philoctetes learns the necessity
of being able to return to his place in an imperfect Greek society
that has not expressed regret for his prior abandonment. These two
political virtues both concern a proper responsiveness and care for
vulnerability—not only care for the weak, but also acceptance and care
for one’s own city in light of the imperfections of political structures.
Plato’s dialogues include both a literary and philosophical dimen-
sion. While Plato is often interpreted as an author who advocates
philosophy as a way to overcome vulnerability, I argue that the
Gorgias and Symposium both display considerable sensitivity to vul-
nerability and its importance in human life. Chapter 4 focuses on the
myth of judgement at the end of the Gorgias and its image of a
wounded, unjust man. There Socrates uses a Ł and, in particular,
the language of wounding to communicate with Callicles, who has so
far failed to be responsive to abstract argumentation. Just as the
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judges of the myth can judge well only because they are naked, as
are the ones that they judge, Socrates emerges as one who is able to
excel at questioning others because of his self-awareness of his vul-
nerability. Socrates not only is vulnerable to the judgement in the
courtroom, but also displays an epistemic vulnerability that guides
his questioning of others. I also argue that Ancient Greek medicine
and its recognition of a healer’s own limits have signiﬁcant parallels
to Socratic practice. Socrates is not only responsive to the ‘wounds’ of
those whom he attends, but is also self-aware of his limitations as a
practitioner. He thus displays a consciousness of the ﬁnite power of
Socratic logos to transform an interlocutor. Plato emerges not as a
perfectionistic thinker who desires to avoid tragedy and human
frailty, but rather as a thinker who is aware and accepting of human
limitation and vulnerability.
Next, I turn to Plato’s Symposium. Chapter 5 examines the links
between eros and vulnerability. Against those who read the Sympo-
sium’s ‘ladder of love’ as a move away from loving the ordinary and
imperfect, I advocate an understanding of philosophy that retains a
care for the imperfect and ordinary. Diotima’s speech describes eros,
at its last stage before reaching the ﬁnality of eternal contemplation,
as the place where human creativity takes place. Reproduction in not
only a physical, but also an intellectual and creative, sense is part of
the human response to our own need and lack, as we strive for but
cannot yet reach the eternal. The fruitfulness of eros depends upon a
lack and need in human beings, and their responsiveness to the
neediness of one another, and not an other-worldly or perfectionistic
orientation. Alcibiades’ entrance into the party as a drunk, erotic, and
frustrated young man who speaks of suffering from a Socratically-
induced ‘snakebite’ also suggests a tragic dimension to eros. While
Alcibiades displays a greater sensitivity to his own vulnerability than
any other Socratic interlocutor in the dialogue, he fails to be able to
move from such self-awareness into action that transforms his life
accordingly. I suggest that Alcibiades is unwilling to take responsi-
bility for his own limits and wounds, choosing instead to blame
Socrates. Socrates, in contrast, remains aware of his own limit, re-
sponsible for it, and so takes his neediness and eros into his actions.
He thus stands as a practitioner of not only good philosophy, but also
political care for others.
The ﬁnal two chapters analyse Aristotle’s thoughts on vulnerability
in the Ethics and Poetics. Chapter 6 carefully analyses Aristotle’s
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discussion of the loss of a friendship of virtue in which one’s friend
has become bad. While Aristotle argues that a virtuous man will only
love what is truly good—and so not a friend turned bad—his discus-
sion of the loss of such a friend displays how friendship itself makes
us vulnerable. While we need friends to practise the virtues and to
reﬂect ourselves back to us, a friend is also valued in himself, as
‘another self ’. The loss of friendship entails a concomitant loss of
an aspect of one’s own self. Aristotle suggests that such friendships
can be retained to some extent in memory, but even memory retains
the pain suffered in loss, as well as the goods, of the friendship.
Aristotle also posits the relative limits of not only friends, but also
family, civic institutions, and laws in rehabilitating those who have
fallen away from virtue. One way to understand those who lack virtue
is in terms of their moral vulnerability. But no single form of familial,
personal, or civic care is entirely sufﬁcient to attend to such a state of
soul. A wide range of forms of moral care and nurture are necessary
for the sake of moving those who lack virtue toward its acquisition.
The last chapter turns to Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy and
narrative in the Poetics. I especially look at the public, performed
aspect of tragedy and what meaning witnessing tragedy as a political
community might have for the body politic. I suggest that one
political function of tragedy is to enable a community to become
more responsive to the vulnerable in their own midst. I then take up
Aristotle’s notion of ŒŁÆæØ and argue for ŒŁÆæØ as a form of
‘rebalancing’, not only of an individual soul, but also of the commu-
nity at large. Tragedy can enlarge a community’s vision of its own
identity and the realities of its own citizens, including vulnerable
citizens. Tragedy and other forms of narrative thus possess not only
an aesthetic, but also a political and philosophical, function.
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1Woundedness, Narrative, and
Community in the Iliad
Traditionally, the Iliadic hero is a man of courage, strength, and self-
control who gains glory as a result of his individual actions. Both
Achilles and Hektor are men who understand their participation and
valour in battle as necessary for achieving Œº (glory) in light of the
inevitability of death. At the same time, Homer is concerned not only
with the individual Greek man of virtue, but also with his relation to
the larger community. This chapter argues that the Iliad presents
vulnerability as central to the possibility of a strong socio-political
bond, especially insofar as the acknowledgement of human mortality
is necessary for the thriving of both individuals and communities.1 In
particular, Homer’s presentation of the wounds of warriors shows the
centrality of vulnerability to the possibility of a teleological narrative
of human existence, offering meaning in the face of mortality.
1 While many commentators emphasize the role of virtue and honour in the Iliad,
only a few have focused on the place of vulnerability and weakness. Among notable
exceptions are Michael Lynn-George, ‘Aspects of the Epic Vocabulary of Vulnerabil-
ity’, Colby Quarterly 29 (3) (1996), 197–221; Graham Zanker, The Heart of Achilles:
Characterization and Personal Ethics in the Iliad (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1996); Brooke Holmes, ‘The Iliad ’s Economy of Pain’, Transactions of the
American Philological Association 137 (1) (Spring 2007); Arlene Saxonhouse, ‘Thu-
mos, Justice, and Moderation of Anger in the Story of Achilles’, in Catherine Zuckert
(ed.),Understanding the Political Spirit (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); and
Simone Weil’s ‘The Iliad, or the Poem of Force’, in S. Weil and R. Bespaloff (eds.),
War and the Iliad (New York: New York Review Books, 2005), 3. See also K. Lynn-
George, ‘Structures of Care in the Iliad ’, Classical Quarterly 46 (1) (1996), 1–26 for an
in-depth discussion of the vocabulary of care and Louise Pratt, ‘The Parental Ethos of
the Iliad ’, Hesperia Supplements 41 (2007), 25–40. My own focus here on the contrast
between divine and mortal wounds, temporality, narrative, and food adds new
material to the picture of vulnerability in the Iliad that these authors have begun to
develop.
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Achilles especially must come to terms with the ‘forward motion’ of
human life, and his inability to remain in the past, as part of human
experience. His virtue requires not only his willingness to die an
honourable death for his fellow Greeks, but also his ability to accept
the loss of Patroklos and to face the inevitable forward motion of
human existence. This temporal character of experience is painful,
but also allows for the possibility of meaning for Achilles and for his
deepening of connection to other Greeks. Achilles’ encounter with
Priam even allows Achilles to extend his sense of community beyond
that of other Greeks to the wider human community. The two men
are tied to one another through their shared encounter with vulner-
ability and grief. In their meeting, words themselves fall short, and
narrative is momentarily replaced with the sharing of a meal and the
gaze of mutual recognition.
I
In a broad sense, the Iliad is a political work.2 Although the epic was
written before the development of the ºØ, and so in a strict sense is
‘pre-political’, nonetheless, the Iliad actively concerns itself with
questions as to how the community is formed, its strengths and
weaknesses, and the nature of the root of the bonds between human
beings, both at the personal level and that of the larger community.
The focal crisis of the book occurs when Achilles removes himself
from the body politic, that is, from the community of Greeks who
have agreed to work together for a common purpose in defeating the
Trojans. Questions of authority, such as whether Agamemnon had
the authority to claim Achilles’ slave girl for himself, and whether
Achilles has a moral, social, or political obligation to ﬁght alongside
the other Greeks, are central questions of the epic. The Iliad raises
social and political questions for reﬂection by its audience.
2 See Dean Hammer, The Iliad as Politics (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2002), which argues that ‘political’ notions such as questions of authority and
communal organization and proper rule are part of the Iliad, although no speciﬁc
sense of ºØ as city-state (‘political’ in a narrower sense) had yet developed. See also
Robin Osborne, ‘Homer’s Society’, in R. Fowler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 211–16.
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Among these questions is how death and mortality ﬁgure into
human community. Conceptually, ‘death’ and ‘mortality’ are distinct.
We can separate death, the facticity of life’s end, from mortality, or
the conscious awareness of ourselves as beings who will die. Homer
presents not death per se, but rather the human awareness of our
capacity to be wounded and to die, as a central constitutive part of the
human social bond. War both strengthens this bond and presents
the community with a host of problems as a result of it. Amongst the
difﬁculties, most obviously, is the fact that war itself is a break in
the social and political bond between the warring parties. Paris has
violated the guest–host relationship in stealing away Helen, and his
violation reverberates through the entire Greek political community.
Yet, Homer treats the Trojans rather sympathetically, as equal human
partners in the drama of war; not always simply as enemies deserving
of death, but quite often as human beings caught in a larger series of
interactions between the gods, men, and the passions of both. War is
a fundamental threat to the political bond between societies and
within the individual societies and families affected by war.
In addition, the death of any individual is a permanent and deep
break in the social bond. The dead cannot participate actively in
community, and those who lose the dead also lose signiﬁcant social
relationships and political status, as well as their connection to
the beloved. Consider, for example, Andromache’s poignant plea to
Hektor not to go directly into battle, since, as she says, ‘Hektor, thus
you are father to me, and my honoured mother, you are my brother,
and you it is who aremy young husband’ (VI. 429–30).3 Andromache’s
status within the Trojan community, and indeed her life’s larger
meaning, depend upon her relationship to her husband. Her pleas
are returned by his own explanation that he is obliged to ﬁght, lest
his wife become enslaved to another: ‘But may I be dead and the piled
earth hidemeunder before I hear you crying and knowby this that they
drag you captive’ (VI. 464–5). To her argument that her family rela-
tionship must be preserved and that his vulnerability threatens it,
Hektor replies that it is precisely these relationships that the Trojans
seek to defend in refusing to surrender, and in Hektor’s refusal to hide
while others ﬁght. War both potentially threatens and protects the
social relationships in which the warring parties exist, often producing
3 All translations in this chapter are from Homer, The Iliad, trans. Stanley Lom-
bardo (Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Press, 1997).
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considerable internal struggle in those who ﬁght. In raising the socio-
political difﬁculties that the human vulnerability to death presents,
Homer does not shy away fromdeath’s grimness, nor from the losses of
the dead and those with whom they were in relationship.
Awareness of one’s own mortality presents speciﬁc challenges to
the community, but also strengthens the bond between its members.
Contrasting the reactions of mortals and gods as they are wounded in
the Iliad provides a ready set of distinctions between the political
communities of human beings who are vulnerable to mortality, and
the divine community whose members are not. Golden has argued
that the divine framework of the Iliad serves in part to increase our
awareness of the fragility of human life and the challenge of prosper-
ing in such a world. Divine indifference to human beings reminds us
of the increased importance of cultivating authentically human values
in the midst of suffering and death.4 Contrasting the wounds of gods
and of mortals similarly opens up the meaning of wounding and
death for human beings.
That the gods are vulnerable, in the most literal sense of being
capable of being wounded, may come as a surprise. In the light of
Plato and the later Neoplatonic tradition that claimed that god by
nature is wholly good and perfect, and therefore cannot change from
a better state to a worse, our own cultural tendency is to think of the
notion of immortal as commensurate with being invulnerable. In
contrast, Homer portrays the gods as capable of injury, even at
human hands. Hephaistos is mocked early on in the Iliad for his
lameness, even as he serves the gods nectar in their goblets (I. 600).
Both Aphrodite and Ares are wounded in battle by mortals, and
complain ﬁercely of their pain. However, as one contrasts the gods’
experience of their vulnerability with the experience of wounded or
dying mortals, Homer reveals deep differences in the meaning and
political signiﬁcance of woundedness for the two.
Aphrodite is wounded by Diomedes’ bronze spear. Her reaction is
presented as that of a beautiful, but sensitive, woman whose beauty
has been marred, and who complains primarily of the pain:
. . . the spear tore the skin driven clean on through the immortal robe
(Iæ	
ı Øa ºı) that the very Graces had woven for her carefully
4 Leon Golden, Understanding the Iliad (Bloomington, Ind.: Authorhouse, 2005),
1–15.
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over the palm’s base; and blood immortal (¼æ –ØÆ) ﬂowed from the
goddess, ichor, that which runs in the veins of the blessed divinities; since
these eat no food, nor do they drink of the shining wine, and therefore they
have no blood and are called immortal. She gave a great shriek and let fall her
son she was carrying . . . (V. 336–43)
The poet makes clear here that while she ‘bleeds’, that is, has the
appearance of bleeding human blood, her veins are neither sustained
by the same food and drink upon which human life depends, nor does
its loss affect her life’s length. Aphrodite easily loses control of herself
and becomes self-concerned immediately upon injury. She drops her
son, Aineias, without any hesitation, and while Apollo steps in to
catch him, Aphrodite turns her attention entirely toward herself once
injured. Returning to heaven with the assistance of her brother, she
complains to Zeus that she has been wounded, on the grounds that
(a) her wound hurts; (b) she has taken offence at its cause being a
mortal; and (c) the mortals in question who wounded her are Da-
naans, whom she opposes in the war. Aphrodite uses her wound as an
occasion to further her own cause, namely, opposition to the Greeks
in the war.
Homer’s presentation is not likely to produce much sympathy for
Aphrodite on the part of his audience. Zeus checks Aphrodite’s overly
active participation on the battleﬁeld. Other goddesses later mock
Aphrodite for her excessive sensitivity and her lack of shame in
favouring Paris, joking that she perhaps cut her hand on a pin on
an Achaian woman’s dress, after begging a new woman to fall in love
with another favoured Trojan, as did Helen with Paris (V. 420–5).
They laugh at her for her lack of control of her passion in loving
mortals, as well as her inability to respond courageously to an act of
war as Athena, or another god strong in battle, might have done.
Neither is Homer’s audience likely to be deeply moved by her injury,
an effect that he accomplishes by constant juxtaposition of her im-
mortal state with her injuries: her blood, we are reminded, is not real
blood, but ichor, and it stains an immortal robe. Homer juxtaposes
the imagery of the wound with the immortality of the wounded one,
who is harmed but not capable of being destroyed by the wound.
Aphrodite cares for Aineias’ life, but she is just as quick to drop him
as to pick him up once she is endangered. Her attitude towards her
son seems ﬁckle, a theme that much later Virgil will expand upon in
his own Aeneid. Moreover, Aphrodite’s main response to her injury is
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to appeal to her father, in part to complain of her own feelings, but
also to further her political ends (and even those political goals are
primarily informed by her personal, whimsical favouritism toward
particular mortal men). She suggests that the Greeks, in particular,
are liable to break proper boundaries and attack the gods, and so
ought not to be supported in the war.
Contrast Aphrodite’s injury to that of Menelaos when Pandaros
hits him in a surprise attack. The colour of Menelaos’ blood is
described extensively, as a ‘cloud of dark blood’ gushes from his
wound. Homer compares the blood to the dark red coloured ivory
cheek piece for a horse, reserved for a king on account of its art.
Menelaos’ blood drips down his thighs, legs, to his ankles. Menelaos’
ankles and thighs are described as shapely and beautiful, emphasizing
his nobility even at the moment of injury.5 Instead of the merely
identifying description of Aphrodite’s ‘blood’ as ichor, here Homer
gives us extensive imagery that allows us to engage imaginatively with
Menelaos’ experience. As Holmes has argued, blood is strongly asso-
ciated with the vital energy of the hero, and its loss with the liminal
status of a wounded man; continued bleeding is also used to commu-
nicate the pain of the victim to others.6 The difference between mortal
and immortal wounding also communicates the difﬁculty of enduring
bodily pain and so the heroism of human endurance of suffering.7
Agamemnon’s response to his brother’s wound also displays the
relational and interpersonal element of suffering between mortal
men. While only moments ago, Agamemnon was presented as a
haughty, difﬁcult leader who alienated Achilles for the sake of pre-
serving his own pride, he is now deeply moved by his brother’s injury:
‘Agamemnon the lord of men was taken with shuddering fear
(Þ
ªÅ	) as he saw how from the cut (TØºB) the dark blood
trickled downward, and Menelaos the warlike himself shuddered in
terror (Þ
ªÅ	); but when he saw the binding strings and the hooked
barbs outside the wound, his spirit was gathered again back into him’
(IV. 148–52).
Here, Homer juxtaposes the authority, strength, and courage of
these two men with their fear. Menelaos rather quickly realizes his
5 Tamara Neal, The Wounded Hero: Non-Fatal Injury in Homer’s Iliad (Bern: Peter
Lang, 2006), 46–8.
6 See Holmes, ‘Iliad’s Economy of Pain’.
7 Holmes, ‘Iliad’s Economy of Pain’, 151–84.
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wound is not fatal, and so is able to gather himself together again. But
his initial reaction to his wound is not primarily its pain or any lack of
honour incurred: the ﬁrst response of both brothers is to see it as a
sign of impending death. Agamemnon immediately questions his
own role in bringing his brother to the point of injury: ‘Dear brother,
it was your death I sealed in the oaths of friendship, setting you alone
before the Achaians to ﬁght with the Trojans’ (IV. 155–6). Agamem-
non promises that his brother’s death will not be in vain, and that he
shall be successful in the war, but then adds poignantly, ‘But I shall
suffer a terrible grief (¼å) for you, Menelaos, if you die and ﬁll out
the destiny of your lifetime’ (IV. 169–70).
Homer’s parallel structure in the line translated above (‘Agamem-
non the lord . . . ’) especially communicates the way in which Mene-
laos’ wound is also a kind of wound for his brother:
Þ
ªÅ	 · ¼æØÆ ¼Æ IæH ªÆø
 E ºÆ ÆxÆ ŒÆÆææ K TØºB;
Þ
ªÅ	 b ŒÆØ ÆPe IæÅ
çØº ºÆ. (IV. 148–50)
His use of Þ
ªÅ	 in parallel lines, ﬁrst with respect to Agamemnon’s
fear and then Menelaos’ own, suggests a sympathetic response of
brother to brother. In striking contrast to Aphrodite, whose wound-
edness leads her to abandon her son, Menelaos responds to his
brother’s sensitivity with care. He reassures him that the wound is
not mortal as the war belt turned it aside from a more vulnerable spot;
he has sympathy for his brother’s fears and seeks to quell them.
Agamemnon says he hopes Menelaos’ assessment is right, and im-
plores the doctor Machaon to come and assist. Each thinks of the
well-being of the other ﬁrst: Agamemnon of his brother’s health, and
Menelaos of assuaging his brother’s fear. In this case, Menelaos’
wound is an occasion for strengthening the bonds between Agamem-
non and Menelaos, deepening their commitment both to the success
of the war and to one another.8
8 Here I disagree with Zanker’s reading of this passage as revealing an egocentric
Agamemnon overly concerned with his own glory. Agamemnon is concerned with
the glory of the Greeks, but the familial and political are interconnected for Agamem-
non: the well-being of his brother is genuinely and rightly connected to a desire to see
glory for the Greeks, since the war was fought over Menelaos’ bride. For Zanker’s
argument, see his contrast between Agamemnon and Achilles in grief, chapter 1 in
Zanker, Heart of Achilles, 1–46.
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Here, Homer deepens our understanding of human vulnerability as
profoundly interpersonal. Vulnerability to suffering and death are not
simply individual experiences as is the immediate experience of pain.
Rather, the possibility of loss reverberates fromMenelaos to Agamem-
non and back again, in their communication about his wound’s
meaning. Menelaos’ wound becomes the occasion for Agamemnon’s
own suffering and fear for his brother and the Greek cause. In turn,
Agamemnon’s words lead to Menelaos’ own reassurances, as the
wounded one also sympathizes with his brother’s experience of fear.
Their mirroring of one another’s suffering is simultaneously familial
and political, as their interpersonal care is intimately linked to the
question of whetherMenelaos’wounds will also result in the loss of the
war’s moral signiﬁcance.
Menelaos’ wound is not simply an experience of individual
suffering. Of course, Menelaos feels pain, but his interpretation of
that pain, the meaning that he gives to it, is to understand his wound
in terms of a larger narrative, a narrative with a social and political
signiﬁcance. Agamemnon understands Menelaos’ injury as part of an
open question of whether his injury and possible death will have a
positive meaning. He insists, if Menelaos dies, that he must be
successful in returning a powerful blow against the Trojans, otherwise
‘at once the Achaians will remember the land of their fathers; and
thus we would leave to Priam and to the Trojans Helen of Argos, to
glory over, while the bones of you rot in the ploughland as you lie
dead in Troy, on a venture that went unaccomplished’ (IV. 171–5).
Menelaos’ injury thus is not only about his own pain, or even that of
his family, but ﬁts into a larger narrative about the Achaians and
especially whether they will be able to restore honour after Helen’s
betrayal and the sacriﬁce of many men’s lives. In particular, since
Menelaos is Helen’s proper husband, his death might mean the end of
the Greek army’s desire to ﬁght for her return; as a result, Agamem-
non fears, the Greeks might wish to return home. Menelaos’ life’s
narrative will then not be one of a man who sought the return of his
wife and his homeland’s honour, but one of a man betrayed by his
wife and later killed in a lengthy, unsuccessful war to return her to
him. From Agamemnon’s perspective, the time and manner of Me-
nelaos’ death is signiﬁcant in terms of how that death gives shape and
meaning to both his own life, and that of the others involved in it. His
attitude towards Menelaos here is not only that of brother to brother,
but also of king to king, both engaged in a war that has serious
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consequences for those who might sacriﬁce their lives for the sake of
Menelaos and the return of Helen—a war grounded in an oath that
various Greek leaders made to one another on behalf of the king and
his marriage and also for the sake of Greek peace and stability.
The possibility of death has political signiﬁcance for Agamemnon.
It is not only a cause of grief. In light of the possibility of death, the
sacriﬁce that the Greeks are willing to make for Menelaos and for one
another possesses real signiﬁcance. Thus, Homer presents vulnerabil-
ity to mortality as the occasion for reﬂection upon the political and
moral signiﬁcance of the war; while Agamemnon is not a particularly
reﬂective man by character, his brother’s wound forces him to en-
counter questions of meaning about the war, his brother’s participa-
tion in it, and his own sense of civic responsibility.
One might argue that Aphrodite also sees her wound as politically
signiﬁcant. After all, she attempts to use her injury as a means to
harm the Greeks, when she suggests to Zeus that the Danaans—not
simply mortals in general!—are now willing to injure the gods.
However, Zeus is unswayed by Aphrodite’s pleas to punish the
Greeks precisely because her wound cannot result in her death.
Zeus’ narrative account of her injury locates it in a string of indig-
nities that must occasionally be borne by the gods. He speaks: ‘Have
patience, my child, and endure it, though you be saddened. For many
of us who have our homes on Olympos endure things from men,
when ourselves we inﬂict hard pain on each other’ (V. 382–3). Zeus
offers Ares, Hera, and Hades as examples of gods who have had to
endure pain and even the risk of a diminishment of power; but
because they are immortal, their wound lacks the permanent signiﬁ-
cance of the ‘end of a story’. The narratives of the gods are always
open-ended; as a consequence, individual episodes of suffering and
wounds are simply experiences of pain, not the possibility of a closure
for a good or bad human life.
To put it somewhat differently, because their wounds cannot result
in death, the gods’ existences also lack the teleology present in the
lives of many of the mortals of the Iliad. Divine lives lack an ‘end’ in
two senses: ﬁrst, the sense of a termination point, such that the
signiﬁcance of any single action is diminished; and second, their
lives lack the signiﬁcance of an ‘end’ in the sense of a º, a reason
for existence that gives shape to the overall story and narrative of their
own lives. Human beings have such a º, but not one that is given
to human beings by the gods; neither does Homer present a strong
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sense of natural teleology, as will later thinkers such as Aristotle.
However, Homer does tell the stories of human lives in the Iliad in
terms of a constant forward movement in which each person seeks
purpose and meaning in life in the face of the inevitability of death
and the shape that death offers to a human narrative. Particular
individual moments in a human life take on deepened meaning in
their place in a story to which death offers deﬁnition. Paradoxically,
the inevitability of life’s termination is part of what grants purpose
and meaning to the lives of those who live and die in the stories that
will be told about them. Narrative accounts link the meaning of
individual lives and deaths to a larger set of patterns and meanings
within the Greek story.
Ares is also injured in battle, this time by Athena, who has ‘put on
the helm of Death’ (V. 845). She leans in on Diomedes’ spear so that it
penetrates into Ares’ stomach, and then wrenches it out again for
maximum effect. Ares ‘the brazen bellowed with a sound as great as
nine thousand men make, or ten thousand, when they cry as they
carry into ﬁghting the fury of the war god’ (V. 859–61). He, too, goes
to Zeus, this time complaining of why the gods themselves ﬁght
among one another, aware that Athena is behind his injury. He
complains that Zeus allows Athena to behave badly since ‘yourself
you begot this child of perdition (ÆP Kª
Æø ÆE· ÆNÅº:)’
(V. 879–80).9 Zeus is far harsher with Ares than he was with Aphro-
dite, accusing Ares of being a whiner and a liar who enjoys quarrelling
by nature (V. 889). Zeus does not attribute Ares’ difﬁculty to his pain
brought on by wounds, but to his warlike nature. Zeus lacks any
fondness for Ares, but reluctantly heals him since Hera is his mother
and Ares is his child (at least in the Homeric account). Ares is quickly
healed and, wearing new clothes, sits down beside Zeus to observe
the war.
Here Homer presents the wounding of the gods as an occasion for
personal pain and suffering, but because death is not a possible
outcome, one god has little, if any, care for the pain suffered by
other gods. For Zeus, the wounds of others in his family are an
occasion for reminding them of the relatively short-term conse-
quences of injury; he also seeks to diminish tensions between them.
9 Thus, Ares ignores the role of Metis and attributes to Zeus a possessive privi-
leging of Athena as his child.
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Both Aphrodite and Ares, once healed, return to their positions in
heaven—they return to a point of stasis. Their injuries have a rela-
tively limited place in the narrative they construct about their own
existences, at least as Zeus describes it: their wounds must simply be
‘endured’ since other gods have also had to suffer, and because this is
the way that life proceeds, for better or for worse. However, such
wounds cannot result in death, or a deeply determining moment in a
divine narrative. Moreover, the gods do not experience much sym-
pathy for one another. Their injuries are not means of strengthening
the bonds between the gods; if anything, we see greater division when
Aphrodite and Ares make their complaints, which Zeus takes to be
indications of weakness. But injury and death for the human beings in
the Iliad have greater consequence and cannot be understood as idle
complaints.
It is not simply the facticity of death that differentiates the mortal
wounds of those who die in the Iliad. Homer presents the deaths of
the innumerable men who fall as signiﬁcant in ordering and deﬁning
the lives of the men. That is, the fact that the human being will die
gives a deﬁnition and boundary to the story of a life. The possibility of
telling a story about a human life with a beginning, middle, and end
provides for the possibility of a teleology of meaning for each mortal
being and for how his life ﬁts in relation to the larger political
community. As Homer presents these deaths, we ﬁnd that a com-
pletely meaningful account of these men’s lives does not fully come
into being until their deaths. How each man is wounded, suffers, and
responds to his suffering inﬂects and informs the community’s
understanding of his life’s signiﬁcance.
The sheer number of deaths in the Iliad is striking, but Homer
takes care to name the wounds and deaths of those who suffer in
battle. The poet does not present the deaths of the soldiers in quanti-
ﬁable terms, but rather presents death as personal. Nearly every major
character of the Iliad sustains a wound, with the exception of Ajax,
and how each one responds to such physical wounding is part of how
he shows his character and whether he is worthy of Œº. As Tamara
Neal has argued, injury becomes a mark of heroic identity. The
injured body becomes a site of differentiation of one person and
allows us to distinguish his character from among those who ﬁght.
How a character is injured, how he experiences the physical pain, the
treatment he undergoes, and whether he receives divine favour are
among some of the means by which the poet communicates the
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hero’s heroism or lack thereof.10 Whether a blow penetrates the
armour of an opponent or results in death communicates the warrior’s
strength. The ability to endure suffering or to exhibit self-control
while undergoing the treatment of a wound also shows his moral
excellence. These actions and responses often showcase the strength,
self-restraint, and physical prowess of the hero. For example, the
juxtaposition of numerous examples of Trojans who faint from
wounding alongside examples of Achaians who maintain conscious-
ness in similar circumstances communicates the greater strength of
character of the Greeks.11
However, mortal wounding does not only display a warrior’s
virtues or strengths. Just as signiﬁcantly, the Homeric narrative
shows sensitivity to the warrior’s weakness and ﬁnitude as a mortal
being. Often the genuine loss involved in death is the most arresting
part of Homer’s narrative. Homer gives power to the sense of the loss
through contrasting the moment of death with the relationships and
the set of possibilities that had characterized a warrior’s life before his
death. That is, we often ﬁnd a common (though not exclusive) pattern
of a warrior’s life as: (1) introduced in terms of those who have loved
him, in childhood, marriage, or other intimate relationships; (2)
followed immediately by a description of an injury; and (3) ﬁnally a
proclamation of death. The immediacy of death that typiﬁes Homeric
accounts adds to its starkness.
Consider the death of Simoeis, a Trojan, in Book IV:
There Telemonian Aias struck down the son of Anthemion Simoeis in his
stripling’s beauty, whom once his mother descending from Ida bore beside
the banks of Simoeis when she had followed her father and mother to tend
the sheepﬂocks. Therefore they called him Simoeis; but he could not render
again the care (ŁææÆ) of his dear parents; he was short-lived, beaten down
beneath the spear of high-hearted Aias, who struck him as he ﬁrst came
forward beside the nipple of the right breast, and bronze spearhead drove
clean through the shoulder. (IV. 473–82)
Homer primarily describes the death of Simoeis through natural
similes, the effect of which is to remind the audience that human
beings, while they strive for glory and honour, remain bound to the
end of all natural beings, which exist in an ongoing cycle of life and
death, in which impermanence of state is fundamental to human
10 Neal, Wounded Hero, 14–16. 11 Neal, Wounded Hero, 84–8.
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nature. Simoeis is not the only one deprived as a result of his death;
his parents’ deprivation, both of their child and of the ŁææÆ (care
given to a parent in old age), is palpable. Thus, wounding and death
are signiﬁcant not only for how they communicate the warrior’s good
character and endurance, but also for how they reveal the reality of
his mortal weakness and its meaning for the community, including
unalterable loss. Homer’s inclusion of Simoeis’ death into a larger
Greek narrative, however, makes his death part of an interpersonal
and public story. Narration does not grant permanence to his life, but
does move events that might otherwise have seemed to be contingent
into the realm of the necessary, as if Simoeis’ death has meaning
through its being linked meaningfully to other events in the Greek
story of war. In other words, even as Homer preserves the contingent
and accidental nature of battleﬁeld deaths, their narration also brings
each person’s life into relief through relation to a larger story
endowed with meaning and purpose.
Achilles’ shield also communicates this idea of the juxtaposition of
human impermanence and ﬂux with respect to particular persons or
even communities (XVIII. 474ff.). The activities described on the
shield, of course, are perennial human activities. Human agriculture,
marriage, war, birth, and death all will continue. However, particu-
larly in the context of a defeated Troy, where the Trojans will no
longer continue to participate in these activities as a uniﬁed commu-
nity, the permanence of these activities as human activities is not
necessarily reason for consolation.12 Indeed, if anything, the shield
that the immortal Hephaistos crafts for Achilles, who knows he is
destined to die when he kills Hektor, while bearing this shield, only
underscores the poignancy of Achilles’ mortality.13 This shield, while
it exhibits in its artistry the beauty of human life in all its variety,
ultimately cannot protect Achilles from his fated death.
Homer continues to describe Simoeis:
He dropped then to the ground in the dust, like some black poplar, which in
the land low-lying above a great marsh grows smooth trimmed yet with
branches growing at the uttermost tree-top; one whom a man, a maker of
chariots fells with the shining iron, to bend it into a wheel for a ﬁne-wrought
chariot, and the tree lies hardening by the banks of a river. (IV. 483–7)
12 Hammer, Iliad as Politics, 111–12.
13 Seth Schein, The Mortal Hero: An Introduction to Homer’s Iliad (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 142.
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Similar passages occur with relative frequency in the Iliad, for
example, when Alkathoos is introduced as beloved by the most
beautiful and gifted wife at home, just before he is struck down and
killed by a spear that penetrates the middle of his chest (XIII. 427–44).
Euphorbos, too, is described as akin to a ﬂower that brieﬂy blooms,
then is torn out of the ground and knocked down by the wind
(XVII. 52–60).
The emotional resonance of such passages for the poet’s audience
arises in part from the skilful contrast between the particular care
bestowed on an individual life, and the starkness of the abrupt
transition from life to death. The details of Simoeis as treasured
by his particular mother in his individual being contrast with the
description of his death and the possibility that in war his life was
simply used and then set aside once its utility had passed. Just as a
chariot maker might use part of a tree, and literally see ‘in’ the tree the
form of the not-yet-constructed wheel, Homer sets forth the possibil-
ity that Simoeis is part of an army where his life has been used more
narrowly for a brief military purpose, the way that a tree is merely one
small part of a chariot. The tree, once used for the chariot, is dis-
carded and left abandoned beside the river. Similarly, the poet sug-
gests, Simoeis is used for the war and then forgotten.
AsWeil has argued, the epic reveals how the force of war converts a
man from a person to a thing. She suggests two senses in which war
makes a thing out of a person: ‘Exercised to the limit, it turns man
into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him.’14
In a second, but equally poignant sense, force has the potential to
make warriors consider the enemy as a thing, an object rather than a
being deserving of dignity and respect. In addition, the possibility of
being set aside and forgotten after death is never fully overcome in the
Iliad.
While Weil captures the dehumanizing elements of war, other
elements of the epic seek to preserve the possibility of a respectful
response to the dead. The possibility of mere utility of soldiers is
tempered by two other, interrelated concepts that weave their way
through the Iliad: memory and narrative. Being remembered takes
place primarily through narrative and through the high respect
14 Simone Weil, ‘Iliad, or the Poem of Force’, 3. See also an excellent account of
Weil on the political force of words and listening in Dean Hammer and Michael
Kicey, ‘Simone Weil’s Iliad: The Power of Words’, Review of Politics 72 (2010), 79–96.
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offered to the dead at funeral rites. The importance and signiﬁcance
of caring for the body and mourning the dead in public is something
that Greeks and Trojans alike consider signiﬁcantly worthy of respect.
Both when Patroklos dies and when Hektor is ﬁnally to be buried, the
signiﬁcance of burial of the dead necessitates a break in the usual
structures of war and division of people into ally and enemy. The
rules of engagement include a space for the suspension of hostility so
that people may mourn.
The tradition of burying the dead and the signiﬁcance of ensuring
that each man is found and remembered lies on an even higher plane
of customary law for the two warring parties than does the outcome
of individual battles. When Hektor offers to ﬁght one on one with a
Greek in order to settle the war so that both sides can move on, he is
careful to set the condition that the winning side return the body of
the dead man so that the man’s life might be properly mourned:
If with the thin edge of the bronze he takes my life, then let him strip my
armor and carry it back to the hollow ships, but give my body to be taken
home again, so that the Trojans and the wives of the Trojans may give me in
death the rite of burning. But if I take his life, and Apollo grants me the glory,
I will strip his armor and carry it to sacred Ilion and hang it in front of the
temple of far-striking Apollo, but his corpse I will give back among the
strong-benched vessels so that the ﬂowing-haired Achaians may give him
due burial and heap up a mound upon him beside the broad passage of Helle.
(VII. 76–86)
Here Hektor recognizes the need for each side to give proper respect
to the dead, an ethical demand that will be violated later in Achilles’
harsh refusal to return Hektor’s body. The rituals and obligations
surrounding care of the dead require that even in the midst of war,
civilization cannot be set aside entirely.
Homer’s descriptions of human wounds, especially when set in
strong contrast to divine wounds, display several important features
of vulnerability. First, they highlight the interpersonal and political
nature of wounds suffered in battle. Menelaos and Agamemnon’s
mirroring of one another’s pain reﬂects the intertwining of the
interpersonal and political signiﬁcance of wounding. Menelaos’ pain
becomes Agamemnon’s suffering, albeit in a mediated form. Their
glances and words about the wound’s signiﬁcance deepen the bonds
between them. Second, human wounds become the occasion for
virtue in enduring suffering. While not all wounds result in death,
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that wounds are capable of resulting in death makes each wounding
an occasion for the display of personal virtue. However, Homer also
uses wounding as a reminder of human ﬁnitude and the real losses of
war, as well as virtue. Third, wounds serve as reminders of death’s
inevitable limit on every life. This ‘end’ or point of ﬁnitude provides
for the possibility of teleology. A story with a beginning, middle, and
end creates narrative meaning for human communities in a way that
divine wounds cannot. Vulnerability to wounding and death both
deepens interpersonal and political bonds and creates the possibility
of a meaningful narrative for those communities.
II
Homer’s link between the inevitability of mortality and the meaning
given by storytelling shapes even the larger structural elements of the
Iliad. Schein usefully provides a framework of two complementary
structural principles that guide the shape of the Iliad.15 First, he
suggests that the Iliad possesses a symmetrical style that grants it a
unity both within its individual passages and as a whole. As a whole,
the epic possesses a symmetry in which the events of the ﬁrst three
books are mirrored in the events of the last three, as in how Book I’s
Agamemnon refuses to accept the supplication of Chryses and refuses
to release his daughter for ransom, whereas in Book XXIV, Achilles
accepts Priam’s supplication and releases Hektor’s body. Similarly,
Book III features the duel of Menelaos and Paris, a theme reiterated in
Book XXII when Achilles and Hektor battle one on one.16 Many
individual passages also possess a static, circular, or parallel structure
such as a ‘ring’ structure that gives each passage coherence and
closure.
At the same time, Schein argues that much of the overall move-
ment of the Iliad is an inevitable, unstoppable movement toward
death and destruction, a movement seen in three distinct stages to
the structure of the Iliad. We might see the Iliad as divisible into three
sections, each of which features the virtues of the characters of
Diomedes, Patroklos, and Achilles, respectively. Whereas Diomedes
15 Schein, Mortal Hero, 30–6. 16 Schein, Mortal Hero, 31–2.
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is a traditional warrior with respect for the gods and his own mortal
limits, the character of Patroklos includes an element of dislocation
and loss of identity, as Patroklos puts on Achilles’ armour, is confused
with him by others, and seems immersed in the characteristically
aggressive manner of Achilles to press on even when the gods oppose
him. This movement toward death culminates as Achilles ﬁghts against
the river god, Skamander, proclaims that he would ﬁght even against
Apollo, were he able (XXII. 15), and eventually chooses death and
honour over life and dishonour.17 This movement is a one-way move-
ment, for death is not a state from which one can recover or return.
One might extend Schein’s idea further and suggest that this dual
structure of symmetrical and one-way movement characterizes some-
thing signiﬁcant about the inherent structure of human vulnerability
itself. On the one hand, we are all (like Achilles) bound for eventual
death. The end of the story for each human being is essentially the
same in that the narratives of our individual lives each come to an
end. Endings are often abrupt and unexpected, and have profound
consequences for families and communities. The temporal movement
of life forward, to one’s own death and through experiences of others’
deaths, is unavoidable. On the other hand, Achilles’ fundamental
decision is to make key choices that inﬂuence how his life’s story
will be told. It is in the narrative meaning that is imposed on a life—
especially, but not only, after the fact—that order and some degree of
closure can come into being. He must decide whether he wishes to
live a long, domestic, uneventful life, or a short but heroic one, and in
choosing his short life but heroic death, both his life and his manner
of death are tied to glory for Troy, and to his passionate, loyal
friendship for Patroklos. His choice is explicitly one that is made in
the light of what will be said about him, the meaning his life will take
on within a narrative context. That life, though abruptly ended in one
sense, is also given a structure and symmetry that his manner of death
imposes on the shape of the larger story. In fact, the narrative of his
life and death is not only what gives order to his own life; his story is
also the centre of the story of the Iliad itself, a story which provides an
entire community with a set of narrative meanings that ground its
social and political identity as Greek. This, too, seems to be a point
capable of extension to characterizing human vulnerability. While
17 Schein, Mortal Hero, 34–6.
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individual events in a life may seem meaningless or not to ﬁt into a
larger order at the moment, the narrative shaping and interconnec-
tion of events after they have passed, and especially after an individ-
ual’s death, lends an order to events not always discovered as they are
occurring. Particular events are connected to other events and per-
sons in a narrative structure that becomes meaningful for the larger
community that tells and hears the story.
Achilles’ vulnerability is the central condition not only of the
possibility of his own life’s meaning, but is also interwoven with the
meaningfulness of the community of the Greeks. Nagy’s well-known
portrayal of Achilles’ heroism, as located in his achievement of
honour in killing Hektor at the price of his own life, is an insightful
understanding of Achilles.18 But Homer tempers Achilles’ love of
honour with a portrayal of an Achilles who struggles with, and ﬁnally
reconciles, his sense of his own vulnerability and is able to connect his
acceptance of vulnerability to that of others. Vulnerability, too, is part
of Achilles’ virtue.19 Part of Achilles’ glory (and the glory of the
Greeks) lies in how Achilles comes to terms with his own ﬁnitude.
Golden argues that Achilles must learn to overcome a kind of ‘narcis-
sistic rage’ at suffering harm from Agamemnon; his generosity toward
Agamemnon in Book XXIII reﬂects the slow culmination of spiritual
and psychological development over the course of the Iliad.20
Indeed, Achilles’ internal growth is a central part of the epic’s
insight into vulnerability. I argue that Achilles must also come to
accept his powerlessness to prevent time from moving forward. Long
ago, Zielinski argued that even simultaneous time is represented se-
quentially in the Iliad.21 The sequential nature of narrative description
18 Gregory Nagy, The Best of the Achaeans (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1979); see also Michael Clarke, ‘Manhood and Heroism’, in R. Fowler (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
74–80.
19 Here I use the terms ‘hero’ and ‘heroism’ in conversation with Nagy’s use of the
term, that is, in an ethical sense and not in order to offer a historical analysis of literary
character.
20 Golden, Understanding the Iliad, 72–120.
21 Originally in Thaddaeus Zielinski, Die Behandlung Gleichzeitiger Ereignisse, im
Antiken Epos (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1901). Zielinski’s emphasis was on the ‘ﬂattening
out’ of simultaneous events, as he posited that Homer was incapable of describing
events simultaneously. However, my contention here is that the constant forward
movement of action in sequential fashion poetically emphasizes the shortness of time
and its forward movement.
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has the poetic effect of keeping the audience’s sense of time as
unremitting. The plot moves forward relentlessly as action follows
upon action, even in Achilles’ absence from the battleﬁeld and ﬁeld of
politics. Achilles not only feels his pride damaged; he also initially
resists the forward movement of time and remains in his anger about
the past. For a while, he even behaves as if time has been suspended in
his political and psychological removal from the Greeks, while phys-
ically being present in their midst. Only when he accepts the necessity
of the one-way directionality of time and embraces his own temporal
nature, can Achilles return to action.22
Nagy and Palmer have argued that Achilles’ name is etymologically
related to the concept of one who suffers pain or grief (¼Œ), both
over the loss of his honour in the conﬂict with Agamemnon and over
the death of Patroklos.23 If they are correct, then what implications
might Achilles’ name hold for understanding vulnerability in the
Iliad? I suggest that Achilles is emblematic of an individual who
struggles with pain and grief, at times responding to that grief
through withdrawal, at times with rage. His excellence is not found
in his achievements alone, nor only in his Œº. Instead, his virtue
lies in part in his responses to his vulnerability, and his eventual
acceptance of the inevitability of death and the loss of honour and
of friends as part of living well.24 His story gains signiﬁcance as
Homer’s audience sees the man struggle with dishonour, grief, and
his own mortality, ﬁnally successfully resolving that struggle by epic’s
end. Achilles’ ﬁnal integration of his own pain in a virtuous manner
takes place not primarily in his victory in battle, but rather in the meal
22 A fascinating account of the links between time and spatiality in Homer is to be
found in Clay’s analysis, which disputes Zielinkski’s prioritization of the temporal in
Homeric narrative. Using contemporary cognitive psychology as well as textual
analysis, Clay argues that the ‘space of the battleﬁeld’ has a priority over narrative
time. See Jenny Strauss Clay, Homer’s Trojan Theater: Space, Vision, and Memory in
the Iliad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also Alex Purves, Space
and Time in Ancient Greek Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
23 Palmer ﬁrst suggests that Achilles might have been a later combination of Akhi-
laos, or ‘he whose host of ﬁghting men has grief ’. See L. R. Palmer, The Interpretation
of Mycenean Greek Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). Nagy, Best of the
Achaeans, chapter 5, lays out the etymological evidence with clarity and makes
connections with the larger text of the Iliad.
24 Hence Weil writes, ‘Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and
knows how not to respect it, is capable of love and justice.’Weil, ‘Iliad, or the Poem of
Force’, 35.
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he shares with Priam after his rage is exhausted. Honour and victory
in battle remain important elements of the Homeric man of virtue,
but Homer also presents the need for a greater sense of vulnerability
on Achilles’ part as constitutive of ethical life. Achilles’ own sense of
vulnerability changes signiﬁcantly through the course of the epic, and
it is only at the epic’s end that Achilles willingly embraces the fullness
of his own vulnerable condition, and so also accepts that condition in
others.
When Achilles is still unwilling to go into battle, even after Aga-
memnon has promised him many gifts as recompense, his former
tutor and guardian, Phoenix, appeals to his own human weakness and
suffering as part of what binds Achilles to him, and what ought also to
bind Achilles to the other Argives who now suffer (IX. 438–95).
Phoenix retells the story of his own life’s events and how they resulted
in his care for Achilles: he himself had to ﬂee his own family and
country after sleeping with his father’s mistress as a result of his
mother’s pleading (IX. 446–56). While he loses a connection to his
own father, he describes Peleus as having received him as a father
does. In turn, Phoenix cared for Achilles as if he were his own son, a
bond that is strengthened by Phoenix’s inability to have children of
his own. Phoenix is clear that the suffering he experienced from his
childlessness is exactly what made the link to Achilles so strong, who
he says was meant to ‘keep hard afﬂiction from me’ (IX. 492–5).
Images of Phoenix cutting up Achilles’ meat into little edible chunks,
and wiping up spit-up wine from his own shirt further emphasize
Achilles’ childhood dependence on Phoenix. This reminder of his
dependence and weakness is clearly intended to soften Achilles’ heart.
He ends his story with a plea: ‘Then Achilles, beat down your anger. It
is not yours to have a pitiless heart’ (IX. 496–7).
In other words, Phoenix connects Achilles’ capacity to have pity for
the Achaians, who are now suffering in battle with the Trojans, to
Achilles’ own capacity for weakness, and memory of his own depend-
ence on others. Achilles needed others in order to survive, and the
clear message here is that others now depend upon him. But his
military strength and physical power are a less signiﬁcant reminder
of his military obligation than is his universally shared human de-
pendence on others, just as Phoenix’s deep bond of care for Achilles
itself stemmed from the loss of a father and the loss of being a father
to another.
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Phoenix’s description of his temptation to parricide there also
supports the larger theme of struggle with loss and suffering, although
lines IX. 458–61 are most likely not Homer’s own. While Plutarch
includes them in Mor. 26, these lines are absent from the larger
tradition of manuscripts and scholia.25 Nonetheless, even as later
interpolations, these lines only deepen the nuances of Phoenix’s
sympathy for Achilles’ internal struggles. There, Phoenix recalls his
desire to kill his own father in order to defend his mother, a decision
he was only prevented from carrying out by other relatives and their
pleadings. There, Phoenix is presented as sympathetic to human
weakness to anger in particular, and its limiting effects on rational,
moral action. It is precisely because of his shared experience of
dishonour and anger that Phoenix can speak to the same condition
in Achilles, both able to sympathize with him and also to recommend
a different course of action in the light of his past experience.
However ineffective Phoenix’s pleas are with Achilles, they are
bound to resonate with Homer’s audience. Among the charges lev-
elled at Achilles when he refuses to rejoin the Achaian community
and ﬁght against the Trojans is that he lacks care and pity (º). For
example, Nestor remarks, when Patroklos comes to visit the wounded
who are resting on the ships, that Achilles is pitiless (XI. 664). His lack
of care for his friends is directly paired with his lack of pity in Nestor’s
comments. The meaning of º in Homer is notably controversial.
Konstan, for example, offers a more cognitive approach to pity, citing
Aristotle’s requirement that one be capable of understanding one’s
own vulnerability as a condition of its practice (Rhetoric 2. 8). Bur-
kert, in contrast, argues that pity in Homer means acting in a par-
ticular way, rather than experiencing a particular emotion; in his
view, expressions of pity are intended to communicate acting merci-
fully toward others.26 Both the expression of actions of mercy and
feelings of pain for others seem to be facets of º over time.
25 My argument does not depend upon the inclusion of lines 458–61, but as some
authors, such as M. L. West’s Teubner edition, do include them, it is worth noting
their effect on the larger arc of Phoenix’s claims regarding how his past suffering and
anger informed his later care for Peleus and Achilles. For a more extensive argument
on the difﬁculties surrounding IX. 458–61, see Bryan Hainsworth (ed.), The Iliad:
A Commentary, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 123. See also
Jasper Grifﬁn, Iliad, Book Nine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
26 David Konstan, Pity Transformed (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2001) and
David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Greek
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As Homer offers no explicitly philosophical account of pity, its
meaning is inevitably more diffuse than in Aristotle’s careful and
nuanced account (which is taken up extensively in Chapter 3 in
relation to the Philoctetes). For example, even the gods, who cannot
fully sympathize with the situation of a dying man, take pity on
human beings. At the start of Book XV, Zeus observes the wounded
Hektor, struggling for breath and vomiting blood, and takes pity
(KºÅ	) on him (XV. 9–12). His pity is quickly followed with his
realization that Hera has deceived him, in seducing him and inducing
sleep so that Hektor might be wounded away from Zeus’ sight, and he
becomes angry with her. While he threatens to use his anger against
Hera, in the end, his sense of pity for Hektor has a higher priority
than his anger in action: Hektor is given a second wind and allowed to
achieve greater glory before his destined end. Zeus’ pity cannot arise
from the possibility of imagining himself in Hektor’s situation; yet,
that he struggles with the conﬂicting demands of anger and pity
suggests an emotional component to pity here.
Zeus’ resolution of his own anger in favour of pity is particularly
striking since Achilles must manage essentially the same sort of
internal conﬂict. His continued anger at Agamemnon and feelings
of betrayal initially overcome his sense of pity and friendship for his
fellow Achaians, as Nestor’s comment cited above makes clear. How-
ever, Achilles does not resolve his own conﬂict as rapidly as does
Zeus. As Achilles slowly acknowledges and accepts his own vulner-
ability and that of others—particularly in the loss of Patroklos—his
capacity to feel pity is actualized. To this extent, Achilles seems to act
in accordance with the general Aristotelian point that awareness of
one’s own vulnerability to suffering is a necessary condition for experi-
encing pity for others, in human (though not divine) experience.
Schein has argued that Achilles’ return to ﬁght among the Greeks
and become part of the social community again begins in part when
in Book XI he observes the wounded being carried away.27 In par-
ticular, the wounding of the healer Machaon arouses Achilles’
Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); W. Burkert, ‘Zum altgrie-
chischen Mitleidsbegriff ’ (Erlangen: Inaugural-Dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander-
Universität, 1955), 69–72, citing Il. V. 561, 610; XVII. 346, 352; Burkert cited in
Elizabeth Belﬁore, ‘Review of David Konstan, Pity Transformed ’, Bryn Mawr Classical
Review 14 April 2002, accessed online at <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2002/2002-04-
14.html>, 21 August 2010.
27 Schein, Mortal Hero, 117.
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interest, and so he sends Patroklos to go to Nestor to ﬁnd out the
identity of the unknown wounded man. Machaon’s identity as a
healer seems to have a special bearing on Patroklos’ interest as well.
Only a few minutes earlier, the narrator declares that Machaon’s
injury is particularly hard to bear because he is the one who heals
others: ‘A healer is a man worth many men in his knowledge of
cutting out arrows and putting kindly medicine on wounds’
(XI. 514–15). Patroklos, too, seems to be deeply affected by the
prospect of a wounded healer. For Machaon’s wounds open up the
possibility that the wounds of others no longer will be healed if he
dies. His vulnerability has a direct effect on the vulnerability of others.
Patroklos is responsive to the demands of the immediate situation as
he recognizes that time is essential, and heals those whom Machaon
cannot attend.
In contrast, Achilles has acted as though he has all the time in the
world to decide whether and when he might return to ﬁght with the
Achaians, as if time were somehow suspended, or the war remained at
the same point in his absence. One such display of his utter removal is
the scene of Achilles idly singing and playing the lyre while the war
continues on (IX. 185). While Achilles is singing of heroes, the
speciﬁc content of Achilles’ song is absent from the narrative. One
effect of its absence from the narration communicates that no content
can compare with the sound of the war surrounding him.
Only when Achilles confronts and acknowledges that time con-
tinues and the effects of war continue, regardless of his own removal,
does Achilles rejoin the battle. While his return only takes place after
Patroklos’ death, his witnessing of Machaon’s wounding and enquiry
into the identity of the wounded suggest a start of his awareness of the
forward motion of the war. Achilles must learn to accept the sense in
which human life moves always forward, and cannot return to the
past. While the immortals can step aside, return to Mount Olympus,
and play music while the wars continue, for Achilles to remove
himself does not cease the war itself. Sending Patroklos in his stead
to ﬁnd out the identity of the wounded man initially serves as a half-
hearted substitute for his own engagement, until Patroklos ﬁnally dies
in his place, wearing his armour, and Achilles can avoid the war’s
forward movement no longer.
Vulnerability and temporality are here interlinked. The wounding
and deaths of others are powerful reminders that time moves forward
and that temporality cannot be escaped, as Patroklos recognizes but
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Achilles seemingly cannot. Achilles’ singing away from the other
Greeks while the war rages on is not simply a sign of his anger; it is
also a refusal to acknowledge the movement forward of his own
community’s situation, as the war continues and deaths mount
whether he participates or not. Achilles refuses to acknowledge a
kind of vulnerability to time itself; such avoidance has profoundly
negative political consequences. Saxonhouse has argued that part of
what Achilles must learn is that the inequitable distribution of goods
and honours is part of ordinary human life and must be accepted as
an inevitable limit.28 Achilles refuses to accept ordinary limit in his
demand for justice for the slight against him; this avoidance of limit
extends even into an avoidance of the temporal itself.
In contrast, after Patroklos discovers Machaon’s identity, he en-
gages with the wounded before him. Patroklos takes on his work in
tending to the wounded Eurypylus. Patroklos is an interesting ﬁgure
at this juncture in the poem, as in turn he takes on two different and
even diametrically opposed identities: ﬁrst, that of the gentle healer,
when he takes the place of Machaon, then that of wrathful warrior,
when he puts on Achilles’ armour and ﬁghts. As Briseis remarks later
over Patroklos’ corpse, Patroklos was an exceptionally gentle man by
nature. But we also see his capacity for fury in battle as he kills many
Trojans with ﬁerceness reminiscent of that of Achilles before meeting
his death. Twice Patroklos takes on the social role of another member
of the community in their absence: in the healer Machaon and the
warrior Achilles.
Perhaps surprisingly, these warrior and healing roles are connected
not only in Patroklos, but also potentially in Achilles. Patroklos
possesses the technical ability to tend to Eurypylus’ wound because
of his link to Achilles. Eurypylus says that Patroklos can help him
since Achilles knows which medicines to place on the wound once it
has been cleaned because the centaur Cheiron told him of these
medicines (XI. 830–1). Patroklos’ own knowledge of healing comes
from Achilles. Patroklos remarks that while he is en route to deliver a
message to Achilles, he will delay his return in order to tend to
Eurypylus. He remarks, ‘I will not leave you in your afﬂiction,’ before
proceeding to remove the arrow, clean the wound, and apply a root
28 Arlene Saxonhouse, ‘Thumos, Justice, and Moderation of Anger in the Story of
Achilles’, in Catherine Zuckert (ed.), Understanding the Political Spirit (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988).
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that makes pain disappear. Patroklos tends not merely to the healing
of the wound, but also to Eurypylus’ need for attention and the relief
of pain. He ‘entertains him with words’ and rests in his tent, despite
Achilles’ expectation that Patroklos will return with news from the
front (XV. 393–5). He only leaves Eurypylus in order to go to
persuade Achilles to re-enter the war, in the hope that ‘the persuasion
of a friend’ might induce Achilles to do so (XV. 404). Thus, he shows
his ability to be responsive to time and to act as is appropriate to the
present moment, displaying a kind of moral kairos that Achilles
seems to lack.
Although much has been said about how Patroklos’ death fore-
shadows the death of Achilles,29 much less has been said about the
link between Patroklos and Achilles and those with knowledge of
healing, no doubt because Achilles has seemingly abandoned an
interest in participating in the activity of healing others. To this
extent, Patroklos integrates his role as healer and as warrior in a
way that Achilles seemingly cannot, realizing the interconnectedness
of wounds and healing and their mutual centrality to human experi-
ence. Achilles, while possessing the formal knowledge of some medi-
cine, lacks a strong sense of care that Patroklos possesses. He ceases to
act on his knowledge of healing, denying the reality of others’ vulner-
ability until Patroklos’ death. At the same time, his continued anger at
his mistreatment by Agamemnon also paralyses his participation in
the battle as a warrior, in a way that is not true for Patroklos. Only
when Patroklos dies—exhibiting his vulnerability and the impossi-
bility of delaying time and the war’s forward motion—does Achilles
return to being a man of action.
Patroklos exhibits a kind of care for community that is linked to a
sense of his own vulnerability that Achilles lacks, immediately before
he dons Achilles’ armour and ﬁghts on behalf of his friend. Patroklos
recognizes that there is something inhuman about Achilles even in his
pleas that Achilles return to battle. He challenges Achilles: ‘Pitiless:
the rider Peleus was never your father nor Thetis was your mother but
it was the grey sea that bore you and the towering rocks, so sheer the
heart in you is turned from us’ (XVI. 33–5). Here, Patroklos questions
whether Achilles is really human, or as unmoving as a stone or water,
which endure far longer than human life, but which lack any sense of
29 For example, see Nagy, Best of the Achaeans, 33.
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connection to others. That is, the image of towering rocks makes an
appeal to Achilles to remember that he is not as invulnerable as stone,
and that it is exactly his sense of his own humanity and connection to
others that ought to lead him to feel pity again.
Patroklos pleads with Achilles at least to allow him to borrow his
armour and enter the battle as if he were Achilles, not out of a desire
for his own glory, but to be a ‘light’ to the other warriors. He sees
Achilles as a potential symbol of hope and rejuvenation, even as
Achilles continues to mull over his wounded honour. Achilles agrees
to the plan so that he might gain glory and honour, but even those
only become means of somehow gaining more gifts and more recog-
nition from others in the community of the terrible wrong done to
him by Agamemnon. Achilles is literally lost in this past slight, and
seemingly cannot move forward from this event, until he feels that it
is rectiﬁed. His ºª about his own life is shaped entirely by his
immediate Ł, and that Ł keeps Achilles oriented to the
past.30 Achilles demands that Patroklos only make an appearance
rather than ﬁght the Trojans, presumably partly out of a sense of
protection for Patroklos, but also out of a strange fantasy that all the
other Greeks might die, so that he and Patroklos alone might defeat
Troy (XVI. 97–100). Thus his disengagement with the present also
results in an unrealistic understanding of his own and his commu-
nity’s future.
Patroklos’ role in the Iliad partly functions to highlight a similar
division within Achilles, one that he is unable to bridge within himself
in an integrated way. For much of the Iliad, Achilles is unable to make
sense of his vulnerability and mortality in a way that gives ordered
meaning to his life. He realizes that honour in battle, and glory, while
goods, do not diminish the ﬁnality of life, nor do they replace the evil
that is the loss of life. While Achilles’ view of honour is tested when
Agamemnon unjustly takes away the spoils of war from him, this
difﬁculty with the ﬁckleness of honour is linked to Achilles’ sense of
his mortality and displacement from the community. Achilles is
correct that honour and glory are not lasting, and are capable of
30 See P. Christopher Smith, ‘Nietzsche and Gadamer: From Strife to Understand-
ing, Achilles/Agamemnon to Achilles/Priam’, Continental Philosophy Review 35
(2002), 379–96. Smith demonstrates how Achilles’ argument with Agamemnon is
grounded entirely in Ł. I would suggest that Phoenix recognizes that Ł is at
the root of his ideas, so makes an appeal to Ł, not reason alone, in attempting to
persuade Achilles.
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being lost as easily as they are gained. This poses a real dilemma for
Achilles, for he is neither respected for his leadership by Agamem-
non, nor as a leader is he obliged to obey some higher authority, for
example, as Achilles’ own soldiers must dutifully obey him. Achilles’
source of meaning in honour and social bond has been violated. He
refuses to pay the price or make the sacriﬁce of risking his life for an
unknown or at least unstable reward. Achilles’ absence from the battle
to some extent staves off, but does not solve, his difﬁculty in resolving
meaning in life in the light of the limitedness of glory and honour.31
Patroklos’ death, however, forces Achilles to encounter his difﬁculty,
rather than remaining in a place where it can be perpetually avoided.
As Hammer phrases it, when confronted with the body of Patroklos,
Achilles ﬁnds that he can no longer act as one who is self-sufﬁcient,
but ‘now places his life in a relational context’.32 But his return to the
war does not resolve, but at ﬁrst only exacerbates, his dilemma, as
Achilles moves from complacency to rage.
Even in mourning Patroklos, Achilles denies his ability to be
affected by his mortality. After Patroklos’ death, he responds to
Odysseus’ encouragement to eat with the claim that they ought
all—not only he, Achilles, but all the Achaians!—to go forth into
battle without eating until Patroklos’ death has been paid for
(XIX. 205–14). Odysseus kindly reminds him that men cannot ﬁght
ably when hungry: no matter how ready their hearts may be for battle,
their limbs will grow weary if not well fed. But he also adds, somewhat
more starkly, ‘we must harden our hearts and bury the man who dies,
when we have wept over him on the day, and all those who are left
about from the hateful work of war must remember food and drink’
(XIX. 228–31).
In other words, acceptance of a fallen friend’s death is necessary for
continuing on in life. The dead body before the completion of a
funeral is in a liminal condition, between life and the ﬁnality of
death, from the point of view of the mourners. In being present to
the body, the mourners are also in this liminal space.33 But the liminal
31 Note, for example, how Achilles fails to respond to Odysseus’ entreaties to pity
him, which Hammer suggests is due to Achilles’ belief that suffering for others no
longer holds moral worth, now that his honour is not respected by others. See
Hammer, Iliad as Politics, chapter 4.
32 Hammer, Iliad as Politics, 178.
33 James Redﬁeld, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 181–2.
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nature of mourning in a ritualized time and space has a purpose,
which is eventually to allow forward movement. The mourning,
sacriﬁce, and even meals that the mourners eat serve in part to
memorialize and to honour the dead. However, these same activities
also allow for a bounded space for grief for the living so that mourners
can eventually move to other activities and relationships, integrating
past relationships and events into a new reality. Achilles continues to
resist this forward movement. He refuses to eat, and eventually
Athena feeds him ambrosia in his sleep, so that he will have the
strength to ﬁght.
To this extent, Achilles acts as though he is not an embodied being.
His foreknowledge of his own death, that it will follow swiftly upon
Hektor’s death, allows him to escape Odysseus’ difﬁcult, but realistic,
claim that part of the task of living is to mourn and thenmove forward
with life in part through leaving behind (at least to some extent) the
dead. Later, when Achilles does begin to move forward, he allows the
fullness of rage to consume him in battle; the poet’s voice describes
him as ‘more than human’. For example, in Book XX, as the poet
describes Achilles’ swift killing of one Trojan after another, he adds,
‘As inhuman ﬁre sweeps on in fury through the deep angles of a
drywood mountain and sets ablaze the depth of the timber and the
blustering wind lashes the ﬂame along, so Achilleus swept everywhere
with his spear like something more than a mortal (Æ
Ø) harrying
them as they died, and the black earth ran blood’ (XX. 490–4).
Homer’s description of Achilles as like a Æ
 implies that Achilles
behaves as though he is something other than human, a Æ
 or
spirit, a part of the supernatural world. Yet, the truth of his existence
is his mortality; he is not a Æ
, as he will soon ﬁnd out in the
encounter with the true river Æ
, Skamander. Although Achilles is
descended from the goddess Thetis, her immortality does not protect
him here. Still, Achilles rages after the Trojans, demanding that their
deaths pay for his friend Patroklos’ death, but his words indicate that
he knows no payment will sufﬁce to rectify the loss. When Lykaon, a
former slave who had once before been captured and sold by Achilles,
meets him again, Achilles is merciless to the suppliant man. But his
speech is strangely tinged with the claim that they are still friends, even
at the moment that he kills him:
Now there is not one who can escape death, if the gods send him against my
hands in front of Ilion, not one of all the Trojans and beyond others the
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children of Priam. So friend (ç
º), you die also. Why all this clamour about
it? Patroklos is also dead, who was better by far than you are, and born of a
great father, and the mother who bore me immortal? Yet even I have also my
death and my strong destiny, and there shall be a dawn or an afternoon or a
noontime when some man in the ﬁghting will take the life from me also
either with a spearcast or an arrow ﬂown from the bowstring. (XXI. 103–13)
Achilles addresses Lykaon as a friend, a ç
º. What kind of ‘friend-
ship’ is this, between a man twice captured by Achilles in war, now
sent to his death to pay a ransom for the death of Patroklos? Achilles’
chilling words suggest that he sees all human beings as sharing a
common friendship in violent death. Just as Patroklos shall die, so
shall Lykaon, and eventually Achilles, too. Achilles deﬁnes his and
others’ lives’ meanings in terms of their inexorable movement to
death, not only death generally, but the violent death that charac-
terizes much of male life in this time of war. Achilles is not angry
speciﬁcally at Lykaon, so much as determined to ‘resolve’ the conﬂict
between ﬁnding life meaningful and accepting human death, by
participating as much as possible in the futile, angry violence, as if
by embracing its futility more fully and more passionately, he might
somehow defeat its power. He understands meaning to be found in
brute power, as when he remarks to a descendant of the river god
after slaughtering him that, as a descendant of Zeus, he surely would
win, since Zeus is more powerful than a river god, and so he as his
descendant must also win over any descendant of the river.
That Achilles battles with a river god, Skamander, is not surprising,
as a river embodies constant change. Each time that Achilles tries to
ﬁght against the river, he ﬁnds himself defeated precisely by the river’s
ability to change shape, to produce a wave above him, to crest where
he does not expect a wave to crest, or to wear out his knees with its
constant ﬂow (XXI. 233–72). Achilles eventually feels as though he
were reduced to being only a boy by the river’s power, and indeed,
there is a good deal of truth in his proclamation that he is childlike
and helpless against the torrent of the river. The torrent, not only of
the river, but of many events outside of his control—beginning with
his loss of Briseis and social place, through his close friend’s death,
and his own powerlessness over his destiny to die once he kills
Hektor—all overwhelm Achilles, who now can no longer believe
that his power to kill can rescue him from his true powerlessness in
the face of death. His strength serves him no more, and it is only the
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reassurances and actions of Poseidon, Athena, Hera, and Hephaistos
that stop Skamander.
Achilles, of course, is brutal with Hektor as well, refusing Hektor’s
civilized offer to promise one another to return one another’s bodies.
Achilles refuses, promising him that he will not return the body, and
when he begins the ﬁght, it is to Ares—the god of irrational, raging
war—and not Athena, that he appeals. When Hektor dies, Achilles
drags his vanquished opponent’s body around Troy, in full view of
everyone. The seriousness of Hektor’s lack of a funeral is emphasized
in Andromache’s fainting and mourning the unperformed rites for
his body, a description that occurs immediately before Patroklos’
funeral rites, as if to emphasize the inhuman nature of Achilles’
treatment of the corpse.
It is only when Patroklos appears to Achilles as a ghost, and asks
speciﬁcally to be buried, so that his soul might pass over to Hades,
that Achilles begins to resolve his inner conﬂict about mortality.
Patroklos’ account of his need to cross over, and to be buried, is
also indicative of Achilles’ need to allow Patroklos to move from the
realm of life into a death from which he will not return. Achilles ﬁnds
this experience of an apparition, or dream, sufﬁcient to allow him
ﬁnally to bury Patroklos, and accept the reality of his friend’s death.
His acceptance of loss and the inability to withstand the forward
movement of time allows Achilles to sympathize with Priam and
ﬁnally to return Hektor’s body.
III
The decision to return Hektor’s body and to host Priam is key to
Achilles’ resolution of his difﬁculty with vulnerability. Homer dra-
matically gives force to the meal as the pinnacle of Achilles’ resolution
of his internal strife.34 Just as Achilles allows himself to eat for the ﬁrst
time at Patroklos’ funerary rites, we see Achilles eat with his enemy.
34 For an excellent account of the development of relationship between Achilles
and Priam, see Marjolein Oele, ‘Suffering, Pity and Friendship: An Aristotelian
Reading of Book 24 of Homer’s Iliad ’, Electronic Antiquity 14 (1) (November 2010),
52–65. I am deeply indebted to many of her insights, which have been inﬂuential for
my own thinking on the passage. See also Rachel Bespaloff ’s ‘Priam and Achilles
Break Bread’, in Weil and Bespaloff, War and the Iliad, 79–85.
30 Woundedness, Narrative, and Community
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
When Priam comes to retrieve Hektor’s body, Achilles acknowledges
a need for food and the continuance of life, not only for himself, but
also for his vanquished opponent.35 This moment of offering food to
Priam is the moment in which Achilles in deed acknowledges his
shared mortality with his enemy, and so also acknowledges it to
himself. It is at precisely this moment that Achilles is able to be
humane, and also able to be more fully human.
Eating is an acknowledgement of mortal dependence on what
changes in the world of the Iliad. Homer is explicit about the relation
between the food of human beings and human mortality when the
gods remark that they ought not to be too deeply invested in mortal
beings’ affairs. Apollo cautions Poseidon:
Shaker of the earth, you would have me be as one without prudence if I am to
ﬁght even you for the sake of insigniﬁcant mortals, who are as leaves are, and
now ﬂourish and grow warm with life, and feed on what the ground gives,
but then again fade away and are dead. Therefore let us with all speed give up
this quarrel and let the mortals ﬁght their own battles. (XI. 462–7)
Apollo sees human mortality as linked to the mortality of plant and
animal life. The food that they eat is one living thing that dies in order
to sustain the life of another, who himself is also destined to die.36 To
eat, then, is to acknowledge one’s dependence on the body, and one’s
link to other mortal beings. To share a meal with another also
connotes intimacy with another who is mortal, like oneself. While
earlier Achilles had spoken of his Œº as that which will be unfailing
(literally IçŁ
, or ‘unwilting’),37 Achilles’ virtue also includes
acknowledgement of the value of that which does wilt, die, wither.
In the ﬁnal scene, the temporary and mortal meaning of food inter-
sects with the cultural and lasting ritualizations of hospitality and a
shared meal. Only in the sharing of conversation and eating with
Priam do we ﬁnally see Achilles come to terms with his mortality, and
return to a life of a mortal, social, political being.
35 Redﬁeld suggests that the warrior in the Iliad has left culture and entered into
nature; in this scene, Achilles returns to civilization and its rituals. See Redﬁeld,
Nature and Culture, 218–23.
36 See Neal, Wounded Hero, 156–7.
37 Nagy connects Homer’s use of IçŁ
 to a direct opposition of what is çŁØ—
i.e., a root of terms used to denote the decay of plant life, for example, Pindar’s usage of
the wilting of crops in the Paen 9. 14. See Nagy, Best of the Achaeans, 176 and 183–6.
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Priam comes to Achilles in supplication for his son’s body, which
Achilles has agreed to give up after his mother Thetis sends word that
Zeus demands it. Priam compares himself to Achilles’ own father:
‘Honour then the gods, Achilleus, and take pity (KºÅ	) upon me
remembering your father, yet I am still more pitiful (KºØæ);
I have gone through what no other mortal on earth has gone through;
I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my children’
(XXIV. 503–6).
The effect on Achilles is to grieve for his own father, the poet tells
us. Achilles ﬁnally experiences pity. His pity arises primarily not from
an intellectual or moral claim that Priam ought to have his son’s body
back. Instead, Achilles experiences pity when he willingly encounters
his own and his father’s pain and can relate that pain back to Priam’s
pain as a father. Achilles makes a double move of identifying not only
with his own father’s sorrow that will result from his own death, but
also with Priam as akin to Achilles’ father.38 In other words, Achilles
feels pain on behalf of his father in anticipation of his own death. This
anticipatory grief opens up a space that allows Achilles also to feel
pain for Priam and so to experience pity.39 His act of engaging in
sympathetic grief is an essentially social move that allows Achilles to
engage with the meaning of his own death—and life—from the point
of view of being his father’s beloved son. Achilles can see his own life’s
worth not simply in terms of its termination, that is, not simply in
terms of his death. His understanding of himself as the son of Peleus
is also his acceptance of his identity as a mortal man. Notably, he does
not mourn for Thetis, his immortal mother, and her impending loss,
but for Peleus, his mortal father. His grief for himself as a mortal man
is intertwined with his grief for Patroklos (see XXIV. 508–12).40
What is moving and surprising is that Priam effectively stands in
for Achilles’ father in his absence. Priam becomes, in the eyes of
Achilles, akin to his own father mourning his death, while Priam
mourns the loss of Hektor in the presence of his son’s killer, who is
also destined soon to die. Priam and Achilles thus stand in a sort of
38 Oele, ‘Suffering, Pity’, 9.
39 Kevin Crotty, The Poetics of Supplication: Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 70–88.
40 As Zanker argues, once Patroklos dies, Achilles exhibits more than any other
character a desire for Œº that is grounded in affective bonds to others, and not
merely glory that is centred around himself. See Zanker, Heart of Achilles, chapter 3.
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mournful imitation of a father–son relationship.41 Homer remarks,
‘The sound of their mourning moved in the house’ (XXIV. 512),
further underscoring the imagery of Priam and Achilles sharing a
house together, through a kind of unity that is reached only in the
acknowledgement of each of their losses. Such unity arises only
through a shared experience of pain and acceptance of suffering as
the plight of all mortals.42
Notably, Achilles, whom Homer had referred to time and time
again as pitiless, is said to take ‘the old man by the hand, and set him
on his feet again, in pity for the grey hair and the grey beard’
(XXIV. 516).43 He arranges for Hektor’s body to be returned, and
then invites Priam to eat with him, though he himself had refused to
eat after Patroklos’ death before. He states the demand that they eat in
the ﬁrst person plural: ‘Come then, we also, aged magniﬁcent sir,
must remember to eat, and afterwards you may take your beloved son
back to Ilion, and mourn for him; and he will be much lamented’
(XXIV. 617–20). This same Achilles, who had refused to eat in grief
for Patroklos, now eats a meal with another who has suffered a similar
loss, and encourages Priam to do the same.44 Achilles displays what
Zanker helpfully terms ‘magnanimity’.45 He offers the example of
Niobe, the mourning mother turned to stone by Zeus because she
refused to stop mourning, and so remained forever in her unchanged
state.46 Like Niobe, Achilles and Priam alike will soon come to an end;
41 Interestingly, Hermes also likens Priam to a beloved father in Book XXIV
(XXIV. 371). See Pratt, ‘Parental Ethos’, 39 for her insightful analysis of the ethos of
parent–child relationships in the Iliad.
42 See also Jinyo Kim, The Pity of Achilles: Oral Style and the Unity of the Iliad
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2000), 146–51.
43 Oele notes the beautiful combination of intimacy and distance in Achilles’
taking of Priam’s hand, and his later pushing him away. As she argues, their relation-
ship moves in the direction of almost a sort of friendship through their intimate
sharing of suffering here. See Oele, ‘Suffering, Pity’, especially 61–3. Hammer also
emphasizes the sense in which mutual grief opens up for Achilles the possibility of
imagining his father Peleus’ grief. He thus becomes vulnerable also to his own father’s
suffering. See Hammer, Iliad as Politics, 182–7.
44 Here eating itself functions as an act of union. See Jasper Grifﬁn, Homer on Life
and Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 16.
45 See Zanker, Heart of Achilles, 127.
46 Malcolm Wilcock, A Companion to the Iliad (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1976), 272–3. AsWilcock explains, Homer is inventive here in his tale of Niobe,
as the ordinary story would not allow for her to eat or dry her tears, since Zeus turned
her to stone. Such a retelling only underscores the Homeric point that eating requires
a kind of engagement with temporality.
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but they also must eat, and continue to participate in the activity of
human life and the communion of other persons, lest they become no
more than stones.
As they eat, they gaze upon one another, focusing not upon one
another’s grief, but upon the other’s beauty: Priam sees Achilles as
possessing looks akin to a god, and Achilles in turn sees the brave
look in Priam’s face.47 In gazing at one another, each participant sees
not only the other, but also the other’s apprehension of himself.
Achilles can see not only that Priam suffers, but also that Priam is
appreciative of Achilles’ own suffering. Priam recognizes his own
courage through observing its apprehension in Achilles’ expression.
This mutual gaze allows each to see in the other a being with worth
and value, even in the midst of great suffering; to some extent, we
might say that the mutuality of the gaze, which both must have
recognized, also conﬁrms each man’s own worth when his enemy
thus looks upon him in wonder. Here Homer’s poetic voice moves
away from formal, ritual elements of hospitality to a description of
this interpersonal encounter between two particular individuals.
Indeed, words themselves seem to have limited value for Achilles
and Priam, and are replaced with the simple actions of eating and
looking at one another. The value of the mutual gaze emphasizes
more than a cultural practice; Homer presents the mutual vulnerabil-
ity of two human beings to one another. Bespaloff suggests that the
beauty of Achilles itself is a moment of redemption, insofar as his
beauty touches something of the eternal in the midst of the temporal
and ﬂeeting.48 And it is in this affective sympathy for one another that
the possibility of a rational resolution of the proper disposal of
Hektor’s body becomes a reality; the emotional interactions of the
two quiet Achilles’ rage, and make possible dialogue with Priam.49
Such an interaction between the gods and human beings, or even
between gods, seems almost unimaginable, for the gods are untouched
by the depth of suffering experienced here, since any moment of pain
remains only a moment in eternity.
47 As Pratt notes, the narrator here also emphasizes how god-like Priam is. Pratt,
‘Parental Ethos’, 40. Oele, ‘Suffering, Pity’, 62–3.
48 Bespaloff, ‘Priam and Achilles Break Bread’, 83.
49 Here I think Smith is entirely correct in suggesting that Achilles’ struggle over
whether to return the body to Priam is not about intellectual assent to beliefs or
propositions, but an internal struggle of emotions. See Smith, ‘Nietzsche and Gada-
mer’, 391–3.
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Achilles gives Priam a place to sleep, and guarantees a space of
twelve days in which to mourn Hektor, before which he will not allow
the Achaians to disturb the Trojans. As we know, the Iliad ends not
with the sacking of Troy, although the audience knows this will
inevitably occur, but rather with the ongoing practice of human life
in the midst of death. While Homer points to the defeat of Troy and
the death of Achilles, the resolution of the epic ends with a shared
meal between enemies and the remembrance of Hektor. Like the art
of Achilles’ shield, and its engagement with human life in its joys and
sorrows, Homer’s poetic art allows life to continue on for the living.
The vulnerability of human life, while acknowledged to contain much
suffering and pain, is also afﬁrmed as the locus of social life not only
in the funeral rites, but also in these simple social acts of eating and
conversation that require an afﬁrmation of life even in the midst of
loss and destruction.
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2Oedipus and Theseus at the Crossroads
Oedipus Rex is a play about the limits of human wisdom, one that
explores the themes of ignorance, knowledge, and knowledge of one’s
own ignorance as a kind of wisdom through multiple metaphors. One
such metaphor is the theme of blindness and its accompanying
wounds. To begin, Oedipus claims that the blind Teiresias is blind
not only in sight, but also with respect to his prophecies, when we
know that the sighted Oedipus is blind. And we also know that it is
after Oedipus learns the truth that he will lose his sight, and be
blinded at his own hands. At the beginning of Oedipus Rex, we ﬁnd
a king who is physically sighted but morally blind, and by the end of
Oedipus Colonus, we ﬁnd a man who lacks sight, but has gained some
moral insight. More importantly, we ﬁnd in the character of Theseus
a man whose moral insight exceeds that of Oedipus himself, and yet,
whose moral sightedness and compassion depend on an encounter
with this blind man, whose strangeness also opens up for Theseus his
own previous encounter with strangeness and estrangement. This
chapter examines two forms of vulnerability in these plays: vulner-
ability to ignorance, and vulnerability to the stranger. While in
Oedipus Rex, Oedipus falls as a result of his ignorance of his own
identity, in Colonus, Oedipus’ status as a  leads to the protection
and integration of political community.
We ﬁnd in Oedipus an ambiguity: the question as to whether he is
one who can ‘see’ or not.1 Oedipus has his physical sight, but lacks not
only knowledge of his status as the polluted one, but also knowledge
of the complexities of human life that might bring compassion to bear
on a polluted man. Oedipus is harsh in his judgement of the
1 Jennifer Ballengee, The Wound and the Witness: The Rhetoric of Torture (New
York: SUNY Press, 2009), 45–8.
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mysterious polluted one, demanding that he not only be exiled from
the community—by itself not a particularly harsh punishment—but
also adding that the man be refused even the smallest cup of water by
any of its citizens. Even Creon, who takes over the throne initially with
reluctance, later exhibiting a capacity for inﬂexibility, cannot bear to
banish Oedipus on the king’s terms. At the same time, Oedipus has the
counsel of a ﬁgure who is his inverse, the blind Teiresias, who lacks
physical sight but can see, can know who Oedipus is, and what it will
mean for the city—for Sophocles makes good use of the dual senses of
rÆ as both ‘I know’ and ‘I see’. Teiresias is more willing to see how
things play themselves out, and not to hurry fate along by revealing
Oedipus to himself. Only whenOedipus mocks Teiresias does Teiresias
turn against him, and retreat from being his counsel right when
Oedipus most needs good counsel. When Oedipus discovers that the
polluted man is himself, when he is no longer blind to his own identity,
he says, ‘Light, may I now look at you for the last time. I have been
brought to light as cursed inmy birth, cursed in mywedlock, and in my
killing’ (1183–5).2 He thereby draws together his ‘sight’ of himself, to
the sight of knowledge, and longing for the darkness. Oedipus longs for
not only blindness, but also what it comes to signify for him: a longed-
for ignorance of terrible acts that cannot be un-known.
Oedipus’ predicament raises immediately for an audience member
of Oedipus Rex the question of responsibility for wisdom, or its lack.
The play raises a number of questions about knowledge, especially
self-knowledge, and whether we can fully know even ourselves. For
example, ought Oedipus to have realized that he was the true killer?
Could he be expected to know that he would kill his own father and
sleep with his own mother, given the long series of highly unusual
circumstances that led to his being in that position? Knowing of the
prophecy was not enough to prevent its occurrence; had he been
ignorant, we suspect that would not have aided him, either. Know-
ledge of his destiny could not change it. If this is the case, Sophocles’
audience might ask whether there is any locus of control for Oedipus,
or whether he is merely in the hands of an unyielding fate, to which
the only possible answer is reluctant acceptance.
To put it into a more traditional philosophical vocabulary, Sopho-
cles raises for his audience questions surrounding the notion of moral
2 The translations throughout this chapter are my own except as noted.
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responsibility in the light of a person choosing without knowledge of
his action’s context or its consequences. Knox has argued that Oedi-
pus is not only free, but also responsible for his actions, for strictly
speaking, the gods and Fate do not force his individual choices.
Oedipus freely chooses to kill Laius, although he does not know his
identity. Oedipus marries and begets children with Jocasta, not as a
result of any speciﬁc external force, but as a result of his own
internally driven actions. Knox writes of Oedipus, ‘The autonomy
of his actions is emphasized by the series of attempts made by others
to stop the investigation . . .The hero is not only free but fully
responsible for the events which constitute the plot.’3 In one sense,
Knox is correct that Oedipus is free in that the source of his action is
internal. However, the play’s supreme dramatic tension arises from a
ﬁgure who somehow both acts freely and yet, in such ignorance that he
seems incapable of genuine freedom. Moreover, his ignorance itself
seems not to be culpable, as it was unavoidable, despite his best efforts
to gain it. The audience, then, must ask even deeper questions about
the constitutive nature of freedom, questions that his audience must
engage in if they are to make sense of the narrative of Oedipus’ life.
The play raises not only the question of individual moral responsi-
bility in the light of ignorance, but, as importantly, the effect of our
vulnerability to ignorance upon the wider community. Oedipus Rex
begins with the city suffering a plague on account of its king’s still
unknown transgressions. By the end of the play, Oedipus is insistent
with Creon that he must leave Thebes, and equally concerned that his
daughters, especially, will suffer a curse as a result of his actions
(1493–6; 1517). Thus, the audience is also encouraged to consider
how and whether vulnerability to ignorance affects the larger political
community as well. At moments, Sophocles points toward the possi-
bility of despair as one response to vulnerability. For example, the
Chorus in Oedipus at Colonus even declares, ‘Not to be born is best of
all: when life there is, second best is to go hence where you came, with
the best speed you may’ (1410–13). However, Colonus ultimately
offers a quite different set of answers about encountering human
vulnerability through the notion of hospitality to the stranger.
This chapter argues that among Oedipus’ failings in Oedipus Rex is
an inability to accept vulnerability and weakness both in himself and
3 B. M. W. Knox, Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles’ Tragic Hero and his Time (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 12.
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others. I then suggest that in Oedipus at Colonus, Sophocles provides
an alternative narrative as to how such vulnerability might be re-
ceived, in the form of compassionate hospitality to the stranger.
Theseus is the true hero of Colonus, insofar as he provides both a
personal and political solution to the problem of Oedipus’ vulnerabil-
ity that Oedipus alone could not overcome.
I
There are several places in the text where Sophocles points to the
possibility of a different response on Oedipus’ part to his own trans-
gressions. First, prior to his knowledge of the identity of the offender
as himself, Oedipus makes the mistake of identifying punishment of
the polluted person with his own ‘advantage’. He says:
With justice you will see me an ally in battle (	

Æå) in seeking to avenge
this land, and god at the same time. Not for some far off friend’s advantage, but
for my own interest I will dispel this pollution. Whoever killed that one, might
also wish to kill me with his ﬁerce hand. So helping him, I helpmyself. (135–41)
We can easily see the deep irony of the passage—for Oedipus will
wish to use his own hand against himself later in the play, but can
hardly be said to be acting in his own interest in pursuing the hereto-
fore unknown murderer. Oedipus’ failing is that he believes too easily
in his own righteousness, as defender of the city and of god’s laws. He
assumes that the city’s interest and his noble intentions will always
line up. And he lacks a sense of compassion for the unknown
criminal, assuming an absolute opposition between city and criminal,
a polarity between the communal justice and the injustice of the
murderer, absolute opposition between himself as the just king and
the polluted one as an unjust man. The tragedy’s audience can see
that the polarity is not so simple: Oedipus is the polluted one, but he
also is truly the one who loves and cares for his city’s well-being. As
Segal notes, Oedipus’ kingship opens up a liminal realm, in which
oppositions between nature and culture, inner and outer, city and
wild are no longer clear.4
4 Charles Segal, Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles (Norman,
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 47.
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Oedipus himself is unaware of the ambiguities inherent in his
kingship and his humanity. His mistake is to believe in absolute
oppositions between the just and unjust when a more nuanced
answer is possible. On this reading, Oedipus thinks of justice and
injustice as morally absolute categories in a world in which such
categories do not always apply neatly.
A second failing might be found in Oedipus’ harshness with the
one that has killed the king, for his vows to exclude the man entirely
from society are extreme. He declares that the polluted one may not
reside in his land; is not to be welcomed by any in the land, not even
greeted by its citizens; excluded from worship and even excluded
from the hospitality of water to wash his hands (236–42). Exile
alone was an appropriate ritual response to pollution, but Oedipus
lays these additional conditions of refusing water or even a simple
greeting to the polluted man. If Oedipus had imagined himself as the
criminal, would he not have considered the possibility that such
additional demands are beyond the requirements of puriﬁcation?
After all, Oedipus is not simply ÆØº	 (king) but 	ææÆ (tyrant),
a man who has acquired his rule by coming into the city from the
outside.5 Oedipus fails in his exclusion of the morally weak, and
especially fails to understand that he is capable of such weakness
himself.
A third instance of inattentiveness to vulnerability is when he treats
Teiresias so harshly. In his understandable desire to escape the truth
of the blind man’s prophecy, Oedipus searches for alternative explan-
ations for why Teiresias declares him to be the criminal. He mocks
the blind Teiresias, calling him a ‘deceitful bogus priest who has eyes
for gain, but is blind in his art’ (388–9). Oedipus’ anger reaches a fever
pitch, and is not easily extinguished.6 Indeed, his rage seems to stem
from a sense of overconﬁdence in his own knowledge, in contrast to
that of others. For example, Oedipus is dismissive of Teiresias’ ability
to know the truth about his identity; he reminds Teiresias of his clever
defeat of the Sphinx with the sarcastic proclamation that the one
who solved the puzzle was ‘I, unknowing Oedipus’ (› 
Åb Ng
ˇNı) (396).7 He is angry not only at the particulars of Teiresias’
5 Knox details the use of 	ææÆ instead of ÆØº	, and notes the irony that
Oedipus also would have been legitimate ÆØº	 on account of his father Laius. See
Knox, Oedipus at Thebes, chapter 2.
6 Knox, Oedipus at Thebes, 27–8. 7 Knox, Oedipus at Thebes, 127.
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ideas, but also at the idea that someone else might know something
that he does not, and could not, know about himself. One wonders
whether Teiresias might have suggested an alternative response to the
problem of pollution, less severe, if only Oedipus had not unleashed
his rage on the seer.
Creon also suggests ‘obstinacy’ on Oedipus’ part when the king
assumes a plot on Creon’s part (549), and refuses to listen to his
entreaties that he is innocent. He says that this obstinacy forms no
part of wisdom, and is part of Oedipus’ limit as a king. Jocasta is
slightly gentler in her assessment, judging Oedipus to have excessive
Łı
 when speakers come with bad news (914). She says, he is ‘under
the speaker’s control, when he speaks of fearful things’ (917–18). We
see this excitability in Oedipus in the account of how he murdered
Laius, out of rage for being pushed off the road. Oedipus lacks the
moral virtue of temperance, to be sure, but along with that lack of
moderation is a lack of consideration of the ordinary imperfections
that accompany being human.
We see in each of these instances a common theme: Oedipus
possesses an overly conﬁdent sense of his own righteousness, a
judgement of the would-be criminal as his polar opposite, a tendency
to suspect or to blame others, rather than to look inwardly. He
assumes an absolute division between those who are just and unjust,
those who care for the city and who bring it harm, those who possess
virtue and who lack it. Thus, when he discovers that he himself is the
source of injustice, his own response is to be harsh with himself and
not even to consider a mode in which such injustice could be reme-
died without expulsion from the city. The pollution brought on by
murder of his father and incest with his mother indeed warranted a
strong response. But Oedipus is unable to incorporate a response that
can maintain and preserve the body politic, while Sophocles in
Colonus will later display its possibility in Theseus. Oedipus is unable
to imagine the possibility of his own moral vulnerability, with the
eventual result that his vulnerability becomes displayed in the form of
a physical wound, in his literal blindness, which expresses the in-
escapability of his vulnerability.
Parker’s book on pollution explores the concept in depth in the
context of early Greek religion.8 Two distinct terms connote pollution:
8 Robert Parker, Miasma: Pollution and Puriﬁcation in Early Greek Religion
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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Æ
Æ and ¼ª. While 
Æ
Æ is the idea of something being
polluted in the sense of contaminated, the term ¼ª also means
more speciﬁcally something directed against the gods and their
rules—not only contaminated, but also ‘unholy’. To use Parker’s
example, a corpse gives off 
Æ
Æ, but an unburied one creates
¼ª, an offence against the gods themselves.9 Most instances of
pollution in the Greek sensibility are connected either to birth or to
death. In the case of Oedipus, his pollution is an unnatural mixture of
both: he’s killed his father, the source of his life, and produced
children in the same womb which had borne him. For most natural
pollutions (the time right after birth and time after contact with the
dead), the only real consequence was to be barred from entering a
temple, in part to emphasize the gulf between the gods, who do not
die, and men, who do.
Parker argues that, while the incestuous relationship was seen as
polluting, alternatives other than permanent exile from homeland
also existed. He writes, ‘The incestuous could be socially isolated
without exile, by exclusion from sacriﬁcial communities and religious
exchanges.’10 Although incest is an extreme case of pollution, even
here the pollution is not irreversible. For many forms of sexual
pollution, Robinson argues (such as male prostitution or adultery),
a period of sexual abstinence was sufﬁcient to return the person to a
state of purity sufﬁcient for religious participation.11 Murder-pollu-
tion, however, was regarded as a terrible violation of the moral order,
and parricide more so than any other form of murder-pollution.12
Expulsion for parricide, even involuntary parricide, expresses the
social evaluation that such a killing is deeply unnatural, and even
more fearful when it is unknown, as in Oedipus’ case. That Oedipus
could kill his father without even realizing it, even after taking such
careful steps to prevent its prophesied occurrence, is itself an upset-
ting of the natural order. Arguably, for many Ancient Greeks, the
concept that one could accidentally kill one’s father, in ignorance, is
even more upsetting than the idea of choosing to do so. So, questions
of freedom of will are not as signiﬁcant as the question of whether the
‘natural’ has been overturned, with regard to ‘pollution’.13 For it is not
9 Parker, Miasma, 8. 10 Parker, Miasma, 98.
11 Parker, Miasma, 97. 12 Parker, Miasma, 124–5.
13 Parker, Miasma, especially 133ff., where Parker develops the concept of natural
pollution.
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a moral evaluation of Oedipus and his choices that counts, but rather
the overturning of basic principles of life and death that leads to
pollution. Thus, nature itself is upset at King Laius’ death, such that at
the beginning of the tragedy we ﬁnd that women cannot give birth
except to stillborn children, crops will not grow, and all generation
has ceased.
As king, then, Oedipus was required to act against the polluted
man in some way, given the extreme reaction of the natural world. As
a ruler, his work was to protect his city, and upon learning of the
pollution, the most obvious course of action is, of course, to expel the
polluted man from the kingdom. Indeed, qua king, his best interest is
the city’s best interest; but part of the tragedy here is that Oedipus the
king’s interest is contrary to Oedipus the man’s interest. When
Oedipus discovers that he himself is the polluted man, his reaction
is not denial of punishment, but rather to proclaim his sorrow that his
future will be so dismal.
Indeed, the point of the tragedy is to set forth Oedipus as a
paradigm of reversal in human life. The language of reversal ﬁgures
throughout Oedipus Rex. The play opens with Oedipus greeting
suppliants, but ends with his becoming a wandering suppliant him-
self. Oedipus begins as a sighted man who cannot see the truth of his
own state, and ends as a blinded man who knows it. We hear the
herdsman speak of his ‘pity’ for the Oedipus who was to die as an
exposed infant, who then realizes that this pity had only ‘saved him
for the greatest evils (ŒŒ N 
ªØ ø)’ (1179–80). What is in
darkness, comes to light, and what had seemed to be light, becomes
only darkness (see e.g. 1183).
We ﬁnd even a reversal of meaning of many of Oedipus’ lines
earlier in the play, before he recognizes his identity as the polluted
man. For example, when the suppliants approach him with their
illness, he tells them, ‘I see you are all sick (E), yet though you
are sick there is no one that is as sick (E) as I am’ (59–61). He
declares himself to be ‘one that is stranger (±ªg ) to the story
(F ºªı) as stranger to the deed (F æÆåŁ)’ (219–20);14
while he intended that he was no part of this deed, we might empha-
size that his own life story, though he has lived it, has so far been
‘strange’ to himself. He is a , a foreigner, to his own identity, or
14 Translation of this line from David Grene (translator and editor), Sophocles I,
2nd edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991).
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to use an English term that connotes this well, he is unknowingly
‘estranged’ from himself. In fact, as the Greek lays out the word order,
the term Kª (self ) here and  are juxtaposed, as if to emphasize
that he is a stranger to himself. Oedipus speaks many words that
contain truths that he cannot yet understand, but whose truth will
later be revealed in a new way; he is an unwitting ironist.15 As
Aristotle long ago commented, Oedipus exempliﬁes the essence of
the tragic plot most perfectly since, in his case, recognition and
reversal coincide (Poetics 1452a30).
Another dimension of reversal has to do with the normal experi-
ence of understanding wisdom or seeing the truth as a joyful experi-
ence, one that satisﬁes our desire to understand, a natural ﬁt between
what we want and the world itself. That is, not only on a philosophical
understanding of the world, but also an ordinary one, we see our-
selves as human beings in a world where there is some kind of a
natural ﬁt between ourselves as knowers, and the world as knowable.
Such a stance is not merely descriptive for us. It is not only a fact that
we can know. The stance of seeking to know is also an emotional way
of being in the world, in which we ﬁnd excitement, joy, surprise, and a
wide range of feeling in making such discoveries. Our natural sense of
discovery is one of joy and pleasure in the ‘ﬁt’ between seeking to
know, and knowing, being completed. Despite Oedipus’ characteristic
valuation of knowledge, as in his solution to the riddle of the Sphinx,
now Oedipus experiences the opposite.16
As we see from the language that Teiresias uses, this is not the case
with Oedipus: ‘he’ll have no joy (ŁÆØ) in the discovery
(ıŁ
çæﬁ A): blindness (ıçºe) though he now sees, and beggary
though he is now wealthy’ (453–5). As the truth begins to ‘come
together’ for Oedipus (a more literal translation of ıŁ
çæﬁ A), he
experiences pain and not pleasure. Teiresias, though a prophet
invested in revelations of divine wisdom, proclaims wisdom to be a
terrible thing at times: ‘Alas, how terrible is wisdom (çæE) when it
does not have the power to beneﬁt those who know (çæFØ)! This
I knew but forgot (Ng Øº ), or I would not have come’ (316–18).
Here çæE, to think, to know, is seen as a terrible (E) thing.
15 Paul Hammond, The Strangeness of Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 76–7.
16 Knox notes Oedipus’ care for not only knowledge in general, but also clarity and
fullness of truth. See Knox, Oedipus at Thebes, 18.
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Teiresias’ term for knowledge, N (the perfect participle of rÆ, to
know), literally means to ‘see’ something. Teiresias the blind prophet
can ‘see’ what Oedipus cannot. But while he cherishes the truth, he
also sees no value in offering words that can only bring pain, even if
they are true (356). To know lacks value, but also to forget has had
destructive value, as the Greek link between forgetting and destruction
connotes (as Øº is the aorist form of Øººı
Ø, meaning ‘to come to
ruin’).17 We have in Oedipus a reversal of the epistemological order,
where the discovery of new knowledge becomes an evil and leads to
misery instead of joy.
While Oedipus is one driven to know, at all costs, Jocasta brieﬂy
offers a dramatically different alternative to the human desire to
know. She asks, ‘What should man fear since chance (	åÅ) rules,
and he can foreknow (æØÆ) nothing with clarity? The best life is to
live at random (NŒB), as one is able’ (977–9). ¯NŒB might here be
translated as ‘randomly’ or even ‘without a plan or purpose’. Jocasta’s
emphasis on chance as central to human existence emphasizes a
certain impossibility of understanding that informs her own prefer-
ence not to reach too deeply into matters, preferring to skim the
surface of things, rather than to discover dark truths that lie beneath.
However, such lightness does not save Jocasta either, who ends her life
in her own horror at discovering her incestuous marriage; neither
would the perpetual hiddenness of the truth have saved the city and
its suppliants from the effects of pollution. So, while Sophocles brieﬂy
raises the possibility of not-seeking-to-know as an alternative to miser-
able truths, this path is also not reasonably open to human beings.
The Chorus presents a tragic sensibility in its declaration of Oedi-
pus as a ‘paradigm’ of human existence: ‘Generations of mortals
(æH), I reckon your life as but a shadow. Where, where is the
man who has more happiness (PÆØ
Æ) than one that is only
seeming (ŒE) and even then seemingly falls away? Oedipus, you are
my pattern (ÆæØª
 ) of this, enduring Oedipus, you and your fate’
(1187–95). Oedipus is a paradigm, literally a model of what it means to
be a mortal man, for the term æ emphasizes his mortality, one
who will die. Oedipus is a model—or the term ÆæØª
Æ can also be
17 This language of destruction runs thematically through descriptions of Oedipus.
For example, the Theban shepherd’s report of Jocasta’s decision to have her son killed
so that the prophecy might go unfulﬁlled uses IÆºŒø, ‘destroy’, rather than weaker
words connoting infant exposure. See Ballengee, Wound and the Witness, 47.
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used as ‘example’—of what it means to be mortal, that is, to be ignorant
of even the most basic knowledge of ourselves.18
While Oedipus sought knowledge at all costs, and Jocasta to avoid
it, Creon initially presents an alternative path. When he encounters
the blinded, distraught Oedipus, Creon insists on taking him into the
house, out of his connection to him as a kinsman (1430–1). While
Oedipus is certain that the god demands that he leave the city, Creon
suggests that they take the time to ﬁnd out what they really should do:
‘This was said. But nonetheless, given the present need, it is better to
learn (KŒ
ÆŁE) fully about what to do’ (1442–3). Creon wishes, no
doubt, to discover what the oracle wants them to do. However, his
words to Oedipus about his care for his children also display com-
passion for Oedipus’ need on Creon’s part. While so many others in
the play react in horror to Oedipus’ actions and his blinded, self-
wounded appearance, at ﬁrst Creon is a paradigm of compassion and
caution. He asks that Oedipus remain a while, and brings his children
to him. He neither insists on Oedipus’ harshness, nor does he advo-
cate the view that it is better not to know, as Jocasta had. Oedipus
thinks Creon is experiencing pity when he brings him his children,
but if we look with care at Creon’s words, we ﬁnd something subtly,
but signiﬁcantly different: ‘You are right. I brought this about, know-
ing the delight (ªf c ÆæFÆ æłØ) you had long ago and
now have’ (1476–7).
Creon brings Oedipus his children out of knowledge for his love of
them. For Creon, this knowledge (ªHØ) of love (literally, delight or
joy, æłØ) is more signiﬁcant a form of wisdom than the others we
have encountered so far. In fact, we might say that this form of
wisdom as a kind of ‘recognition’—as the term ªHØ connotes—to
recognize, to see who someone is, Sophocles raises as an important
kind of knowing. Creon’s brotherly love for Oedipus informs how he
sees him, how he understands him, and how he reacts to him. What
he sees in Oedipus is not primarily the polluted man, nor a dispos-
sessed king, but a man who is capable of fatherly love. Creon looks at
the children not primarily as children of incest, but instead as the
father’s beloved ones, the few remaining beings that can still give him
enjoyment. Creon thus momentarily provides the tragedy’s audience
with an alternative vision of wisdom in moments of vulnerability as
18 Ballengee, Wound and the Witness, 48.
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linked to recognition of the concrete reality of another human being.
While commentators such as Knox propose that the play asserts a
‘religious view of a divinely ordered universe’,19 the multiple perspec-
tives set out by various characters on the nature of suffering suggest
otherwise. Sophocles engages with the mystery of the question of
suffering. Instead of providing a single, clear intellectual solution to
the problems raised by freedom and fate, Sophocles presents multiple
answers to the question as to the appropriate human response to
suffering. His play raises for his audience the possibility of reﬂection
on fate and freedom, suffering and freedom from it, not only during
the play, but also after its performance. Here, Creon exhibits the
possibility of a wisdom informed by gentleness, compassion, and
identiﬁcation with human weakness, instead of Oedipus’ harsh self-
judgement, or Jocasta’s wilful ignorance.
II
This theme of familial gentleness and compassion is central to Oedi-
pus at Colonus, where we see Antigone’s great devotion to her blind
father. While her two brothers have abandoned Oedipus in his need,
Antigone has accompanied her father in his wanderings, as his seeing
eyes, and at considerable personal risk to herself. Oedipus says that
she acts with the bravery more associated with men than with
women, while his sons have done little for him. There is sweetness
between Antigone and Oedipus, a care she exerts for him in his
vulnerability and blindness, which tempers many of the harsh suffer-
ings of the plays’ action. While the two plays were not performed
together, and do not constitute a cycle in the way that Aeschylus’
Oresteia does, it is nonetheless telling to consider how differently
Sophocles treats the same characters and a related storyline in two
plays staged many years apart. In particular, we ﬁnd in Oedipus at
Colonus that Sophocles displays a considerable amount of sensitivity
toward the cursed Oedipus, and links hospitality to the vulnerable to
the political good of Athens. While Oedipus Rex considers pollution
and the difﬁculties with ﬁnding a reasonable political response to
19 Ballengee, Wound and the Witness, 47.
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pollution, Oedipus at Colonus emphasizes the value to be found in
reception of the wounded stranger by the city or its leaders.
At the outset of Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus expresses that he
has learned something from his suffering, especially ‘to endure’ (8).
He takes comfort in the prophecy that at his life’s end, he ﬁnally will
ﬁnd a place to rest, that he will be a ‘ruin (¼Å)’ for those who drove
him away, but ‘proﬁt (ŒæÅ)’ for those who receive him (92–3).
Oedipus sees the possibility of a meaningful end, a meaningful re-
sponse to his vulnerable moral and physical condition, as displayed in
the downfall of those who harmed him, and the uplifting of those who
received him. We might understand these earlier words to be fulﬁlled
in the blessings placed upon Theseus, who receives him with hospi-
tality and compassion, despite knowledge of his pollution. While in
life his kingship did not bring good to Thebes for the long term, in
death, his presence will bring protection to Athens. Oedipus is no
longer king, but nonetheless, plays a political and spiritual role in his
presence at Athens.
Moreover, Oedipus’model for knowledge is no longer that of sight,
but touch. While the Oedipus Rex is dominated by images of know-
ledge as sight, in Oedipus at Colonus, we see a man whose main entry
into the world of sensation comes through hearing and through his
daughter Antigone’s touch, as she leads him from place to place in his
exile. Oedipus is reliant on others who speak to him, and remarks,
‘I see by the sound of a voice (çøBﬁ ªaæ ›æH), as the saying goes’
(139). Here, his hearing makes him dependent on others, insofar as
they choose whether to reveal themselves and the world to him.
Antigone willingly describes to Oedipus his surroundings and the
events that unfold around him (e.g. 17–22). Similarly, he depends on
Antigone to offer her lead of hand to him; there is tenderness and a
revealed dependency when he asks, ‘Give me your hand,’ and Antigone
reassuringly replies, ‘Here I place it in yours’ (176–7). Such a response
stands in contrast to Oedipus’ distraught question in Oedipus Rex, ‘Do
you think my children, born as they were, could look sweet to my eyes?’
As Long has argued, the use of the model of touch, rather than
sight, changes the way in which Oedipus relates to the objects of his
knowledge.20 In the case of sight, the person being seen can be
20 Christopher Long, ‘A Father’s Touch, a Daughter’s Voice: Antigone, Oedipus
and Ismene at Colonus’, presented at the 2010 Sophocles Colloquium, University of
Utah, November 2009.
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objectiﬁed. The seeing subject can see his object, apart from being
seen in return, and can be at a distance from that object, protected by
his own distance. In the case of touch, however, the contact with the
object of perception is immediate. Here, in the instance of human
touch, the contact between subject and object is also mutual. The
one who touches, in being led by hand on his journey, is also the
one who is being touched and felt as a presence by another. In
the dependence of touch for Oedipus to know and to navigate his
world, Oedipus experiences a certain kind of vulnerability in his
very mode of knowledge, for he cannot know without also being
known. This vulnerability seems to have brought him closer to both
of his daughters, in his dependence on Antigone and gentleness
with her. He expresses his need for Ismene’s touch, also, when she
arrives at Thebes, both to conﬁrm her presence and also to express
his care (349–50). Oedipus is not a king, 	ææÆ, looking down
from his throne at the suppliants, but instead, led by his daughter’s
hand, touched by Antigone in her care and support of him as the
suppliant and exile.
However, the Oedipus of Colonus is an angry man, despite what his
initial words about learning endurance might seem to indicate. While
Oedipus seeks pity for himself and his polluted state, he shows little
compassion for what might have led his sons to pursue lives apart
from accompanying him in his wanderings. His focus on whether
they are living ‘good’ lives centres entirely around whether their
devotion to their father has been sufﬁcient. There is more than a little
irony in Oedipus’ judgement of his sons; after all, his parricide would
seem to exceed their negligence of him in degree of moral failure.
Similarly, Oedipus continues to be angry about Creon’s treatment of
him, in forcing him to go into exile.
Oedipus seeks to differentiate his parricide and incestuous mar-
riage from Creon’s actions through focusing on his own relative lack
of knowledge: ‘I knew nothing (Pb Ng) arriving where I did. But
those on account of whom I suffered, they with knowledge (Nø)
destroyed me’ (273–4). This judgement makes the clarity of knowing
or not knowing, possessing responsibility for one’s actions, and not
possessing it, too clean cut, however. The Creon of Oedipus Rex, as
much as anyone, was puzzled by how to respond to Oedipus’ pollu-
tion, for he did understand that it was not by any informed choice
that Oedipus acted in ways that were polluting; and yet, his pollution
did upset the natural order and the gods such that the only viable
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solution seemed to be to expel him from the city. And yet, Creon
waited to follow through even on Oedipus’ command to banish him,
seemingly waiting for an alternative possibility to present itself. Creon
cannot be said to have possessed full knowledge of the best way in
which to rule the city after these unusual events. While Creon’s
motives in Oedipus at Colonus are unclear, they are not entirely
unreasonable, given what audiences may recall of Oedipus Rex.
Aristotle’s categories of moral responsibility in the Nicomachean
Ethics are helpful here (N. Ethics III. 1). While not a fully de-
veloped theory of responsibility, Oedipus’ comments about his
own ignorance point in a general way to the kinds of consider-
ations Aristotle later raises about the role of knowledge of particu-
lars in moral accountability. While Aristotle includes under the
designation ‘voluntary’ a whole range of actions undertaken by a
moral actor, he offers notable exceptions to ordinarily voluntary
actions if certain circumstances are present. The term ‘involuntary’
applies to actions in which the moral actor was ignorant of
particulars. For example, if a man believed that a weapon that he
threw was harmless and meant for practice exercises, but turned
out to be a real weapon, and so injured his victim unintentionally,
this lack of knowledge is a mitigating factor. Importantly, Aristotle
sees the presence of regret afterwards as central to this moral
evaluation of an action as ‘involuntary’; the moral actor must be
regretful and must wish that the event had not occurred. Such a
combination of ignorance of particulars and regret is clearly pre-
sent in Oedipus’ polluting crimes. He lacked knowledge of his
father as his father, of his mother as his mother, and so did not
know the particulars of his moral action. Moreover, he felt not
only regret, but anguish at the patricide and the incest. On an
Aristotelian model, Oedipus ought not be seen as morally culpable
for parricide or incest.
Creon, Polyneices, and Eteocles seem to have had full knowledge of
the particulars of their actions with Oedipus, and little regret for their
moral choices, and so cannot be said to act in an involuntary way.
Oedipus says of Eteocles and Polyneices that when they had the
power to bring help, they chose not to help him (427–45). They
lacked neither the means to assist him in his wanderings, nor the
knowledge of his state or his identity as their father. Oedipus sees
them as wholly responsible for their neglect of him, in a way that he is
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not responsible for his more extreme acts against his own parents,
chosen entirely in ignorance.21
However, we can imagine many other motivations that might have
led Polyneices and Eteocles to choose lives that did not include
devoting all their energy to their father’s care. To begin, these sons
seemed not to deﬁne themselves in terms of an identity as products of
their parents’ incest. That is, rather than choosing exile along with
their father, who understood himself to be polluted, they refused to
see themselves as polluted along with him. Indeed, prior to Oedipus’
curse against them, there is no reason to believe that Oedipus’
children were polluted, or needed to ﬂee the city. In Oedipus Rex,
Oedipus worries about his daughters’ ability to marry, as they may
seem to others to be cursed (1500), but we have no independent
evidence in the plays that this is true, and Oedipus expresses no such
worries about his sons. In the Antigone, Creon’s main hesitation with
his son’s involvement with Antigone is her difﬁcult temperament and
wilful lawlessness; there is no mention of her being polluted as a
reason not to marry her. Polyneices and Eteocles alike commit them-
selves to living the lives not of exiles, but of political men, as their
station in life would have demanded. If their mistake is to seek to
escape the wandering and exile to which their father is subjected, it is
an understandable desire on their part.
Neither son is particularly virtuous, of course. Both brothers ﬁght
one another for the throne, instead of choosing the shared rule that
Oedipus had with Creon in his better days. Indeed, Polyneices seems
to have inherited his father’s temper as well, when he refuses to leave
behind his ambition to rule Thebes, insisting that he go to his own
death and ﬁght his brother in combat, even as Antigone asks why he
must succumb to being made ‘angry (Łı
FŁÆØ) again’ (1420). Creon
tells Oedipus that he is ‘giving in to your temper (OæªBﬁ ), which always
ruins you’ when he refuses Creon’s (deceitful) offer to return home
and offer protection to Thebes (855). But Creon speaks to Oedipus
not with care, but with threats of kidnapping his daughter, and
violating Oedipus’ freedom.
21 As Ahrensdorf notes, Oedipus here seems motivated by anger and not reason; he
fails to recognize the contradiction in absolving himself of his unknowing parricide
and yet, his desire for harsh punishment of his sons for their neglect of him. Peter
Ahrensdorf, Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy: Rationalism and Religion in
Sophocles’ Theban Plays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 70.
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At numerous points, words are understood to be powerful, as either
forces of good or evil. Many times, Oedipus treats words as though they
were intrinsically dangerous, or hurtful, particularly if those words
revealed his own weakness to others or even only to himself. At the
beginning of Colonus, Oedipus prefers that his story remain silent, that
he remain alone in his suffering with only his daughter. Oedipus speaks
of the Chorus as uttering wounding words, when they speak aloud of
his father’s murder. When he says, ‘A second time you strike me,
afﬂiction upon afﬂiction (øﬁ ),’ he refers to the speech as if it
were itself a way to harm him (545). It is not only the memory of the
patricide, or its revelation, but the words themselves that are blows to
Oedipus, who prefers to keep his suffering silent and to endure. He is
afraid to tell the truth about himself, and it is only Antigone’s insistence
that he must speak his truth, as difﬁcult as it is, that frees Oedipus to
confess his real identity, a confession that will eventually bring him
freedom instead of continued exile (217). He is afraid of his story being
told: ‘Do not lay bare (Iﬁ Å) my sufferings’ (515).ªı
Ø, means
literally ‘to open up’, as Oedipus feels exposed in being known for his
deeds. Words have the power to open up, to make vulnerable.
Oedipus himself chooses to wound his own sons with a curse upon
them, a curse that will come to fruition not only with the deaths of
Polyneices and Eteocles, but also the death of Antigone, whom
Oedipus wishes to protect. His harmful words have repercussions
far beyond what he anticipated. Antigone also speaks of the power of
words: ‘Words offer many things, bringing delight, or sometimes
anger, or pity; they somehow give voice (çøc) to what is voiceless
(IçøØ)’ (1281). However, Theseus offers an alternative to
wounding words, words of reception and hospitality. While Oedipus
is convinced that the truth of his life will be too shocking, or his
history too revolting once told, Theseus receives his full story in
compassion, even sharing a bit of his own story in return.
III
Theseus begins with the possibility that this  might teach him
something:
Teach me (ÆŒ). You would need to tell me something terrible (Øc) to
make me depart from you. For I know (YÆ) myself what it means to be
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raised in exile (), like you, and in foreign lands, I wrestled with many
hazards, more than any other man. So there is no stranger (), as you
are now, from whom I would turn away or fail to help. For I know (Ø )
I am only a man (Icæ), whose fulﬁllment of tomorrow is no greater than is
yours. (561–9)
Theseus not only reassures Oedipus that he is not as Ø, as terrible,
as he fears; he also suggests that the polluted man has something to
teach him. Theseus grounds his understanding of Oedipus in his own
experience of being a , a foreigner, one who is excluded from
others, but also as a person who has understood his primary identity
as the same as that of Oedipus, insofar as they are both simply men.
Theseus incorporates Oedipus’ vulnerability in which his wounds are
constitutive of his humanity, and not a mark of his necessary exclu-
sion from society.
When Theseus goes to rescue Ismene and Antigone from their
uncle, he tells his army to go to a crossroads in order to bring them
home (901). We might remember that the murder of Oedipus’ father
also took place at a crossroads. This ‘second crossroads’ at which
Theseus’ men act is representative of a turning in Oedipus’ fate.
While the ﬁrst crossroads was the site of his pollution, this second
crossroads becomes the locus of his own acceptance. In listening to
and receiving Oedipus’ story, a story that heretofore has only caused
him shame, Theseus allows Oedipus to participate in a kind of self-
observation of himself from the perspective of others. While Oedipus
has already learned some compassion for himself in the years since
his exile from Thebes, this compassion and a kind of peace arise when
he can see himself through Theseus’ eyes. His blindness, he learns, is
not only the metaphorical blindness he had of his own identity in the
murder and incest and his literal, self-inﬂicted blindness. Oedipus has
also been blind to the possibility of full reconciliation and acceptance
into the community. But in the background of Colonus is also the
theme of the Eumenides, Aeschylus’ gentled Furies who now kindly
protect Athens instead of pursuing the polluted.22 Theseus, too, will
act as a gentle spirit to Oedipus.
Theseus not only accepts Oedipus’ story, and welcomes him in the
fullness of his reality, but also explains in this passage the motivation
22 Henry Walker, Theseus and Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 176.
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for his deep compassion.23 Theseus is a man who is well aware of his
own vulnerability, and so can identify with others with whom he
shares this vulnerability. Indeed, such self-awareness seems to inform
his courage and sensible judgement in how he responds to Oedipus,
in stark contrast to Creon’s relative impulsiveness. Theseus under-
stands the experience of being in exile, and the longing for ‘home’. As
if to emphasize Theseus’ compassion, Sophocles’ account of Theseus’
story makes no allusion to earlier myths about Theseus that are less
than hospitable, for example, his kidnapping of Helen, abandonment
of Ariadne, or attempted kidnapping of Persephone.24 Instead,
Sophocles’ presentation of Theseus is of a king who recalls his own
experiences as a  and one who searches for his true home, and
so understands what is ‘strange’ in others. As Mills phrases it, the
Athenian version of Theseus is ‘purged of anything alien to the ideal
Athens’.25
The term  has multiple layers of meaning within these two
plays. It can mean simply ‘stranger’, the one who is not Greek, or not
of this particular city, the outsider to whomever ‘we’ are. As Kristeva
emphasizes, the stranger allows a community to deﬁne itself and even
to grant it a false sense of its own security by assuring itself that while
the Other is outside, we are not the other, we are on the inside.26 The
Outsider’s presence reminds us of the possibility that we could be
outside, and yet, reassures us that, for the moment, we are not him, we
are on the inside, we who belong to whatever community the stranger
does not belong to. The paradox of Oedipus is that he has been both
the leader and the outsider to his own community. The one who saves
and leads Thebes, who indeed embodies the unity of the community, is
the one who turns out to be responsible for its pollution. And the same
king who not only belongs to the political community, but who
23 Blundell notes that Theseus may have multiple motives including ‘sympathy,
piety, loyalty, self-interest, and the interests of his city’. Here I focus on Theseus’
sympathy in order to highlight the centrality of the acknowledgement of vulnerability
in virtue, but of course do not exclude additional motives. See Mary Whitlock
Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 231.
24 For an excellent summary of pre-tragic myths surrounding Theseus, see Walker,
Theseus and Athens, chapter 1 and Sophie Mills, Theseus, Tragedy, and the Athenian
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 1.
25 Mills, Theseus, Tragedy, 69.
26 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Col-
umbia University Press, 1991), chapter 2.
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possesses the power to determine who is in and who is out, who is a
member and who will not belong, turns out to be an outsider. Oedipus
is a kind of ‘hidden stranger’, hidden both from others and from
himself in his status as the ‘polluted one’ who has committed incest
and who brings sickness on the city. He is a paradigm for the idea that
the safety and security of belonging to an ‘inner circle’ is often false,
or at least temporary. Oedipus at Colonus was written around the
time of the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and the overthrow of the
democracy (404 bce), and staged in 401 bce after the democracy’s
restoration.27 The question as to who belongs to the city, who is
excluded, and who is in political and social exile was a living reality
for many Athenians.
But the meaning of  here goes even deeper, for the term 
can also mean a person in a formalized Æ, or guest–host relation-
ship, as this sense increasingly becomes important in Oedipus’ rela-
tionship with Theseus.28 The stranger and the foreigner is not only
one who reminds us of our own coherence as a community, but is also
a constant reminder of the real possibility of our own estrangement
and our own exile. Zeus, the most powerful of the gods, is sometimes
called Zeus Xenios, god of the stranger; and we see in works such as
Homer’s Odyssey the moral imperative to care for the stranger, the
beggar, the outsider who may be a god in disguise. Therefore, the host
must treat the guest as almost divine, even without knowing who he
is. And if there is a mutual exchange of gifts between host and ,
then the obligation of mutual care occurs. After a relationship of Æ
has been formalized by an exchange of signiﬁcant gifts, the two in the
relationship may even be obligated to care for one another’s children,
or to undertake rescue of one other if endangered.
It turns out that Oedipus is also a  in this latter sense: the one
polluted and hated by the gods turns out to be the person who will
protect Athens and who will keep it safe, precisely through being
welcomed in by its host, Theseus. Theseus sees in Oedipus what
Oedipus is blind to seeing, namely, the possibility that the polluted
one, too, is under the care of Zeus Xenios, and can return, gift for gift,
27 Andreas Markantonatos, Oedipus at Colonus: Sophocles, Athens, and the World
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 38–9.
28 Hammond, Strangeness of Tragedy, 86; Joseph Wilson, The Hero and the City:
An Interpretation of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus (Ann Arbor: University of Mich-
igan Press, 1997), 82–7.
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protection in exchange for protection. Oedipus will give Theseus the
gift of his protection, and in exchange, Theseus will grant Oedipus
the protection of his children and a heroic status in his burial at
Colonus.29
Moreover, Theseus explains that Oedipus is not a stranger in a
moral sense. Both Theseus and Oedipus are men, who share a
common humanity that bridges the gap between ‘strangers’, Ø;
in this sense, Theseus suggests that no  is completely an ‘out-
sider’, if only because he knows what it means to be human. Theseus
will not turn him away, not even when he possesses full knowledge of
Oedipus’ identity and his actions. While Polyneices insists on hiding
his father’s curse from his men, claiming that it is best for a leader
only to tell of one’s strengths, not weaknesses, Theseus is a leader
willing to speak of himself in his wholeness, and to receive both
strength and weakness in listening. He is aware of human vulnerabil-
ity and accepting of it, as a constitutive part of the city. Such aware-
ness helps to constitute his ability to be fair, rational, and even-
handed in treatment of Oedipus; that is, awareness of limit informs
how Theseus embodies classical Greek virtues such as wisdom, cour-
age, and moderation in his dealings with others.30 His listening to this
story embodies the reciprocity of speech for Theseus, and also his
receptiveness to this stranger grounded in a reception of his own
experiences of estrangement. Here Sophocles presents not a vision of
human wisdom that rejects reason, but rather one that insists that
wisdom must be informed by awareness of limit and understanding
of limit in others. Theseus acts rationally, but warmly here, and his
considered judgements stem in part from reﬂection upon his own
prior experience including its affective elements. Theseus can better
understand limit in Oedipus than others because Theseus has a
wisdom in which his own experience has been transformed into a
considered sympathy for others. He does not express anger about his
past, but rather utilizes those difﬁcult past experiences in order to
cultivate this new politically friendly relationship with Oedipus. To
this extent, Sophocles does not reject the rational in favour of a tragic
29 Wilson, Hero and the City, 86.
30 As Blundell argues, Theseus embodies the classical Greek virtues of justice,
courage, sound-mindedness, and piety. See Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming
Enemies, 248–53.
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vision that is anti-rational or non-rational; rather, the rational itself
includes an affective element.31
Indeed, Oedipus becomes representative of something much
greater than himself after his death. As Budelmann has pointed out,
Sophocles’ language about Oedipus suddenly shifts after the death, so
that he is no longer called by name, but only obliquely by indetermin-
ate references that allude to him, for the last 150 lines of the play.32 He
offers the example of Theseus’ instructions to Antigone and Ismene:
‘Girls, that man (ŒE) told me that no one should approach those
places, or name the holy tomb which that man occupies (ŒE åØ)
(1763–5).’Here, the use of the indeterminate ŒE to name Oedipus
reinforces the sense of a supernatural transformation that occurs with
Oedipus (as do the clap of thunder and the divine voice mentioned at
1621–8).33 Theseus must shield his eyes so that even he does not
directly witness Oedipus’ transformation, which he describes as Ø
(powerful). Here, again, the term Oedipus had used to describe the
‘terribleness’ of his crimes is transformed into a positive power for the
city.34 Oedipus the  becomes transformed into something
greater than his individuated identity, to become ‘the one’ who
protects Athens.35
Theseus alludes to his own history as a  in the passage quoted
above (561–9), he does not offer details of his exile. While the text
does not elaborate, that Sophocles alludes to the exile suggests that he
expects his audience to know something of the details of his
31 Here I distinguish my analysis both from that of Nietzsche, who looks to
Sophocles as the last great tragic thinker before the advent of Socratic rationalism,
and from those who ﬁnd a more theoretical orientation in Sophocles. For the former,
see Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1967). For
an example of the latter, see Ahrensdorf, Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy.
Ahrensdorf also argues for Theseus’ sympathetic nature, but understands the rationale
in Theseus to be based on an ability to sympathize with others’ self-interest. I suggest the
reverse: that Theseus can understand others’ limit and need on the basis of a shared
‘interest’ in having one’s vulnerability hospitably received. Thus, his piety and wisdom
are interconnected.
32 Felix Budelmann, The Language of Sophocles: Communality, Communication,
and Involvement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 42–3.
33 Budelmann, The Language of Sophocles, 42–3.
34 Hammond, Strangeness of Tragedy, 91.
35 While many editors have read Theseus as offering citizenship to Oedipus at line
637, Wilson convincingly argues that the required emendation of the text from
K
ºØ to K
ºØ is not borne out by any other textual evidence that Theseus
makes Oedipus a citizen. See Wilson, Hero and the City, chapter 5. Oedipus becomes
much more than a citizen here; he is a heroic presence.
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difﬁculties. Theseus struggled in his long trip to return to Athens after
being raised in the land of his mother, so that he might take his
birthright as ruler of Athens. His welcome from his father Aegeus was
somewhat mixed, at best, as he welcomed Theseus initially with
suspicion, and his wife Medea attempted to kill him when she realized
his true identity as Aegeus’ son. Some mythical accounts of Theseus
also feature him as the product of a union that was lacking in full
consent: one story says that his mother, daughter of a local king, lay
with Aegeus when her father made him drunk as a way of guarantee-
ing his progeny a place in the royal order. Theseus’ mother’s father
was King Pittheus, a son of Pelops; thus, Theseus, like Oedipus, comes
from a family lineage cursed by the gods. We might recall that Pelops
is killed by his father Tantalus to be served up as food for the gods in a
testing of divine omniscience, an act that becomes the root source of
the curse laid upon the house of Atreus, Menelaos, and Agamemnon.
Theseus’ father and Oedipus’ father also have a history together, for
the story goes that Laius fell in love with one of Pelops’ sons and so
carried him off, but Pelops (once his son was recovered) did not wish
to punish Laius on account of love, only to send him away. Father and
son, Pelops and Theseus, both possess a common sensitivity to
human fault and limit that Oedipus and his sons seem to have lacked.
In the Athenian sensibility, Theseus was seen as the uniﬁer of
Athens, who brought all in Athens to live together (ıØŒ
)
under a common ruler and a capital city, instead of being a number
of independent demes or villages. While, in the archaic period, images
of Theseus as a brutish philanderer dominated, under the Athenian
democracy Theseus was raised to near cult status as a benevolent
king. His role as hero of Athens became so signiﬁcant that in 476/5, in
response to an oracle that demanded the recovery of Theseus’ bones,
Cimon led a procession containing what were said to be his remains,
which were then enshrined in a sanctuary in the mid-ﬁfth century.36
Additionally, a celebration of Theseus, the Oscophoria, took place in
part at the temple at Skiron, where traditionally Theseus was cleansed
of his murder of robbers before entering Athens to take his place as
36 Walker, Theseus and Athens, 56–61. As Cimon was a conservative Athenian,
Walker suggests the use of Theseus was not his ﬁrst choice, but rather a concession to
the democracy that bolstered Cimon’s popularity at a time of reform. Markantonatos
notes that Sophocles himself received a statue of Asclepius into his home and was
deeply involved in hero cults, no doubt an inﬂuence upon his playwriting here. See
Markantonatos, Oedipus at Colonus, 15–16.
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his father’s son.37 Theseus has the experience of being polluted, but
then also cleansed of his pollution. Thus, there are strong parallels
between Oedipus’ fate, as the one who protects Athens at its bound-
aries through the presence of his dead body, and the presence of
Theseus’ body as Athens’ protector and guarantor of democracy. The
festival’s annual presence at the Skiron, at the edge of Attica, reson-
ates strongly with the idea that Oedipus, too, is buried at a boundary,
i.e. just outside its walls. The boundary of Athens is thus both
presented as signiﬁcant for distinguishing citizen from non-citizen,
but understood as permeable, as that which can be crossed so that
those such as Theseus who were once ‘outside’ can also belong.
Sophocles offers here as part of Theseus’ unifying talent, his desire
to include all in ‘dwelling together’. In the light of Theseus’ political
role as uniﬁer of Athens, we might even see his claim that he will turn
away no stranger as Sophocles’ own reﬂection upon the centrality of
inclusiveness of the city, that no matter how ‘outside’ of the city a
person may seem to be, Athenian democracy includes ‘all’ in its
community.38 While the people, the 
, was once simply a part
of the ºØ, under Theseus 
 and ºØ were united, so that the
people and the city were now one and the same in the self-under-
standing of the democracy. Theseus’ image was a visible presence in
political and religious sites in Athens. In 460 bce, a statue of Theseus
lifting the rock to take his father’s sword, the source of his identity as
Aegeus’ true son, was set up on the Acropolis, and in 438/7, his image
as conqueror of the Amazonians appeared on the shield of the statue
of Athena, and his presence on the friezes of buildings such as the
Hephaisteion and Greek vases of the time is well documented.39
Much later, Plutarch reports that Theseus was unparalleled in his
care and concern for those who were deemed to be ‘outside’ the city.
He writes of Theseus:
Farther yet designing to enlarge his city, he invited all strangers to come and
enjoy equal privileges with the natives, and it is said that the common form,
37 Walker, Theseus and Athens, 98–9.
38 In contrast, Walker argues that Sophocles offers Colonus as an aristocratic
alternative to democracy, in emphasizing Theseus’ kingly nature, in contrast to the
presentation in Euripides’ Suppliant Women. See along similar lines, Wilson, Hero
and the City, 198–200, who sees this as more anti-democratic sentiment on Sophocles’
part.
39 Walker, Theseus and Athens, 64–6.
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‘Come hither all ye people,’ was the words that Theseus proclaimed when he
thus set up a commonwealth, in a manner, for all nations.40
Sophocles is innovative in his use of Colonus as the locale of Oedipus’
burial, and refers not to Athens, but to Attica (the countryside
surrounding Athens), as if to emphasize the inclusion of both country
and city as part of Athens’s full identity.41 As Hammond insightfully
notes, when Oedipus had said of his arrival, ‘ı
çæA 	ŁÅ
 K
B,’
or ‘It is the sign of my destiny,’ he uses two terms in a row that
connote the joining together of what has been apart (line 47).42
Theseus also is he who has brought together what was previously
apart, so that all might dwell together. Here Sophocles associates
Theseus’ bringing together of the city with Oedipus’ arrival at his
destiny. While Sophocles is better known for his conservative orien-
tation toward aristocracy, Sophocles’ last work displays a care and
concern for inclusion and gentleness in the reception of countryman,
exile, and stranger into Athens, precisely at a time when the Athen-
ians were facing defeat in war and considerable political division.43
Theseus, then, might be said to be the true hero of Oedipus at
Colonus, for he is the reversal of Oedipus, a man who began in exile,
but ends in gentle rule. Instead of ending in harsh judgement against
those who had harmed him, Theseus welcomes with hospitality those
who have received harm. Theseus might be said to be the only ‘happy
reversal’ of the play, and his presence as a gentle and compassionate
ruler has consequences not only for himself, but for his whole city.
He replaces the rule of force with the rule of law, for law treats all
alike according to a common, single principle, as force cannot. While
Thebes had suffered because of Oedipus’ pollution, Athens will pros-
per because of its reception of Oedipus in his pollution and in his
misery. While Oedipus’ family will suffer greatly because of his fate,
and because of his reaction to that Fate, the families in the audience of
the plays, in Athens, are assured of the benevolent protection of the
city because of Theseus’ care for the exiled and polluted one.
40 Plutarch, Lives, Vol. I, trans. J. Dryden with revisions by A. H. Clough (New
York: A. L. Burt, n.d.), 23.
41 Walker, Theseus and Athens, 174–5.
42 Hammond, Strangeness of Tragedy, 88.
43 Markantonatos, Oedipus at Colonus, 10–21, convincingly lays out the argument
for the biographical indications of a Sophocles who was strongly democratic late in
life; see also his reﬂections on the signiﬁcance of the drama as a way to bolster Athens
at a time of decline in Markantonatos, Oedipus at Colonus, 157–67.
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Theseus is the true possessor of wisdom in this dialogue, even as
Oedipus is Athens’ guarantor of its longevity. Oedipus’ suffering body
is the source of the city’s protection, an embodied witness of the
power of suffering to protect as well as to cause distress.44 Theseus’
wisdom is gleaned from his own experience of exile and suffering,
which brings compassion and care to his rule. His is not a divine
wisdom, but a human one informed by a sense of his own limits and
compassion for others in their humanity.45 Oedipus’ presence in
death, outside of the city, is also the city’s protection, for his protec-
tion arises from the incorporation of his weakness. Sophocles was also
offering his own political community a reﬂection on the necessity for
Athens to embody this approach to political community as a ‘dwell-
ing together’, not only of strong, but also of weak.
44 Ballengee, Wound and the Witness, 59–64. Ballengee views Oedipus’ physical
woundedness as holding the memory of his past deeds, a physical presence that grants
his body political power in its ability to exact vengeance on threats to Athens.
However, Oedipus is also positively characterized as a blessing to Athens, a positive
protective presence to the city.
45 Along similar lines, Mills remarks of Theseus, ‘he is no deus ex machina, since he
has no power or knowledge beyond what might be expected of a wise human king; he
can mitigate suffering, but he cannot explain it’. See Mills, Theseus, Tragedy, 168.
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3Pity as a Civic Virtue in Sophocles’
Philoctetes
The Philoctetes does not open with its main character, because at the
start of the play, no dialogue is possible for him. The ﬁrst word of the
dialogue in Greek is IŒ, or shore, an appropriate beginning since
Philoctetes himself belongs at the periphery, the edge, the space in
between belonging to society—to which he naturally as a human
being forms a part—and being an island to himself in his isolation
on Lemnos. Lemnos is a large island west of Troy, and so it is
somewhat surprising when Odysseus describes it as completely unin-
habited, a place that no one even visits. Because of this isolation, we
ﬁnd Philoctetes to be someone in a place that is ‘in between’. Physic-
ally, he is entirely separated from his fellow comrades in arms with
whom he willingly went to ﬁght at Troy. He lacks the ability to speak
with any other human being, to communicate. He is also excluded
from the company of the gods, insofar as his treading on the sacred
ground of Chryses, en route to Troy, is the cause of his oozing wound,
and the ground of his subsequent exclusion from the company of his
own men. At the same time, we know Philoctetes to be by nature a
social man. While Odysseus himself is said to have feigned madness
in order to avoid ﬁghting in the war, Philoctetes went willingly,
bringing seven armies with him. His bow and his subsequent military
power, so highly sought after by Odysseus in this ﬁnal year at Troy,
are the result of a gift of Herakles. When Herakles desires to die to
escape the intolerable pain of his poisoned cloak, it is Philoctetes who
willingly sets the ﬁre to the pyre after others refuse, allowing Herakles
to escape his pain. Although he is severely wounded, Philoctetes’
empty cave nonetheless contains traces of civilization: a crudely
carved wooden cup; a bed made of leaves; material for making a
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ﬁre; and especially Philoctetes’ bow, which allows him to slay birds
and to survive off their meat. While isolated from the materiality
and sociality of civilization, Philoctetes nonetheless endeavours to
live a distinctively human life. The ‘shore’ is thus an image of Phi-
loctetes himself, not only as in between island and world, but also
as representative of someone who is located in between isolation
and society, between brutishness and culture, between nature and
civilization.
Sophocles presents not only Philoctetes’ physical wounds, but also
his existence in this ‘in between’ space as that which grants him access
into humanity in a special way possible for those at the margins. As a
marginal ﬁgure, he belongs to both the human and the inhuman. As
the shore is both sea and sand, Philoctetes is both social because
human, and yet, denied the sociality that he craves. But what is
important about Philoctetes is not only the fact of his wound. Surely
his extreme physical pain matters to him, and at times occupies his
attention to the exclusion of many things. But even for Philoctetes,
this wound is only a ﬁgure of much deeper wounds suffered in his
exclusion from society, from the company of fellow human beings.
He knows his need for society, precisely through its being denied to
him. Philoctetes eventually gains a deeper access to his humanity,
precisely through others’ denial of it. His experience of longing for
others opens him up to a deeper understanding of his own nature, by
virtue of his lack. And it is this longing and need that lead another,
Neoptolemus, to his growth in the political community. The vulner-
able and wounded are not merely to be tolerated or accepted; rather,
Sophocles presents Philoctetes’ weakness as contributing to the
growth of Neoptolemus’ virtue, and to the growth of the political
community.
In this chapter, I argue that Sophocles develops the notion of two
political virtues: ﬁrst, pity as a political virtue and, second, the virtue
of being able to accommodate unjust harm properly. The vulnerabil-
ity of individuals such as Philoctetes demands the need for both a
kind of pity that verges on interpersonal compassion (as found in
Neoptolemus), but also the ability to respond properly to unjust harm.
Our own contemporary cultural tendency is to think of such musings
about vulnerability and pity as private, as apolitical, as better suited
to the realm of psychology than to the realm of politics. However,
Sophocles presents Philoctetes’ physical and emotional woundedness
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as a distinctively political problem. Neoptolemus is not simply en-
gaged in an interpersonal relationship with Philoctetes; he is a polit-
ical emissary who seeks to return Philoctetes to Troy. Odysseus is
not presented only as an individual concerned with his own glory. In
some ways, he stands for a fundamental problem in politics itself,
namely, the tendency of politics to move toward dissembling
and even ruthlessness in the working out of its larger goals. Odysseus
and the Greeks wish to succeed in the war against Troy, and Philoctetes
in his individuality is subsumed to that larger project and its
demands. To this extent, Odysseus and his lies possess a kind of
‘reasonableness’, from the point of view of achieving ‘greater’ political
ends. Thus, Neoptolemus must work out for himself how to reconcile
his care for Philoctetes and for moral integrity, against the demands of
his political world. Philoctetes must learn how to accommodate
the past harm done to him, in the light of Odysseus’ refusal to
express sorrow, into his own citizenship as part of an imperfect
Greek community.
I
Odysseus initially describes Philoctetes to Neoptolemus primarily as
one who cries, who makes noise. He claims that Philoctetes was
abandoned because his ‘savage cries (IªæÆØ) and ill-omened words
(ıçÅÆØ)’ kept interrupting sacriﬁces (9–10). Indeed, the Chorus
and Neoptolemus discover Philoctetes by his constant cries, so that
we might expect to ﬁnd a wild man, a savage, in that ﬁrst encounter.
But instead of wildness, we ﬁnd something else entirely. Philoctetes’
ﬁrst sounds, once he encounters men again, are not screams, but a
speech; in fact, he gives a speech about speeches. Philoctetes pleads
that the others speak to him (he is especially hopeful from their
clothing that it will be in Greek, which he can understand) because
primary to his own healing is communication:
Strangers (	
Ø)! Who are you? Who are you that have landed in this place
without good mooring or inhabitants? Of what homeland are you, and what
family might I be right to say? The style of your clothing is Greek, always
beloved to me. I want to hear your voice (çøB). Don’t shrink in dread from
my wildness, but pity me a man miserable, alone, abandoned, friendless.
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Speak, if you have arrived in friendship. Answer me, for it is not appropriate
that I should miss (±ÆæE) this from you or you from me. (219–31)1
Philoctetes asks a whole series of questions, questions that demand
answers, and whose answers demand an expression of identity: the
speakers’ home, ethnicity, language, and whether their presence is
one of friendship or not. Every one of these ﬁrst questions posed by
Philoctetes expresses the need for society in both content and in form:
the content concerns the social nexus into which his visitors belong,
and whether Philoctetes in some way belongs to that same nexus, as
Greek or friend; but the form of speaking itself for Philoctetes is also
already connective; and his question as a question is connective, or at
least desirous of connection. Questions are speech acts that embody
longing of some sort—whether the longing for an answer to a prob-
lematic philosophical question, or the longing for the contact of
speech itself, a question is an invitation to another person, or to the
world, to offer some kind of an answer. A question is an expression of
not-yet-having what one desires, of lack, of need. Philoctetes is a
needy man, and is far past the point of denying his neediness. For
him, that they would somehow miss one another (±ÆæE) is
beyond what is reasonable for a man to endure; the use of ±ÆæE
here gives us the sense that it would be almost a moral or religious
failing.
When Neoptolemus offers the briefest of answers, ‘Stranger (	
· ),
know ﬁrst that we are Greeks (232),’ Philoctetes makes no effort to
hide his joy in ﬁnding this moment of connection, exclaiming, ‘What
beloved sound (çºÆ çÅÆ)! Alas! To receive (ºÆE) a
greeting from such a man after such a long time!’ (234–5). The
sound of the Greek is a ‘beloved’ experience for him, because of the
fellowship that it offers, the possibility of meaningful exchange, the
experience of gift and giver, of reception and recipient making a
return of the gift of the word, in each reply. Philoctetes is deeply
aware of the giftedness of the word, of ºª, almost exuberant with
its joy.
1 Translations in this chapter are my own. Greek text is from Sophocles,
The Philoctetes of Sophocles, edited with introduction and notes by Richard Jebb
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898). Perseus Digital Library, <http://
www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0193>, accessed
2010–12.
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Philoctetes’ eager desire for speech is matched only by Neoptole-
mus’ hesitance to engage in speech, a hesitancy that I think we can
fairly attribute to two causes: ﬁrst, Odysseus has warned Neoptole-
mus that Philoctetes may be resentful of Odysseus or anyone associ-
ated with him. The image he has conveyed to Neoptolemus is to be
careful not to be shot at with the powerful bow. Second, Neoptolemus
has been sent by Odysseus to use deceitful speech to trick Philoctetes
into handing over the bow, but Neoptolemus from the beginning
ﬁnds such a use of speech to lack nobility and goodness. He is most
hesitant to begin speaking, because of the possibility that words may
be used for deception, not friendship, to steal, rather than to make a
gift. We ﬁnd then, in these earliest exchanges between Philoctetes and
Neoptolemus, a preﬁguring of a choice Neoptolemus himself will
have to make about the proper use of speech in response to his
encounter with Philoctetes’ woundedness.
Speech, especially persuasive speech, will be a central topic of this
play, and here we see the necessity of speech for a human being at its
most elemental. At its most basic level, speech presumes contact, and
the play’s concern centres around two interrelated issues: ﬁrst, the
narrower issue as to whether false persuasive speech for the sake of a
just goal (such as the defeat of Troy) is an acceptable means to that
end, and second, the broader issue as to what speech ought to
communicate.2 For Neoptolemus, his own development is to regard
speech not only as a means of effecting action, but more importantly,
as a communication of the self, or of two selves to one another.
Neoptolemus’ window into the need of speech to be interpersonal,
an authentic communication of one person to another, arises (even-
tually) from his contact with one who has so long been deprived of
such communication. It is Philoctetes’ lack that will expose his needi-
ness for communication to Neoptolemus, and so also communicate a
larger truth about speech to him. Neoptolemus learns that speech is
that which connects persons, and is not only a means of accomplish-
ing goals, as Odysseus would have it. To this extent, Neoptolemus
preserves his natural inclination toward speech that is measured by
virtue, rather than political efﬁcacy; his encounter with Philoctetes
2 As Rose demonstrates, many anthropological claims of the sophists about sur-
vival, the development of society, and the need for persuasive speech enter into the
drama and narrative of the play. See Peter Rose, ‘Sophocles’ Philoctetes and the
Teachings of the Sophists’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 80 (1976), 49–105.
Pity as a Civic Virtue 67
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
reinforces his understanding of justice and virtue as central to good
speech.3 Philoctetes’ need, and even his pain, are what assist Neop-
tolemus in growing in his understanding of speech as requiring a care
for virtue. Neoptolemus’ sympathy for Philoctetes allows him to resist
an understanding of speech as oriented exclusively toward political
efﬁcacy, instead moving him to understand speech as oriented toward
building political community and friendship.
When Neoptolemus feigns ignorance of Philoctetes’ story, Philoc-
tetes seeks to communicate it. His self-understanding is not merely
that he is wounded, but he says that his comrades abandoned him
(267). To be sure, Philoctetes’ wound itself is painful, but his suffering
comes from his understanding of himself as abandoned, desolate, left
alone with no one to witness the pain, let alone to share in it with him,
even through a minimal act of sympathy, as an experience of choos-
ing to take on and experience some portion of pain with another. This
idea of being known, his pain being witnessed, is apparent in his deep
disappointment that Neoptolemus has not even heard his story. Part
of the suffering, to be sure, is simply the absence of human contact,
and his sorrow that he is not even missed enough for stories to be told
about him. But the suffering from abandonment in this case is worse,
for the very reason for his being abandoned is that his pain was too
much for the other Greeks to bear. It was, for them, an interruption, a
disturbance of their senses of smell and sound. However, perhaps his
cries also disrupted the others precisely because they did call forth a
certain shared feeling, a feeling-with Philoctetes of extreme discom-
fort, that could not be ignored, or put away, except by putting him
away. So while Philoctetes is in pain, he suffers less from the wounded
leg than from the wounds of rejection, from the judgement and
evaluation that his pain is too much to bear, that the community
will not bear his pain along with him. Philoctetes becomes identiﬁed
not as a man who has pain, but as pain, as the one who cries and
disturbs the order. His identity becomes submerged in his being ‘the
wounded one’, when for Philoctetes, he is still a Greek, a warrior, the
3 Biancalana sets out a similar distinction between virtue and efﬁcacy in speech,
but sees it as a direct criticism of Athenian politics when the play was produced
around 409, shortly after the political revolt of 411 bce. See Joseph Biancalana, ‘The
Politics and Laws of Philoctetes’, Law and Literature 17 (2) (2005), 155–82. I agree,
but wish to link vulnerability and pity to political community in a way that Biancalana
does not. See also Charles Segal, Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of
Sophocles (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 333–40.
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one who mastered the bow of Herakles, the one who was willing to
ﬁght for his fellow men. He does not wish to be deﬁned entirely by his
pain, but ironically, in being cast out from society, is left with little
else except his pain, through the exclusion of all the rest.
Philoctetes survives—just barely—because he is able to crawl out
and to ﬁnd food, to hunt with the bow, and to create ﬁre. He says,
‘When there was no ﬁre, striking stone against stone, I’d bring to
light the hidden spark (çÅ· ¼çÆ çH), which always saved me’
(296–7). Philoctetes’ three technologies available to him are ﬁre,
shelter, and the bow.4 These are his only bridge to civilization, as
well as his means of survival, when deprived of the culture and society
of others. In Sophocles’ Greece, when a new colony was founded, a
symbolic ﬁre was taken from the public hearth of the Prytaneum, to
the new city, and used to light its hearth. In the light of this tradition,
we might imagine the importance of ﬁre in the Greek understanding
of a public space. Philoctetes has a private ﬁre, which he must strike
anew each time, and is deprived of the public hearth, the ﬁre of the city
that burns for the whole community, and not only a private home. Still,
the presence of ﬁre is more than a mere necessity for him, and serves as
a reminder of the civilization that he has left behind.
Herakles’ bow is also representative of Philoctetes’ middle place
between solitary existence and civilization, for its original purpose in
being with him was for use in the Trojan War. As such, his bow was
intended to serve him as a warrior and as an ally in the Greek
agreement to defend the guest–host relationship. On the isolated
island, however, Philoctetes’ bow is primarily an instrument that
can bring him food, in the absence of the physical ability to work
the ground and grow food. Instead of ﬁghting Trojans, he is killing
birds. His bow is also his last remaining vestige of his power; it is the
sole reason that Odysseus returns for Philoctetes and wishes to bring
him back. As Segal argues, the bow connects Philoctetes to the divine;
in the absence of wine, he was unable to perform sacriﬁces to the gods
while on Lemnos, but his bow was invested with Herakles’ greatness
and becomes almost a ‘talisman’ of the dead king.5 The bow soon also
becomes a sign of friendship between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes,
when the latter allows the young man to hold it and even to protect it,
4 Later Philoctetes also mentions the herb he found that is somewhat capable of
soothing his pain.
5 Segal, Tragedy and Civilization, 294.
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as a sign of his trust in their bond. By its very structure, a bow is
connective; in its exchange between the two men, the bow also
becomes a symbol of their connection. Thus, the bow connects
Philoctetes to the divine Herakles, but also back again to the social
and political world through Neoptolemus.
Rather quickly into their conversation, Philoctetes receives the
experience of connection and of empathy that he desires, but in the
form of a deception. Neoptolemus seeks to gain Philoctetes’ trust and
conﬁdence by suggesting that they share a common enemy among
the leaders of Troy. He tells the story of how Odysseus denied him the
armour that had belonged to his father, Achilles, and emphasizes his
own anger at Odysseus’ lack of honour. The psychological aim of
such a story is to ally himself with the wounded man through a kind
of reverse empathy. Neoptolemus presents himself as one with whom
Philoctetes can sympathize. He presents himself as if he were the one
in need; rather than directly sympathizing with Philoctetes, Neop-
tolemus engages him by drawing him into his own false story.
Philoctetes can identify with the story insofar as he can see himself,
or aspects of himself, within it. Thus, in this act of sympathizing with
the false Neoptolemus, Philoctetes is, in a way, sympathizing with
himself. His own pain is put on display for him, albeit in a modiﬁed
form. He is both the suffering one, and the one witnessing the
suffering, through this story of anguish similar to his being placed
before him in the story of Neoptolemus. Through the other’s narra-
tive, he can understand something of his own suffering, and ﬁnd relief
in its being shared by another. Thus, the tragedy exhibits for us the
ways in which the witnessing to pain, and sharing in it, to some extent
lightens its load for those who suffer, and can even draw them into a
mutual fellowship. As the ﬁnal chapter of this book will argue, such
mediation and sharing of suffering is also key to the audience’s
experience of tragedy, an experience that makes possible sympathy
not only between audience and characters, but also even between the
members of the audience.
Neoptolemus’ account of his own suffering resonates with Philoc-
tetes (343–90). The most obvious resonance rests upon their shared
sense of anger with Odysseus, who is supposedly responsible for
denying him his father Achilles’ armour, a typical gift for a son
after his father’s death. But his story sets forth other elements present
in Philoctetes’ life, too: Neoptolemus feels the loss of his father, and
his separation from the one he loves, as does Philoctetes feel strongly
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the separation from his people. Odysseus has supposedly told Neop-
tolemus that the reason he may not have Achilles’ armour is that ‘You
were not with us, but instead somewhere else, where you shouldn’t
have been’ (379). But this sentence also articulates perfectly Philoc-
tetes’ perception of his own situation with respect to Troy: that he
cannot share in the glory of war, because he is somewhere else, and
should not be. Lemnos for Philoctetes is hardly even a place, for the
island is not deﬁned by any people; when he leaves, he says that he is
leaving behind a ‘dwelling’, but not a ‘home’. Just as in Homer,
Odysseus is hØ, nobody, and no one, on the island of the Cyclops,
when denied the presence of a civilized community, Philoctetes can
see his own location only as ‘somewhere else’; he is nowhere and
somewhere all at once.
Philoctetes begs Neoptolemus not to leave him by making himself
a suppliant. In asking a question, a person makes himself somewhat
vulnerable to another person or to reality itself, in admitting a need
for something he lacks, and his desire to have that which he does not
yet possess. Supplication is an even more intensive expression of lack
or need. The Greek verb for supplication, ƒŒ
ıø, is speciﬁc to a
ritualized set of practices that place a supplicant into a speciﬁc
relation to the one whom he supplicates. As Naiden has demon-
strated, the difference between a supplication to a god and a prayer
is that in supplication, the god must be present (as in an epiphany),
while prayer is possible when the god is not literally present.6 Thus,
supplication always implies asking for an immediate response, in a
way that prayer need not; it is a two-way social act. Here, Philoctetes
supplicates not only to get the goal he wants (to leave Lemnos), but
also to continue social interaction (the supplication itself assures that
he will not be alone, so long as the conversation and act of supplica-
tion continues). His supplication is an expression of his desire for
home, and of his loneliness in dreading the possibility of yet another
abandonment.
In kneeling or grasping the knees of another, a supplicant makes
himself vulnerable to the other, by displaying in physical posture his
weakness compared to the one he is approaching (kneeling, or
lowering oneself expresses one’s lower station, but also makes one
vulnerable to attack from above). His verbal request, accompanied by
6 F. S. Naiden, Ancient Supplication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7–8.
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the physical gesture, is desperate. He explicitly asks Neoptolemus to
take pity (Kº
Å) on him (501). (At other times, Philoctetes uses the
term rŒ for pity; rŒ might better be rendered as something
like pity/grief as it expresses elements of lamentation as well as pity;
when Aristotle discusses pity, he restricts himself entirely to the term
º.7)
Konstan’s work on the nature of pity in Greek and Roman thought
brieﬂy attends to Philoctetes. As part of his analysis of the Aristotelian
concept of pity, Konstan points out that Aristotle requires vulnerabil-
ity to suffering as a condition of pity. Aristotle writes that there are
two sorts of people that are unlikely to feel pity: those who have lost
everything, for they are not likely to fear the possibility of losing
anything further; and those who are extremely fortunate, for they are
not likely to believe that they might suffer the same sort of experience
as the one who is now suffering (Rhetoric 2. 8). In other words,
Aristotle makes as a condition of experiencing pity my ability to
identify myself as capable of being in the same or a similar situation.
On the one hand, to have pity for another requires that we have
different current fortunes (if we are both sharing the same afﬂiction, it
is not pity, but something more like commiseration); on the other
hand, I need to be able to imagine myself into the position in which
you are. For this reason, Aristotle suggests that most often we are
capable of pity for those who are more like us in age, station in life, or
character.8 We must also understand ourselves as vulnerable, and so
as like the other who asks for our pity.
At the same time, pity is distinct from sympathy, in which the
emotion is more closely shared between two people. Konstan shows
that fairly consistently in Greek literature, the term pity (rŒ) is
excluded from reference to family members’ feelings for one another,
and for the emotions of friends who witness one other’s suffering.
Pity requires a certain emotional distance, a continued stance of being
a bit of an observer, rather than simply one who suffers the same as
the one pitied, while sympathy (ıŁØÆ, a term that arises only
after the classical period) or other terms such as ıÆºªE (to feel
pain with) or ıºıÆØ (to feel pain or grieve with) connote a
7 See David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and
Greek Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 111–28.
8 Konstan, Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 49–50.
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deeper sharing of the experience that we might expect in friendship or
familial relationships.9
We might ask, then, what allows Neoptolemus to take pity on
Philoctetes, what in his character, experience, or disposition opens
up the possibility of pity that also moves him to action, when Phi-
loctetes’ comrades had abandoned him as a reaction to his wound and
his cries. Of course, Neoptolemus and Odysseus have come for
Philoctetes’ bow, so that the Trojan War might be won. However
much this is a part of Neoptolemus’ own motivation, in his reluctant
agreement that they must deceive Philoctetes, eventually the ‘better
part’ of Neoptolemus wins out, the part of Neoptolemus that under-
stands good speech to be virtuous, and not only effective. Good
speech in this case also means being responsive to Philoctetes as a
man, not only as the possessor of the bow; that is, Neoptolemus
understands Philoctetes’ dignity as a human being to be more signiﬁ-
cant than his status as possessor of the weapon that must be had in
order to win Troy.10 We see the natural pity that Philoctetes incurs as
a human being even in the Chorus’ response to him as one of pity
(317–18).
The use of the character of Neoptolemus as the one sent to retrieve
Philoctetes is a Sophoclean innovation. While little is known of the
Aeschylean and Euripidean versions of the play, aside from a ﬁrst-
century critical essay by Dio Chrysostom, we do know that Sophocles
alone has Neoptolemus be Philoctetes’ primary relationship on
Lemnos; in both Aeschylus and Euripides, the conﬂict centres around
Odysseus and his relation to Philoctetes.11 This dramatic innovation
allows Sophocles to explore the signiﬁcance of natural sympathy
between human beings as the ground for a political bond. Neoptole-
mus has no direct connection to Philoctetes aside from being a Greek
of noble class, and yet, his interpersonal bond to Philoctetes is
profound as a result of their mutual encounter with his pain.
9 Konstan offers extensive evidence on this distinction between Greek terms;
Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 111–28.
10 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Consequences and Character in Sophocles’ “Philoc-
tetes” ’, Philosophy and Literature 1 (1) (Fall 1976), 47 which emphasizes Neoptole-
mus’ concern that Philoctetes be free to choose.
11 See John S. Kieffer, ‘Philoctetes and Arete’, Classical Philology 37 (1) (January
1942), 38–50; Dio discusses the three Philoctetes tragedies in his 52nd and 59th
Discourses. Dio Chrysostom, also called Dio of Prusa, was a ﬁrst-century ce commen-
tator, philosopher, and writer in the Roman Empire.
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The turning point for Neoptolemus seems to be neither entreaties
to be pious, nor the praise of his good character heaped upon him, not
even Philoctetes’ claim that Neoptolemus is a ‘friend’ (çº), though
we might imagine that these words prepare the ground for Neoptole-
mus’ renunciation of his deceitful rhetoric. Instead, Philoctetes’ cries
of pain, when an episode of especially acute suffering comes upon
him, deeply affect Neoptolemus. As Philoctetes cries out both for
relief from the pain, and for protection for his sacred bow (the only
thing of worth to him aside from a pain-soothing herb), Neoptolemus
exclaims that he feels Philoctetes’ pain along with him and has been
concerned for his troubles this whole time (806). In the midst of this
pain, Philoctetes begs for Neoptolemus to light a ﬁre to burn him, so
that he might escape his pain (800–1), just as Philoctetes had once
done for Herakles.12 While Neoptolemus ignores this request, he does
give his oath that he will wait and will not leave without Philoctetes
(813). When the wounded man falls asleep, Neoptolemus is faced
with the possibility of recapitulating the previous episode in which
Odysseus and his men abandoned him on the island (while he slept);
but while the Chorus suggests that this is the most advantageous
time for a clean get away now that he has the bow in hand, Neoptole-
mus remains. His reason is: ‘I see (›æH) that the hunt for the bow is in
vain if we sail without him. For he is the one who must have the
garland. He is the one that the god told us to bring back (ŒÇØ)’
(839–41).
Philoctetes’ suffering produces a clear decision on Neoptolemus’
part to bring back not only the bow, but also the man (whereas
Odysseus thought stealing the bow to be the wisest course of action).
While his reasons to the Chorus are that the mission includes taking
back Philoctetes, not just the bow, as soon as the wounded man
awakens, Neoptolemus can no longer contain his ambivalence over
his next course of action. His increased rational understanding of
Philoctetes as a man whose dignity must be respected, lest he deserve
shame and disgrace, stems from an emotional, not simply purely
rational, encounter with the man.13 That is, Sophocles presents this
12 Segal notes the traditional association of Lemnian ﬁre with the volcanic ﬁre of
Mount Mosychlos, again suggesting that Philoctetes seeks to ﬂee the gods and the
heavens for the depths of the earth. See Segal, Tragedy and Civilization, 305.
13 See Anne Hawkins, ‘Ethical Tragedy and Sophocles’ “Philoctetes” ’, Classical
World 92 (4) (1999), 337–57. Hawkins offers an account of the role of emotional
response in Neoptolemus’ ethical dilemma of the Philoctetes. See also Mary Whitlock
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young man’s moral growth, and understanding of the right moral
action to take with Philoctetes stems in part from a proper emotional
response (feeling pity) to the suffering man. While Neoptolemus
from the beginning suggests that it is not in his nature (çı) to
plot against others (88–9), his nature (çØ) can only be developed
and brought to fruition through an encounter with the one who
suffers. He also must reconcile Odysseus’ claim that the oracle
demands the return of Philoctetes with the question of the man’s
freedom; that is, he must try to understand piety better.14 Thus, the
political problem of how to get Philoctetes back into the community
and back to Troy, so that the Greeks may be victorious, requires an
interpersonal, sympathetic encounter that allows Neoptolemus to
grow morally. Such moral growth includes a proper emotional, as
well as rational, component.
Indeed, one might say that Neoptolemus’ moral growth comes to
fruition when he is able to unify the emotional and rational elements
within that have so far been in conﬂict, without excluding the com-
plexity of their demands. Odysseus seems to rely solely on his judge-
ment that piety and justice require that the bow be taken; he excludes
compassion from his moral compass, or even to avoid internal
conﬂict. In contrast, Neoptolemus’ experience of pity signiﬁcantly
informs his exercise of reason, for the experience of witnessing the
suffering man leads to his reasoned judgement that the proper moral
response is to abide by his promise and to return the bow to Philoc-
tetes. He manages to integrate his reasoned judgement about the best
course of action with his affective response to the man. Neither
Philoctetes nor Odysseus seems to manage such integration of feeling
and reason: Odysseus excludes compassion, but Philoctetes seems
completely under the sway of his immediate feelings, unable to
consider the demands of political obligation. Philoctetes, too,
must come to terms with his vulnerability, though differently from
Neoptolemus.
Blundell, ‘The Phusis of Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ “Philoctetes” ’, Greece and Rome,
Second Series 35 (2) (October 1988), 140; and Rose, ‘Teachings of the Sophists’, 74.
14 Charles Segal, ‘Philoctetes and the Imperishable Piety’, Hermes 105 (2) (1977),
133–58.
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II
Philoctetes is initially overjoyed when he awakes to ﬁnd himself still
surrounded by others, but Neoptolemus expresses confusion, disgust,
and even pain in trying to discern what next to choose (see 911–21).
Neoptolemus even uses the Greek term ÆÆE, the same exclamation
that Philoctetes had earlier used when he was in pain, suggesting that
Neoptolemus’ pain over his own moral failing mirrors the physical
pain that Philoctetes had experienced; it exhibits itself as much more
than regret, or worry, but as taking on a physical, gut-wrenching
quality (compare 895 and 785–6). Neoptolemus explains, ‘It’s not
that I am leaving you, but rather I am sending you somewhere that
will cause you distress. This is what’s been grieving me (IØHÆØ) for
so long’ (912–13). His agony is understandable, for Neoptolemus
must consider not only the justice and nobility of his actions towards
Philoctetes, but also the question of piety. Odysseus has argued
that if Neoptolemus obeys Odysseus he will nevertheless still be called
‘the most pious of mortals’ (P
Æ æH) (85). While it
is conceivable that Odysseus is simply claiming that one shameless
act will not stand in the way of Neoptolemus’ reputation for piety,
if we take Odysseus to have a genuine concern for piety, then he
might understand piety as demanding obedience to the oracle (83–5).
Even so, Odysseus’ sense of piety is subservient to his sense of his
own glory and victory; it is Neoptolemus who is left struggling to
reconcile the multiple demands of piety, politics, natural pity, and
nobility.15
Philoctetes, understandably, feels betrayed, and demands the
return of his bow. Here, we especially see how the bow has taken on
the signiﬁcance of a sign of friendship between them. Just as Herakles
had offered it to Philoctetes not only as a reward for his relief
from pain, but also as a sign of their connection to one another,16
15 Aristide Tessitore describes the potentially conﬂicting demands of piety and
politics experienced by Neoptolemus in ‘Justice, Politics, and Piety in Sophocles’
Philoctetes’, Review of Politics 65 (1) (Winter 2003), 61–88. Nussbaum suggests the
good of all citizens is more signiﬁcant than Odysseus’ personal glory, but it is more
accurate to say that Odysseus sees his own victory here as tied to the success of his
mission, no matter what that means. See Nussbaum, ‘Consequences and Character’,
25–53.
16 As Avery points out, when Philoctetes addresses the bow at 1128–9, he says that
it must pity ‘e  æ˙ŒºØ’; the use of the adjectival form of Herakles here links
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Philoctetes had allowed Neoptolemus to touch it as a sign of their
friendship, a connection which had relieved much of the wounded
man’s pain of isolation. The bow is not only Philoctetes’ only way to
survive, in his lameness and inability to grow food for himself; more
signiﬁcantly, it is a sign of his honour and his strength. Traditionally,
Herakles himself received the bow from Apollo;17 this bow, then, is
also a sign of the friendship between the gods and human beings; but
Philoctetes’ frequent expressions of doubt as to the justice and care of
the gods suggest his bow may be one of the last concrete signs of that
divine–human care. In choosing to hand over this bow to Neoptole-
mus, he makes himself much more vulnerable than he had been
before; in feeling betrayed in his moment of trust and vulnerability,
he demands that the main sign of his vulnerable friendship with
Neoptolemus be returned to him (924).
The moment of betrayal arises not in Neoptolemus’ claim that the
Greeks need the bow, but rather in his admission that his stories thus
far have been a lie: the violation of trust experienced in deception is as
signiﬁcant for Philoctetes as the potential loss of the bow itself.
Philoctetes’ angry reaction to the betrayal is understandable, for
while Philoctetes could have chosen differently, out of his great
need and loneliness, he chose to open himself in friendship to Neop-
tolemus. One might imagine, for example, an alternative story of a
man abandoned on an island because of his wound, who grows to
hate others, to reject humanity in others and even in himself as a
result of the rejection that he had experienced. Or imagine Philoc-
tetes, after ten years, turned entirely to non-human concerns, separ-
ating himself from his humanity through a reserved asceticism.
Philoctetes might reasonably have been distrustful of the strangers
who arrived on his island, assuming that these human beings, too,
were likely to bring him harm. Instead, Philoctetes lays himself bare
to them in his need, hiding none of his suffering, neither his physical
pain, nor his desire for friendship, community, and truth. Sophocles
presents Philoctetes as far more willingly vulnerable than in the
Philoctetes closely to Herakles as his successor or even like a son. See Harry C. Avery,
‘Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus’, Hermes 93 (3) (1965), 293. For an excellent
account of the many, layered nuances of the bow, see Segal, Tragedy and Civilization,
318–21.
17 Diodorus Siculus, 4. 14. 3. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, Vol. II, Books
2. 35–4. 58 (Loeb), trans. C. H. Oldfather (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1935).
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Euripidean version of the play in which, Dio tells us, Philoctetes’ ﬁrst
response to Odysseus’ arrival and proclamation that he is a Greek is
that he will shoot any Greek he meets with his bow.18 This Philoctetes
is aware of the dangers, but willing to encounter them. He chooses to
react to his pain by willingly ‘staying with’ his neediness and vulner-
ability, in trusting Neoptolemus after Odysseus’ prior betrayal, only
to ﬁnd that the two of them have been deceiving him all along.
Philoctetes repeatedly uses language that indicates he feels a fatherly
connection to Neoptolemus, whom he speaks of in terms that might
be used of a son: through much of the play, Philoctetes calls him ÆE,
or 
Œ (more than ﬁfty-two times in all).19 It is no wonder that
Philoctetes says that Neoptolemus is taking his life and that he is
‘nothing, the ill-fated one (› Ææ)’ (931; 951). Philoctetes had
used his very last strength to decide to engage openly and wholeheart-
edly with those who promised him relief, even abasing himself in
supplication, only to ﬁnd that Neoptolemus’ treasured words were
only lies.20
At the same time, Philoctetes deﬁnes himself too much in terms of
his own victimhood; his many years on the island in isolation have led
to an element of bitterness and resentment easily triggered by others’
actions. He understands himself too much as a passive recipient of
others’ actions and not enough as an active agent in the world.
Philoctetes wishes to curse Neoptolemus, failing to recognize the
complexity of the demands that Neoptolemus faces, in the youth’s
struggle to reconcile obedience to his superiors, piety, and care for
Philoctetes. Still, even here, kindheartedness inherent in the man
remains beneath his sense of victimhood, as he says, ‘Curse you
(ZºØ)—but not yet, before I learn whether you might again change
your mind (ªÅ Ø)’ (961–2). His desire for goodness in
Neoptolemus, for goodness in the humanity that Neoptolemus has
come to symbolize, is so strong that, even now, he awaits a change of
heart on the youth’s part.
Neoptolemus does not disappoint, and the young man is remark-
ably open in discussing his own feelings of pity, confusion, and
18 See Dio Chrystostom, Discourse 59, line 7.
19 Avery, ‘Heracles, Philoctetes, Neptolemus’, 285.
20 The gift of the bow bears strong resemblances to rites in a 	Æ (guest–host)
relationship. As Belﬁore has argued, the gift of the bow is reminiscent of 	Æ rituals
that unite the two men in a form of formalized friendship. See Elizabeth Belﬁore,
‘Xenia in Sophocles’ Philoctetes’, Classical Journal 89 (2) (1993–4), 113–29.
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oppression. Philoctetes consoles him, suggesting that Neoptolemus is
not a bad person, but has been taught by evil men. Here, again, we see
the Sophoclean use of the language of virtue, a language that focuses
on the good of character as necessarily linked to persuasion, rather
than the efﬁcacy of words as central to the good life. Philoctetes asks
for the peaceful return of the bow and to be left alone. At this
moment, Odysseus appears, unmoved and inﬂexible in his demand
that both the bow and Philoctetes come with him. Philoctetes releases
all his anger on Odysseus, challenging him for his reasons for aban-
donment (since, now that it serves his purposes, his cries and the
smell of his wound are no longer reasons for separation). Philoctetes
curses Odysseus with the curse that he had considered laying on
Neoptolemus. Odysseus responds by saying he will then leave with
the bow, and take the glory of defeating Troy for himself. Here again,
Odysseus misses the point, seeing neither the bow’s signiﬁcance as an
inheritance from the gods, nor as a bond of friendship, but simply as
an instrument of war; once again, efﬁcacy is foremost in Odysseus’
mind.21 In a moment of real cowardice, Neoptolemus does not act
counter to Odysseus’ demands.
Philoctetes bemoans his situation, and falls into despair, as his
missing bow is also his only source for food. The Chorus entreats
him to join the ship before it departs, insisting, ‘know that it is up to
you to escape death’ (1166). But the difﬁculty of this choice for
Philoctetes is understandable, for to rejoin the ship is to accede
completely to his enemy’s demands, to endure further humiliation,
and to again make himself even more vulnerable than he is in his
isolation. To return is to resume a place in a community where other
men who have treated him with so little care, most often with a
concern for convenience. Philoctetes eventually expresses a wish to
commit suicide, so lost is he in his sense of the inevitability of his
isolation, lack of power, and his feelings of betrayal. Just as he asks
for a weapon such as an axe with which to complete the deed,
21 See Biancalana, ‘The Politics and Laws of Philoctetes’, 162. Ryan Drake also
makes the interesting point that Odysseus himself is confronted with many of the
same issues that Neoptolemus faces, namely, a conﬂict between compassion for
another and the political order. In my view, Odysseus is not as ambivalent about
how to treat Philoctetes as Drake suggests. However, Drake raises signiﬁcant points
about the role of political order in the play, and Philoctetes’ limits in recognizing the
larger, divine narrative of which he forms a part. See Ryan Drake, ‘Natural and Divine
Orders: The Politics of Sophocles’ Philoctetes’, Polis 24 (2) (2007), 179–92.
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Neoptolemus arrives, running and out of breath, to return the bow.
Instead of being given a weapon to end his own life, Philoctetes
receives this sign of power and of friendship, not only restoring him
the means of survival, but also restoring his honour (along with
Neoptolemus’ own sense of his dignity). The bow takes the place of
the axe. Neoptolemus deﬁes Odysseus, insisting that the justice of this
act is more signiﬁcant than any strategic advantage for Troy in
owning the bow. Even when Odysseus threatens that the whole
Greek army will come after the young man if he returns the bow,
Neoptolemus stands ﬁrm in his belief that it is just to return it.
Here Neoptolemus stands in the same position to Philoctetes as
Philoctetes once stood in relation to Herakles. Philoctetes seeks to
repeat history, in asking Neoptolemus to end his suffering and pain;
his initial choice of hurling himself into a volcano even repeats the
motif of death by ﬁre.22 As Kirkwood phrases it, ‘Philoctetes is heir
not only to the bow but to the suffering of Heracles.’23 But Neoptole-
mus will not light the pyre, so to speak; instead, his return of the bow
seeks to move Philoctetes not away from, but back to, the political
community of the Greeks. The return of the bow is not a return to
stasis, but rather an acknowledgement of Philoctetes’ dignity in being
free to choose, or not to choose, to return to ﬁght at Troy. Thus,
Neoptolemus rejects both force and forceful persuasion, in favour of a
form of persuasion that acknowledges Philoctetes’ human freedom.
But this transition back to society is not easy for Philoctetes.
Neoptolemus not only returns the bow and arrows, but also stays
the bow when Philoctetes tries to kill the approaching Odysseus. As a
mediating ﬁgure, Neoptolemus here represents a mean between two
extremes, advocating neither betrayal of the sort that Odysseus
planned for the sake of defeating Troy, nor the simple vengeance of
anger. While Neoptolemus fails to be persuaded by Odysseus’ ma-
nipulations (outright humiliating Odysseus at one point; see 1292–5),
Neoptolemus also insists that such a vengeful act will not bring
Philoctetes any honour.
And to this extent, Neoptolemus is acknowledging the possibility of
honour, of a return of social status, and of the importance of a place in
the community for Philoctetes. That is, simply by saying that honour
22 See Avery, ‘Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus’, 295 and Gordon Kirkwood,
‘Persuasion and Allusion in Sophocles’ “Philoctetes” ’, Hermes 122 (4) (1994), 426.
23 See Kirkwood, ‘Persuasion and Allusion’, 426.
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must be a concern for Philoctetes, Neoptolemus reintroduces the
possibility of an orientation to the world that is not limited to
victimhood, or even the place of a supplicant. He offers the exiled
man something better than being a victim, even something better
than being rescued, which is to be returned to a moral status in the
community where his honour is up to himself again. Such a world
view also seeks to reconcile the multiple demands of nobility, friend-
ship, piety, and political expediency, insofar as he challenges Philoc-
tetes to willingly take up his divinely given task, not out of subservience
to the Greeks who have harmed him, but out of a sense of his own
responsibility for honour.
Neoptolemus then offers mature advice well beyond his years, in
suggesting that Philoctetes must leave his sense of injury behind. Of
course, Philoctetes’ feelings are understandable, after ten years of
rejection and separation, and then re-experiencing the same trauma
when Odysseus returns and again betrays him. However, Neoptole-
mus tells him that ‘Those who willingly (ŒıØØ) wrap them-
selves in their pain (ªŒØÆØ ºÆØ), just like you, it is not right
either to excuse or to feel compassion for’ (1318–20). Neoptolemus
cannot mean the wounded leg, for this wound was entirely accidental,
and so far is incurable. Instead, the ‘self-inﬂicted injury’ that Philoc-
tetes continues to experience is his living in accordance with his own
vision of himself as a victim of both physical and emotional, even
spiritual, injury. Neoptolemus lays out the facts: ‘You will never ﬁnd
rest from this heavy sickness so long as the sun rises and sets again,
unless you go to the plain of Troy freely (Œg), meet with the sons of
Asclepius there, and be relieved of this sickness (ı)’ (1330–4).
It is not that Philoctetes is inaccurate about the depth of his
mistreatment by the others. The abandonment he experienced, the
betrayals of being left alone on Lemnos, and then deceived in an effort
only to gain his weapon, are indeed real betrayals and losses, which
reﬂect poorly on Odysseus and those who support his manipulations.
The gods have not done much to assist the wounded Philoctetes until
now. But Neoptolemus’ point is that Philoctetes chooses to see
himself in the light of these others’ visions of him: as sick, as too
noisy in his cries; as useless to the war; as a victim to be pitied. His
choice to reside in the place that these others have ‘given’ to him is no
longer enforced by his physical isolation, but can be overcome by a
choice to go to Troy. To do so from a position of strength requires
that Philoctetes abandon his view of himself as victim, and return to
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Troy. To some extent, he must also move past his image of himself as
the inheritor of Herakles’ pain along with the bow, and understand
his unique place in history, distinct from that of Herakles. Thus,
Neoptolemus says he must return not only to be healed of the
wound, but also to ﬁght and to be ‘revealed as the one who sacked’
Troy (1335). Through Neoptolemus’ imagined vision of who Philoc-
tetes really is, or who he might choose to become, Philoctetes gains a
new perspective on himself, and does leave his sense of himself as
victim behind.
In abandoning his view of himself as victim, Philoctetes does not
leave behind his vulnerability, his capacity to be wounded. Indeed, his
return to society is also a return to social vulnerability. Philoctetes
does not replace his vision of himself as the wounded one with a view
of himself as invincible, nor does he pretend that no wrongs have
been done to him. As he mulls over the question of whether to
embark on the ship, the question of whether to rejoin society (realis-
tically, his only chance to do so), he expresses his fear that his
vulnerability to future harm remains: ‘it’s not the pain of what’s
bygone that bites (ŒØ) at me, but what it is necessary to suffer
from these people, as I think about what is still to come’ (1358–60).
And Philoctetes is completely right; not only does return not guaran-
tee his safety, but also, he is rather accurate about some of his
comrades’ deﬁciencies, and the evils that might befall him in rejoining
their company. He ought not to be naive in supposing that betrayal of
trust is not a possibility; he has experienced too much betrayal to
know that it might even be likely. His deepest longing is to go not to
Troy, but to retreat, and to go home . . . or to remain isolated in his
suffering.24 To some extent, his vulnerability to society and possibility
of rejection begins when he leaves Lemnos, and must participate in
political, social, and military actions with those who betrayed him.
That is, Philoctetes must accept the limitations of the political realm
and the reality of its inherent tensions between care for virtue and the
necessity of political expediency.
From all of this, Neoptolemus learns not only a general truth that
the vulnerable man has a place in the community. More speciﬁcally,
Neoptolemus learns another virtue, one that concerns the proper way
to respond to unjust harm. As Achilles’ son, Neoptolemus has in his
24 Avery, ‘Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus’, 284.
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father one model for how to respond to being harmed by others in the
community (in Achilles’ case, the taking of his prized Briseis). Achil-
les reacts ﬁrst by withdrawing from that community and later by re-
entering the war with rage at all who encounter him. Achilles’ rage is
one extreme response to suffering harm unjustly. At the other ex-
treme is Philoctetes’ desired withdrawal from the body politic. Phi-
loctetes’ response to the harm suffered by the Greeks is initially to
wish to return home, and to leave behind those who had abandoned
him. Neoptolemus chooses to encourage a middle path in Philoctetes:
neither to retreat altogether, nor to respond in anger, but rather to
return to the community with a realistic, but open, sense of his role
within it. Philoctetes, must learn to suffer harm at the hands of others
in the proper way: not to overlook it, but also to participate in that
community despite its shortcomings and the contingent nature of
harm. Through the process of ﬁnding a way to bring Philoctetes back
into the community, Neoptolemus himself learns that part of political
virtue is to know how to suffer harm appropriately, i.e. to know that
suffering from experiences that do not ﬁt into a perfect model of
justice is part of ordinary political life.
Ultimately, Neoptolemus chooses to make virtue a part of politics,
against mere political efﬁcacy.25 In contrast to the false merchant,
who says that either force or persuasive ºªØ must be used to bring
Philoctetes to Troy, Neoptolemus asks about why those who deserted
the man now want to bring him back: ‘What longing (Ł) has
come to them? What force and vengeance (
Ø) from the gods,
who punish evil deeds?’ (601–3)26
Neoptolemus reintroduces the question of proper moral motive as
part of political solution. Still, Neoptolemus and Philoctetes alike
must grow to understand that the political order will never allow
for the complete moral reconciliation of the sort that Philoctetes
desires, i.e. sorrow from Odysseus and the rendering of justice for
past harms from the other Greeks. For the nature of politics always
includes a concern with the necessary, the useful, the expedient; part
of human virtue is to know how to accept such limitations in order to
25 One commentator suggests that the general thrust of the Philoctetes as a whole is
to defend traditional aristocratic virtue against the new democracy of Athens. Bian-
calana, ‘The Politics and Laws of Philoctetes’, 155–82.
26 Biancalana, ‘The Politics and Laws of Philoctetes’, 166, where Biancalana notes
Philoctetes’ concern with Ł.
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continue to participate in the everyday human world. Herakles’
speech serves as a reminder of the importance of larger social and
political needs beyond Neoptolemus’ interpersonal relationships.
Neoptolemus manages to balance such concerns without abandoning
the moral claims made on him, and without ignoring friendship with
Philoctetes in favour of political efﬁcacy.
Whether or not Pericles was explicitly on Sophocles’ mind, Neop-
tolemus proves himself to be his father’s son, though more moderate
than Achilles himself.27 Neoptolemus insists that returning to Troy,
being healed, and ﬁghting again is really best for Philoctetes—his
friend’s good now being Neoptolemus’ primary concern instead of
the bow. Neoptolemus wishes to see Philoctetes restored to health,
and to return to the war—but Philoctetes will not and can not be the
same man who goes to Troy now as the one who ﬁrst set out on the
journey there so many years ago. Philoctetes refuses, until Herakles
appears, as a deus ex machina. While some commentators have
disparaged the appearance as a contrived end to the dilemma,28
Sophocles’ inclusion of Herakles is entirely appropriate to Philoctetes’
emergence into society again, because of the role that he had played to
Herakles, and how Herakles has served as a model for him.
Herakles’ speech is no doubt persuasive because of the bond that he
shares with Philoctetes; as a friend, and as the original giver of the
bow, his words instil trust in the wounded man in a way that
Neoptolemus has not been able to do. But Herakles also fulﬁls the
function of being two relationships for which Philoctetes longs:
a father, and a caring god. Philoctetes, in his moments of pain,
most often exclaims ÆØ, or even long strings of ÆÆÆÆÆE
(see e.g. 754). Avery suggests that the exclamations play upon the
Greek ÆÆ, or father.29 Herakles appears as a strong, male
presence. Philoctetes has also characterized himself as ‘hateful to
the gods (ØŒæe ŁE)’ (254) and so Herakles’ presence serves as a
sign that the gods, who seemingly have only injured or ignored him,
27 See Blundell, ‘The Phusis of Neoptolemus’, 144.
28 See, for example, Biancalana, ‘The Politics and Laws of Philoctetes’, 178.
29 Avery, ‘Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus’, 288. See also M. Roisman, Sopho-
cles: Philoctetes, Duckworth Companions to Greek and Roman Tragedy (London:
Duckworth, 2005), 108. For a different perspective, see Segal, who argues that such
exclamations show how far Philoctetes has departed from the civilized world, in these
moments of ‘linguistic depravation’: Tragedy and Civilization, 333.
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do care for his well-being.30 After all, Philoctetes wonders whether the
decrees of the gods are just or not (451–2); in Herakles, he ﬁnds not
only a promise of future restoration of his glory, but friendship with
the gods, the presence of care. Whether or not Philoctetes’ desire for
justice has been fulﬁlled, at least his desire to know that the gods care
is fulﬁlled in Herakles’ appearance. Moreover, Philoctetes is reminded
that his own story, his own life’s narrative, takes on meaning in the
light of a larger divine narrative; to be pious is not merely to carry out
the correct sacriﬁces and rituals, but to understand one’s self in terms
of the story of the Greeks. Herakles shows Philoctetes that his life’s
meaning is connected to the Greek story of victory against Troy that
is to be told; a narrow concept of justice as revenge will not fulﬁl that
larger, divinely sanctioned narrative.
Philoctetes’ language in assenting to the return to Troy reveals a
Sophoclean sensitivity to the relational nature of the bond with
Herakles. He proclaims, ‘The voice (t çŁ
ªÆ) much longed for,
you brought, you who after a long time appeared (çÆ), I will not
disobey your words (ŁØ)’ (1445–7). Herakles is not only import-
ant because of his words, but because of his voice, çŁ
ªÆ. That is,
Herakles’ voice communicates more than just words or the content of
ideas; his voice communicates his presence, the friendship of the gods,
to Philoctetes. ø (voice) both condemns and redeems Philoctetes;
while his cries at ﬁrst had led his comrades to abandon him as a curse
to the gods, words from a god also restore him to his position in the
community. In the way that God’s self-revelation to Job in the
Hebrew Bible heals Job’s spiritual afﬂiction (as well as physical
ones) even as his suffering is not adequately explained, Herakles’
simple presence in and of itself is healing for Philoctetes. That he
also promises glory is secondary to Philoctetes’ concern as to whether
the gods are just and capable of friendship. Such friendship assures
Philoctetes that the problem of justice, which he understands as a
theological problem—‘Are the gods just?’—has a positive resolution,
at least in Philoctetes’ concrete, lived history. Sophocles presents the
question of justice as both political and theological, for both concern
the possibility of friendship and community, between human beings
and between the divine and the human.
30 Roisman, Philoctetes, 108. See also Christopher Gill, ‘Bow, Oracle, and Epiphany
in Sophocles’ Philoctetes’, Greece and Rome 27 (2) (1980), 137–46.
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Herakles can play this role of bridging the gap between the divine
and human because he is not only a god, but also a friend. His story is
also especially resonant with Philoctetes’ own story. Herakles re-
counts his own story, telling of his own deeds, labours, and eventual
divine glory. However, absent from Herakles’ tale is the well-known
story of the intolerable pain he felt that led him to escape from life.
Although the Sophoclean play does not mention the longer story of
Herakles’ suffering, Philoctetes references it earlier when he himself
desires to die by ﬁre: ‘Oh, my son, noble one, take me and burn me
with this ﬁre which is called Lemnian. I once agreed to do this to the
son of Zeus in exchange for the weapons that you are now guarding’
(799–801). On some accounts, Herakles suffers because of a betrayal,
as he wears a poisoned robe given to him by his wife. Both the
physical suffering and sense of betrayal that Philoctetes encountered
long ago in Herakles must resonate with Philoctetes. Indeed, they
might well have been ideas on which he dwelt when on Lemnos alone,
with Herakles’ bow as his only real connection to civilization.
However, while Philoctetes has presumably seen the death of
Herakles, and his own assistance in that death, as the key feature
of Herakles’ life, Herakles speaks not at all of these events. Instead,
for Herakles, the greatest signiﬁcance of his life lies in his deeds, his
accomplishments, and the mutual interdependence that Neoptole-
mus and Philoctetes will need to have with one another if they are to
capture Troy. Betrayal and suffering were a signiﬁcant reality for
Herakles, but in his narrative understanding of his life after its end,
they are not the main events. Indeed, Philoctetes must return if he is
to become an active agent, instead of a mere passive recipient of
others’ actions. If Philoctetes’ sense of his own victimhood arises in
part from being one who merely is the passive recipient of others’
actions, whether just or unjust, then his return to ﬁght at Troy is not
only necessary for the Greeks, but also for himself. There alone will he
ﬁnd healing in becoming an active agent in the political realm.
At the same time, Herakles is insistent that the bond that Philoc-
tetes and Neoptolemus share is crucial to their success. Like a ‘pair
of lions (º
)’, they will have to guard one another (1436). But
the source of their close bond stems from this mutual vulnerability
that they have experienced on Lemnos: not only Philoctetes’ multiple
vulnerabilities, but also Neoptolemus’ willingness to expose his
shame, his moral vulnerability and weakness, to Philoctetes, and to
seek reparation rather than running away from its possibility.
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Philoctetes willingly rejoins the political community with openness to
the reality of his vulnerability within it. Just as importantly, Neop-
tolemus rejoins that community with an understanding of the vul-
nerable one as he who possesses dignity and who is fundamental to
the success of the community. We cannot also forget that Herakles
warns against impiety; and in that tradition, Neoptolemus will im-
piously kill Priam on the altar at Troy. Sophocles is not naive about
the difﬁculty, the fragility of care for the vulnerable, and there is a
dark edge that accompanies this mostly happy ending.31 Nonetheless,
such an event lies outside the scope of the play’s action. Instead, the
play ends with an afﬁrmation of inclusion of the wounded one and
the promise of his restoration. At the moment of their departure from
Lemnos, we can see in Philoctetes and in Neoptolemus that each has
undertaken a journey made possible only by the presence of the other;
each has grown in new directions previously thought impossible. So
while their destination is Troy and a new battle, the Chorus’ words
of homecoming are nonetheless appropriate, as they end the play,
saying,
Let all of us depart together
when we have prayed to the sea nymphs
to come and guide our safe return (ı). (1469–71)
31 Blundell, ‘The Phusis of Neoptolemus’, 146; Kirkwood, ‘Persuasion and Allu-
sion’, 428; Rose, ‘Teachings of the Sophists’, 102.
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4Wounding and Wisdom in Plato’s Gorgias
Any discussion of vulnerability in Greek thinking ought to consider
the difﬁcult case of Plato. A variety of commentators have argued that
Plato is particularly insensitive to vulnerability and human imper-
fection. Martha Nussbaum, for example, sets out the thesis that in the
dialogues, Plato is offering an example of ‘anti-tragic theater’.1 Nuss-
baum argues that Plato writes in a theatrical genre, the philosophical
dialogue, in a way that deliberately minimizes the engagement of
emotions, thus separating himself from the tragedians who encourage
such feelings.2 In her view, works such as the Republic diminish the
affective realm and even attack the goodness of ordinary life in favour
of a more removed, rational order. Similarly, Charles Griswold has
argued that the Republic asserts the goodness of the perfection of the
forms at the expense of diminishing ordinary, imperfect human life;
the world inside the cave is undesirable on the Platonic account, yet
where most people actually live their lives.3 Against this view, others
argue that Plato takes up an outright tragic view, for example, identi-
fying a certain scepticism in Platonic thought with respect to the
ability of reason to achieve the ends for which it strives.4 Socrates
1 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
and Philosophy, rev. edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 122–35.
2 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 132.
3 Charles Griswold, too, interprets the Republic to be opposed to a kind of care for
the ordinary in favour of a longing for something not simply better, but best. See
Griswold, ‘Longing for the Best: Plato on Reconciliation with Imperfection’, Arion 11
(2003), 101–36.
4 See, notably, David Roochnik’s work Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of
Plato’s Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003) and The Tragedy of
Reason: Toward a Platonic Conception of Logos (London: Routledge, 1991).
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posits an idealistic account of excellence, but does not argue that he
has achieved it or that human beings can do so.
Indeed, the dialogues offer philosophy through the dialogue form
as an alternative both to the tragic form and to the work of other
intellectuals of Plato’s time (such as the sophists, but also other
politically minded thinkers, including Isocrates).5 The dialogue form
draws upon the tragic genre (and other genres such as the epic
and even poetic), while also offering criticisms of the shortcomings of
those narrative forms.6 At the same time, however, Plato continues
within a tradition of writing in dramatic form, not in treatises.
His works, like those of tragedy, comedy, and epic, contain multiple
voices and perspectives as part of their articulation of ideas. Platonic
dialogues rely upon narrative not only as dramatic setting for abstract
ideas, but also include dramatic action as part of the working out
of philosophical activity. Plato presents philosophy as a way of living,
and not only a way of thinking. Moreover, we ﬁnd the dialogues
themselves concerned with the question of vulnerability within some
of their internal narratives.
This chapter examines one such narrative: the myth at the end of
Plato’s Gorgias that features as its central image a wounded and
unjust man. In that myth, Plato sets forth attentiveness to human
vulnerability as central both to philosophical living and to the polit-
ical art. While he does prescribe the virtues as a means for overcom-
ing a degree of vulnerability to harm, Socrates also recognizes a limit
to the extent to which such overcoming of imperfection is possible.
Socrates’ continued willingness to seek out and to engage others in
their imperfection through philosophical conversation reﬂects a care
for human imperfection and frailty. Just as Greek medicine under-
stood itself to be a limited, although valuable, therapeutic, Socratic
and Platonic philosophy seeks to meet and to act as a kind of
ŁæÆÆ for others in their imperfection. In this chapter, I ﬁrst
examine the notion of wounding in the myth of the Gorgias, and
then explore links between Greek medicine and philosophy for how
5 See my earlier work on distinguishing between the rhetoric of sophistry and
Platonic philosophy in Marina McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and
Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
6 See Andrea Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philoso-
phy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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their relation helps us better to understand Socrates’ care for his
interlocutors in their vulnerability.
The myth that ends Plato’s Gorgias is one of the strangest in the
Platonic corpus, both for its content and the context in which it arises.
Socrates and Callicles have been arguing over whether the just man or
the unjust man lives the happiest life, and rather than ending either
with a resolution of the problem, or even ordinary IæÆ, their
conversation has degenerated into total silence on Callicles’ side.
Shortly before the myth, Socrates takes both his and Callicles’ ‘part’
in the conversation before an angry, disgruntled Callicles—who is
understandably upset after Socrates’ comparison of Callicles’ ideal
man to a ŒÆØ (catamite, or passive homosexual). Neither Socrates
nor Callicles seems to be a model of good sportsmanship by the end
of their conversation. Yet, Socrates feels compelled not to rest in
silence, but insists on telling his myth of judgement. The myth is a
harsh indictment of the unjust man and, by implication, also of
Callicles. However harsh it is, Socrates’ myth nonetheless shows a
deep sensitivity to the vulnerability of the human condition.
The question of vulnerability is also of interest, insofar as Socrates’
reasoned arguments with Callicles fail to persuade; we might then
also see the myth about judgement as an alternative philosophical
response in light of the limits of reason. Indeed, Socrates insists that
his tale is both a 	FŁ and a º
ª; the two terms are not necessarily
exclusive: ‘Give ear then—as they put it—to a very ﬁne account.
You’ll think that it’s a mere tale (	FŁ), I believe, although I think
it’s an account (º
ª), for what I’m about to say I will tell you as true
(IºÅŁB)’ (Gorgias 523a1–3).7 By ‘true’, Socrates cannot mean a literal
account of what happens after death, for we know from both the
Apology and Phaedo that Socrates repeatedly asserts that he does not
know the exact nature of what awaits him after death. Instead,
Socrates seems to think that a story is better suited to convey an
idea to his audience about a reality that is at least somewhat unknow-
able. Precisely because the literal details of what follows death are
unknown, a 	FŁ is self-disclosive about its limits: it is ‘only a story’,
yet its images evoke its audience’s imagination, feelings, and desires
where reason by necessity cannot go. As such, a 	FŁ can still speak
about the meaning of death as a human limit, and how that limit
7 Translations of the Gorgias throughout this chapter are from Plato, Gorgias,
trans. Donald Zeyl (Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1986).
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ought to inform human life. Narratives such as the myth of judge-
ment in the Gorgias serve as important reminders that the enterprise
of Socratic philosophy is best understood as an exploration of human
weakness, as well as of human strength. The myth of judgement
exhibits such limit in its content, as it features a man who is wounded,
who bears scars in his soul.
However, Socrates’ move to a mythological form also suggests a
limit being displayed by this form of º
ª: myth expresses a form of
understanding that admits its own limits in light of a reality (e.g.
death) beyond full comprehension, but one which profoundly affects
the whole of the soul while yet it lives. As Kathryn Morgan has
argued, the tensions created by movement in and out of myths,
from argument to myth and back again, force an audience to change
perspective.8 The Gorgias’ ﬁnal myth seems to intend a change of
perspective, in asking Callicles to rethink his understanding of the
large context of his choices and values. The particular imagery of the
myth and its emphasis upon the language of health, woundedness,
and judgement seems especially well suited for use with Callicles, with
whom Socrates has had little success thus far in argument. The
images of the myth re-contextualize some of Callicles’ aims and
values into a larger, cosmic scheme.
I
Socrates begins his own story with a reference to the Homeric div-
ision of the cosmos among the gods Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades, but
then links that division to a story of judgement in Hades’ realm.
Under the reign of Cronos, he says, the souls of those who were
about to die were judged while still alive, clothed, and able to bring
forth family and friends as witnesses to their worthiness for heaven.9
However, their clothing disguised their true natures, insofar as
clothing implied wealth, power, or beauty that veiled the true soul
beneath. It was not only the souls of the dead that were veiled, but also
the souls of the judges: even the judges were ‘awed’ by the souls
8 Kathryn A. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6.
9 See Iliad XV. 187ff.
92 Wounding and Wisdom
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
because they, too, were still alive when rendering judgement, and
‘they themselves too [had] their clothes on when judging; their eyes
and ears and their whole bodies [were] interposed as a veil
(æŒŒÆºı		Ø) before their own souls’ (523d). In other words,
these living judges lacked not only knowledge of those whom they
judged, but also accurate knowledge of their own condition. This lack
of self-knowledge, as well as knowledge of the other, rendered their
judgements unjust, such that many who ought to have gone to the
heavens were sent to Hades and vice versa.
To correct for these judicial mistakes, Zeus devises a new system of
judgement. He announces to Prometheus:
What we must do ﬁrst, he said, is to stop them from knowing their death
ahead of time (æØ
Æ). Now they do have that knowledge (æEÆØ).
This is something that Prometheus has already been told to put a stop to.
Next, they must be judged when they’re stripped naked (ªı	f) of all these
things, for they should be judged when they’re dead (ŁHÆ). The judge,
too, should be naked (ªı	e) and dead (ŁHÆ), and with only his soul he
should study only the soul of each person immediately upon his death, when
he’s isolated from all his kinsmen and has left behind on earth all that
adornment (Œ
	), so that the judgment may be a just one. (523d–e)
The state of judges as dead and naked is a most curious feature of the
myth. While the nakedness of the man who is to be judged is
expected, that the judges themselves must be stripped and dead is
striking (especially given the strong parallelism of language in the
passage above with respect to the judge and the one being judged).
If Socrates’ main concern with a fair judgement is that the truth
about a human being be public and ‘out in the light of day’, then the
only one who is ﬁt to render such a judgement would be another soul
who himself has undergone the process of being ‘stripped down’ to
his bare soul, the soul that understands what it is like to be in the
position of being judged and made vulnerable to the judgement of
another human being. He best understands the complexity of the
human condition: the life of the person before judgement who lacks
foreknowledge of death and who has had the experience of being
stripped of the external goods that were once signiﬁcant to him. The
judges themselves must be dead because they alone comprehend both
the ﬁnality of death and the difﬁculty of living a life in which the day
of our death and the judgement of our lives’ goodness is fundamen-
tally uncertain.
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Socrates makes clear that nakedness of the judge’s soul proves to be
a key to just judgement because only then will his own perceptions
also be freed of the same reliance of social status and his own
connections through kin, wealth, and other temporary ‘cloaks’ of
the soul. Additionally, as one who is himself naked, but was once
clothed, he is aware of the difference in himself between the self that
he projected in the social world and the true self that lay veiled
beneath. To this extent, he also has the capacity to see the true self
in the other and to sympathize with the human condition of being
stripped of such external trappings. That is, it seems that the self-
knowledge and authenticity of the judge’s encounter with his own
state of soul, as well as his past experience as part of the human social
world, prepare him to see another accurately and sympathetically.
One implication of the myth is that we are not especially accurate
judges of our own souls while still engaged in the process of living. In
life, we might often have the experience that we understand aspects of
another person that the other fails to see about himself or herself;
thus, it is almost a common piece of wisdom that our friends often
know us even better than we know ourselves. In death, too, the naked
souls only come to see themselves through the eyes of another who
can show or reveal their souls and their real conditions to themselves.
As when, in the Phaedrus, Socrates suggests that one soul can come
better to know itself as if in a mirror through interaction with a lover
(Phaedrus 255d), the judges here reﬂect back to the judgedman his true
condition. That is, Socrates implies that our self-knowledge in life is
rarely accurate, and that to come to a greater truth about oneself
requires others. But a paradox of death is that it comes at a time not
of our own choosing or foreknowledge, and yet, until the moment of
death, it is not fully possible to make a fair judgement about oneself.
The souls of the dead are judged and sent to one of two places,
either to Tartarus or to the Isles of the Blessed, for punishment or for
reward. Initially, Socrates offers as the divine plan a total bifurcation
of the world into good and evil: either one has lived the life of the
non-meddlesome philosopher in justice and holiness, and so is
rewarded with ‘perfect happiness’, or one has lived impiously and
so is punished with a vengeance (526b–c). Missing from this picture
of the human being is any sense of the ‘in between’ nature of the
human being familiar from the Symposium and Phaedrus. If we look
at many of Socrates’ interlocutors, too, we ﬁnd that they are more
often than not ‘in between’ people, who might care deeply about
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courage, as does Laches, but not fully understand its nature. Some want
to change their deepest life’s commitments, as does Alcibiades—at least
in the presence of Socrates—but ﬁnd themselves unable to do so.
Moreover, thismyth reveals that we are also capable of self-wounding:
some moral choices leave us deeply wounded with resulting scars that
must be lived with or somehow integrated, or at least accommodated.
Socrates’ interlocutors are at times sympathetic to Plato’s reading audi-
ence because we can, as readers, identify with them.We can understand
not only why they might arrive at their philosophical positions (or at
least unphilosophical beliefs), but also sometimes identify with their
thumotic or appetitive reactions, or shortcomings of character. When
Alcibiades in the Symposium presents his painstakingly honest situation
as one who is always trapped in his political ambition, desires to be free
of it, but ﬁnds himself never quite able to escape, he is sympathetic
because his situation is human. Socrates, too, seems to have understood
that Alcibiades was a wounded soul, looking to escape himself in his
current state; where others might see a mutilator of the hermai or a
betrayer (or hero) of politics, Socrates sees the inner, wounded man.
So it is at ﬁrst unexpected that the souls in this myth are either
destined for pure bliss or total suffering. However, as Fussi has
argued, one of the key vulnerabilities of the human being displayed
in this myth is the ﬁnality of death.10 While the myth speaks of a time
when human beings once knew the day of their deaths and so could
prepare for judgement, Zeus removed our ability to know the
moment at which each one of us will die. Death is ﬁnal with reference
to our ability to change our characters. The ‘in betweenness’ of
human nature that is central to our self-knowledge while alive ceases
at the moment of death, when suddenly others can look back at a life
no longer in motion and make an assessment, a judgement, of how
that life was lived. Just as Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics points
to the difﬁculty of assessing the happiness of an entire life until that
life is over (N. Ethics 1100a1–6)—the least valuable time for a moral
actor himself—Socrates’ myth points to the difﬁculty of assessing a
whole life accurately from the point of view within the development
of that life. Human beings are vulnerable not only to the facticity of
death, i.e. death as the termination of life, but also to the way in which
the overall shape or pattern of our lives as a whole is unknown to us
before death. Even if a person of virtue can somehow regard himself
10 Alessandra Fussi, ‘The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias’, Review of
Metaphysics 5 (3) (2001), 534–5.
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as a just person now—and Socrates often shows his interlocutors their
lack of accuracy in self-knowledge—Socrates in the Apology presents
the human being as in a constant ‘race’ against injustice, when he
says that ‘injustice is swifter than death’ (Apology 39a). Added to the
vulnerability of judgement itself is a kind of vulnerability of self-
knowledge, in which we are at least partially ignorant of our own
just or unjust state at precisely the time that we could change our
state. Last, most human beings avoid thinking of death in the midst of
life. At the purely phenomenological level, death often seems unex-
pected; despite abstract knowledge of my own mortality, it remains
somewhat surprising that ‘I will die.’ Yet, once we are fully aware of
the just judgement of our souls after death, Socrates implies, it is too
late to change that state.
For Socrates, this limit is no cause for cynicism, but rather a call to
devote oneself even more fully to the practice of virtue, rather than
relying upon the social ‘clothing’ of wealth, status, and appearance as
a place in which to hide our true selves from others and even from
ourselves. In other words, if one is to come to see the truth about
oneself, Socrates implies, one must be willing to be vulnerable to
judgement: not the judgements of those who rely upon conventional
measures of political and social success, but another who possesses
some degree of self-knowledge. To this extent, it might be possible
before death to remove some of the obstacles to self-knowledge. That
is, if the myth suggests that status, wealth, honour, and power are
ways that we ‘cloak’ ourselves not only from others, but also from
ourselves, then by removing these ‘cloaks’ while alive, we might
become more aware of our true selves and our own limitations.
Such an approach also makes room for a constructive response to
the results of past mistakes, or self-wounding.
Plato presents us with the possibility of one who can judge and
awaken another while still alive precisely because of his knowledge of
his own nakedness: Socrates. In the Apology, Socrates professes
knowledge of his own ignorance (Apology 21d). He is aware of the
weakness of his own soul as a human being and does not project false
strength, as do the politicians, poets, and craftsmen of the Apology, or
Callicles, Polus, and Gorgias do in the Gorgias. Within the Gorgias,
Socrates claims that he is a man who enjoys being refuted even more
than he enjoys refuting (Gorgias 458a). He takes pleasure in the
recognition of his own vulnerability, and appreciates whatever judges
in his life have found a way to expose his vulnerability and lack to
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him. As such, the character serves as an idealized exemplar of a soul
still living who has the capacity to awaken another soul to its true
state precisely because he is more naked to himself, so to speak, than
most souls. The ﬁnal section of the Symposium, in which Alcibiades
describes his feelings of doubting and questioning the value of his
devotion to conventional political goods when in the presence of
Socrates, is a well-known case of such an awakening produced by
Socrates, even while conceding that it was never sufﬁcient to trans-
form Alcibiades’ life (Symposium 215a–222b). Socrates not only
chooses the life of the often-barefoot man unconcerned with clothing,
reputation, or wealth. In the Gorgias he even speaks about his own
death and the false judgement that he might receive, were he ever to
be brought to court: ‘And because I’m not willing to do those clever
things you recommend, I won’t know what to say in court. And the
same account I applied to Polus comes back to me. For I’ll be judged
the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef
were to bring accusations against him’ (521e). Socrates adds that he
would not be surprised if he were put to death, through the false
judgements of those who lack the proper means by which to judge.
Socrates anticipates a false judgement of him, one that parallels the
ﬁrst mode of judgement in the myth, based on the outward appear-
ance, rather than the inward truth of his soul, by judges who lack
accurate self-knowledge and judge through the cloaks of their own
false opinions of themselves and others. Here in the Gorgias, Socrates
is prophetic. To some extent, he escapes the ignorance of most souls
who know little of themselves or their eventual deaths. This knowing
Socrates is, of course, itself a Platonic invention. That is, the Platonic
dialogue is itself a 	FŁ of sorts, in presenting an idealized Socrates
who alludes directly to the cause of his eventual death. As one who is
more aware than most of his own ﬁnitude, his own ignorance,
Socrates at times is able to uncover and uncloak it in others. Uncloak-
ing Callicles to himself is also the purpose of this story, this 	FŁ.
I I
The myth seeks to awaken Callicles’moral imagination, or at least the
imagination of others present to the conversation, about how to
understand human life and justice in terms of a larger whole. The
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story can be understood as an effort to reconﬁgure Callicles’ view of
himself in relation to the world in the light of the context of human
vulnerability and mortality, through calling to Callicles’ imagination.
Socrates’ appeal to the ‘moral imagination’ works differently from, for
example, a logical refutation of a series of premisses, insofar as his
story engages our emotions, as well as our intellects. If one looks at
the overall shape of the Gorgias, one ﬁnds that logical refutations
prove to be rather ineffective with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles alike.
When Gorgias is tripped up and claims in turn both that some orators
use rhetoric unjustly and that an orator will never want to do what is
unjust, Polus interrupts the conversation to tell Socrates that he has
only forced Gorgias into a ‘little inconsistency’ and that Socrates
cannot really believe what he seems to be arguing. When Socrates
shows Callicles that, by his own premisses, doing what’s unjust is
more shameful, not only by law, but also by nature, Callicles accuses
him of engaging in eristics and ‘making hay out of someone’s tripping
on a phrase’ (489c). While it would be easy to assume that Callicles
simply does not care for the truth, or is eager to escape verbal defeat
for the sake of his reputation, it also seems that Callicles really
believes in his stated opinions. A purely rational engagement with
the possible inconsistencies within his view is not enough to move
Callicles to an entirely different view of the world.11
Most of our moral beliefs engage our souls as a whole, and not only
our reason. Shame, for example, can be a powerful motivator. Tarno-
polsky offers a thoughtful and careful analysis of two forms of shame
in the Gorgias: a view of shame that is solely oriented toward avoiding
having one’s self-image punctured, and a receptive form of shame.12
Callicles wishes to avoid criticism of his identity or exposure of his
inadequacies. Thus, Socrates’ arguments anger him immensely. How-
ever, Socrates’ aim is not discomfort for the sake of destroying
Callicles’ image, but rather to show Callicles the limits of his self-
image and to move him toward openness to consider signiﬁcant
change in his ethical norms.13 Socrates’ shaming of Callicles takes
place out of a respect for Callicles, although Callicles certainly does
11 See my more extensive argument for this point in McCoy, Rhetoric of Philoso-
phers and Sophists, chapter 4.
12 Christina Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato’s Gorgias and the
Art of Shame (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially 18–21.
13 Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, 19.
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not perceive it that way. Images such as the ﬁnal myth of the Gorgias
engage Callicles’ shame, not only his reason.
In addition, Socrates’ turn to the use of images, such as a leaky jar
or a ŒÆØ, and Callicles’ similar offering of the image of a corpse,
are attempts to reframe the world views of one another by re-con-
textualizing part within a whole. For example, hearing of a just soul as
akin to a corpse, for example, might cause fear or anxiety of a wasted
life that never really lived. Instead of only picturing a soul that
restrains its appetites, Callicles’ image reframes the ‘moderate’ soul
as one who has never lived fully, insofar as this soul seems to be a
milder version of a corpse who no longer desires anything at all. As
part of the presumed unpleasantness of anticipating death is the loss
of desire and fulﬁlment, Callicles leads his listeners to picture the just
soul as one that is ‘dying prematurely’, so to speak. The effect of such
an image includes an emotional response to the thought of losing
oneself in death, and not only an intellectual one.
Similarly, Socrates’ use of his own images in response to Callicles’
image of the corpse also allows us to think differently about the
context of Callicles’ claims about the appetitive life.14 Socrates re-
sponds to Callicles’ claim that the best life is one in which one’s
appetites are enlarged and left undisciplined, so that they might be
ﬁlled over and over again (491e–493d). In return, Socrates offers the
image of a leaky jar, fed by a leaky sieve, as a good image of Callicles’
ideal soul. Socrates takes up and reincorporates Callicles’ image of
endless ‘emptying and ﬁlling’, which might have a certain appetitive
appeal, in terms of a defective nature. It reframes the reason behind
the unjust man’s need for constant ‘reﬁlling’: the soul of large and
endless appetites is defective. While Callicles wishes to draw a sharp
line between 
	 and çØ, Socrates’ image of the leaky jar presents
the difﬁculty with such absolute separation by tying the 
	 and the
çØ of the unjust man back together again. A leaky jar is judged as
not useful and therefore bad because of its failure to fulﬁl nature: it
fails to perform its task because it fails to be itself, that is, it has a
nature to contain and to hold, and fails to live up to that standard.
14 Whether the ﬁnal narrative is effective with Callicles is unknown, as we do not
hear Callicles’ own response. However, Morgan thoughtfully suggests that Callicles’
expressed disdain for 	FŁ earlier in the dialogues diminishes his respect for this
mode of discourse as well. See Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 190–1. Still, the use of
imagery and myth remains important for Plato’s own audience.
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The soul, too, has a function or purpose, and to be itself in an ordered
manner, it must contain its appetites; but this same ability to fulﬁl its
nature (in part through ordered containment) is also what makes it
socially useful. Socrates has already argued for the importance of a
nature that acts in accordance with 
	, but the argument fails to
persuade Callicles at the level of abstraction. Imagery, however,
engages the imaginations of those who listen, as we might feel a
natural distaste if we have encountered, for example, a leaky jar in a
cabinet of food, or spoiled food inside such a jar. The image draws
together a considered rational assessment with a proper appetitive
distaste for injustice.
The myth of judgement adds further to the recontextualizing of
the unjust man’s soul in a larger, cosmic context. Callicles speaks
of the ability to indulge in pleasure as the mark of the free man, and
sees the world of politics as the largest context of human affairs.
In contrast, Socrates presents the larger cosmic picture as one in
which the unjust man is scourged and unfree, subject to punishment
by another whose judgement is born out of that wider context.
Earlier, Socrates had also compared the unjust man to a ŒÆØ.
For the Athenians, a ŒÆØ was understood as one who, on an
Ancient Greek understanding of male sexuality, has feminized
himself through allowing himself to be penetrated.15 A typical pun-
ishment was to lose one’s rights as a citizen, for example, the right
to vote in the Assembly. Here, Socrates re-asserts a link between
licentiousness and a lack of freedom through appeal to the example
of a disempowered man. Thus, he draws upon Callicles’ own respect
for free democratic leaders, and suggests an inconsistency between
Callicles’ hedonism and view of free citizenship.16
The myth of judgement also emphasizes the unjust soul as one that
lacks freedom. In claiming that the soul permanently takes on the
marks of its past unjust actions—just as the body does if the latter is
wounded, whipped, or scarred—Socrates re-uniﬁes 
	 and çØ:
And I think that the same thing, therefore, holds true also for the soul,
Callicles. All that’s in the body is evident after it has been stripped naked of
the body, both things that are natural to it and things that have happened to
15 See John Winkler, ‘Laying Down the Law: The Oversight of Men’s Sexual
Behavior in Classical Athens’, in Froma Zeitlin, John J. Winkler, and David Halperin
(eds.), Before Sexuality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 171–201.
16 See also Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, 84.
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it, things that the person came to have in his soul as the result of each
objective. (524d)
Socrates goes on to say that each of the souls’ actions has been
‘stamped’ upon his soul. A character, a åÆæÆŒæ, is literally an
impression: these souls are ‘impressed’ with their own deeds. But
the scarred soul of the myth of judgement is not one harmed by
others; instead, he ﬁnds that he is scarred as the result of his own
actions. Socrates’ myth asks Callicles to imagine the possibility that
he, too, if uncovered, would be unfree not only as the result of others’
judgements (i.e. a 
	 for which Callicles has displayed a kind of
contempt), but also as result of discovering his own self-inﬂicted
wounds. In other words, eventually Callicles will have to face his
own judgement of himself in his real condition.
We might return to the Philoctetes for a moment and recall Odys-
seus’ insistence that persuasion (even false persuasion) is the best
route for resolving problems. When Neoptolemus hesitates to lie to
Philoctetes, preferring even to capture him in battle with an open
purpose over deceitful capture in words, Odysseus tells him, ‘I was
young, too, once and then I had a tongue very inactive and a doing
hand. Now as I go forth to the test, I see that everywhere among the
race of men it is the tongue that wins and not the deeds’ (Philoctetes
96–9). Here Odysseus refers to judgements as being made primarily
in reference to words and not deeds.
Socrates’ vision in the myth of judgement stands in direct oppos-
ition to that of Odysseus. While he is famously a lover of º
ªØ and
teller of 	FŁØ, Socrates’ myth of the judgement is ﬁnally focused on
deeds and not words. It is not the words, but the actions of the person
that leave a mark on his own soul. In the myth, the judges silently
look at the soul, who it has become through its activity in the world.
No º
ª or speech is offered on behalf of the soul being judged. In
the Gorgias, after Callicles has claimed that Socrates had better
exercise care in how he speaks, or else he might be dragged away to
be judged and ﬁnd himself without means to defend himself, Socrates
admits that this is true, but it is not what most concerns him. Indeed,
if Socrates were to be judged as the man in the myth is judged, he
would not even be asked to speak. Instead the truth of his soul would
show forth, when uncovered, his past deeds. The myth renders
concrete the meaning of IºŁÆ (truth) as an ‘uncovering’, in the
soul’s being uncovered for judgement.
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The myth also suggests a reason for why one might judge another
unjustly: the judges, while still alive, lack a sense of their own vulner-
ability and nakedness. That is, they do not see Socrates ﬁrst as another
soul, akin to their own, destined for death. Socrates’main fear is not a
fear of death, but instead of living badly, i.e. being an unjust man—as
we see in the Apology when he compares himself to Achilles and
argues that he has cared only for justice and not for the length of his
own life (Apology 28d–e). To this extent, Socrates might appear to be
invulnerable in his utter conﬁdence in the courtroom. However,
Plato’s Socrates spent so much of his time among non-philosophers,
even those destined for the history books as unjust men (think of
Charmides and Critias). He had a deep understanding and appreciation
of the vulnerability of human nature to injustice, as well as to judge-
ment. Like the judges of the myth, he was well suited to question and to
seek to expose others’ inadequacies to themselves, even while alive.
To this extent, I would argue that Socrates’myth is an expansion of
his earlier claim to Callicles that a good political leader must not only
imitate, but also be like, those whom he leads (510d). A good judge is
one who is aware of his own limit and vulnerability as a human being.
Just as the judges can only judge other souls in a state of nakedness
and exposure, Socrates can assess others well because he keeps in
mind his own vulnerability and exposure to danger. This is part of
what Socrates intends to communicate when he states that he is the
only one who puts his hand to the political art (521d). Socrates is not
a politician in the conventional sense, but he displays a remarkable
ability to understand the human soul and all of its shortcomings, and
in that sense is a deeply political man.
We might then also see the myth of judgement as a direct reply to
Callicles’ assertion that philosophy is a useless and apolitical enter-
prise, for Callicles says to Socrates that he feels a brotherly feeling for
Socrates, as Zethus did for Amphion, and so warns him that too
much philosophy distracts from the real work of human life. Callicles
cautions him:
As it is, if someone got hold of you or anyone else like you and took you off to
prison on the charge that you’re doing something unjust when in fact you
aren’t, you can know that you wouldn’t have any use for yourself. You’d get
dizzy, your mouth would hang open and you wouldn’t know what to say.
You’d come up for trial and face some no good wretch of an accuser and be
put to death, if death is what he’d want to condemn you to. (Gorgias 486a)
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Plato, of course, writes this after Socrates’ trial and death, and so
might be understood as offering one possible criticism of Socrates’
philosophical practice, as an activity that made him too vulnerable,
open to the unjust manipulation of others, and unprepared to defend
himself.17 Callicles’ criticism of philosophy is not without merit:
Socrates’ practice and especially his unwillingness to be more ‘politic’
in his speaking to others renders him vulnerable to the judgement of
the city.
But the Apology makes clear that Socrates’ work is not to defend
himself at all costs, but rather to work for the care of souls. Socrates
even speaks of the importance of maintaining an epistemic vulner-
ability. He claims that the one practice that he loves more than
refuting another is to be refuted himself. The reason he offers is
that it is ‘a greater good to be rid of the greatest evil from oneself
than to rid someone else of it’ (458a). Callicles is disturbed by such an
idea, as when he objects to Socrates’ refutation of Polus with the
exclamation that if Socrates is right that it is better to suffer an
injustice than to commit one, then all of the world will be ‘overturned’
(IÆæÆ		; 481c). Gorgias, too, sees rhetoric as the source of
freedom for the city and for those within a city who practise rhetoric,
and again this is related back to a sense of safety found in careful
control and planning of words and speeches. But Socrates sees º
ª
not always as the source of comfort but sometimes also of discomfort.
He does not use words to ﬂatter others, but often to upset or to
overturn their ideas, and to push them to greater self-knowledge,
especially knowledge of their limits.18 Fussi helpfully connects vul-
nerability in this myth also to another basic form of epistemic vul-
nerability: the recognition that truth is independent of the thinker.
17 For example, James Arieti, ‘Plato’s Philosophical Antiope: The Gorgias in Plato’s
Dialogues’, in Gerald Press (ed.), Plato’s Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 1993), 197–214.
18 Tarnopolsky has recently argued that the nature of judgement in the myth
parallels Socratic elenchus in a number of ways. For example, Socrates’ demand to
Polus that he alone defend his view, and not call on the testimony of others (Gorgias
472c), is akin to the just man standing alone in judgement. The feelings of the
wounded man under judgement parallel the experience of being shamed by Socrates.
See Tarnpolsky, Prudes, Perverts, 120–6. Morgan also argues that when Socrates
moves between different types of discourse, he problematizes the use of any one,
thus in his rhetorical style demonstrating a critical dimension; see Morgan,Myth and
Philosophy, 15–45. See also McCoy, Philosophers and Sophists, on Socrates’ rhetoric
with Callicles in the Gorgias, especially 107–9.
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I cannot entirely create my own truth, nor even can a community
create its own truth, without eventually bumping up against some-
thing that reminds me that some aspect of my ‘truth’ is a mere
construction. Of course, such events occur often as experience
widens, which is why we often ﬁnd our understandings of the world
overturned, shattered, upset, and must reconﬁgure them: because
there is a truth that reminds us that we have not created it. We cannot
long force the world into categories that we alone create so long as
there are others in the world with whom we willingly interact. As
Fussi says, those trapped in the age of Cronos are ‘prey to appearance’
because ‘truth like death, is beyond their control’.19 We need others
to help us to ﬁnd the truth, but they are not its creators, but more
like witnesses who assist us.20 To this extent, we are all vulnerable
to the truth, and vulnerable to the difﬁculties that accompany our
own gradual realization of our limitedness when the truth bumps up
against our own constructed understandings of what we think is, or
ought to be.
The myth, in other words, begins with the idea that human
woundedness, or openness to wound, is one of the most basic facts
or truths about our own existence. These things, Socrates says, al-
though a myth, are also true (523a). These are facts: the human being
is a mortal, is going to die, will be stripped of clothing and status and
security. All of these parts of the myth are ‘facts’, but for Socrates,
there is something more important than even this: the ultimate
vulnerability is that we can harm ourselves through our own unjust
actions. Such actions have signiﬁcance for the whole community, for
they become an example to others, either of how to be or how not to
be. Others will judge and evaluate us by our actions. Socrates, then,
also objects to Callicles’ denigration of 
	 (law or custom) as mere
convention, for according to Socrates, even what a soul does to itself is
already inextricably interwoven with the life of the larger community,
who witness something which a person stands for. In other words,
even my own vulnerability is already a political fact, as well as an
individual one.
19 Fussi, ‘The Myth of the Last Judgment’, 536.
20 Fussi, ‘The Myth of the Last Judgment’, 537.
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III
The political problem of woundedness also arises more problematic-
ally in the Republic, when Socrates argues that a perfectly just city will
not offer medical treatment to those who are chronically ill, if they are
beyond cure. Certainly, such a view is opposed to the kind of outlook
presented in the Philoctetes, where Philoctetes’ abandonment as a
result of his wounds is problematized and criticized. In the Republic,
Socrates especially cautions against the treatment of illness when such
treatment becomes the primary activity of one’s life. He cites the case
of Herodicus, a gymnastics master who was so ill that he treated a
chronic illness with a regimen of gymnastics and medicine that left
him no time for any other treatment. Socrates suggests that for the
sake of the city, no person should be given such leisure to treat an
illness, for the function of the human being in this city in speech is to
perform his task for the good of the larger community:
[Asclepius] knew that for all men obedient to good laws a certain job has
been assigned to each in the city at which he is compelled to work, and no
one has the leisure to be sick throughout his life and treat himself. It’s
laughable that we recognize this for the craftsmen, while for the rich and
reputed happy we don’t. (406c)21
He then goes on to suggest that not only the ordinary carpenter, but
also the guardian or leader who becomes chronically ill, must not
be treated if treatment cannot restore him to health. For Socrates,
the perpetually ill man would ﬁnd ‘no proﬁt’ in going on living
(407a).
Socrates’ words here seem harshly insensitive to the plight of the ill,
not only in overlooking the suffering of illness and fear of death. The
good of the individual here seems to exist only insofar as he beneﬁts
the community. Through work, a person gains value in the commu-
nity, but activities outside of these contributions of ‘one man, one job’
on the Republic’s model of justice seem to be of insigniﬁcant consider-
ation. Such a view of the city has rightly been questioned and criti-
cized for its lack of care for the human individual. Yet, Socrates’
indifference here to the ill stands in sharp contrast to his care and
21 Bloom’s translation of the Republic is used throughout this chapter. See Plato’s
Republic trans. Allan Bloom, 2nd edn. (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
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continued ‘treatment’ of persons such as Charmides, Critias, Callicles,
or Alcibiades who struggled with health of the soul. Indeed, strong
parallels between philosophy and medicine further problematize the
Republic’s denial of treatment of the ill and whether such a view can
legitimately be ascribed to Plato.
Michael Frede, in his book Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy,
argues for the deep interconnections between ancient philosophy and
ancient medicine. He notes that the author of the Decorum, a treatise
on Hippocratic medicine, thought philosophy should be part of
medicine, and medicine a part of philosophy. Such an understanding
of the connection between philosophy and medicine ranged far
beyond the concern that doctors be aware of ethical issues, or become
interested in matters of bioethics as theory. The interconnectedness of
the two enterprises rests on their common understanding of the
signiﬁcance of knowledge and its limits. Both were concerned with
giving an account of nature, especially its most complex features, as
seen in the human body.22 Various competing theories of medicine
abounded, with those who emphasized the practical value of trial and
error, and those who emphasized theory.23 However, both philosophy
and medicine purported to offer overarching understandings of the
‘good life’, often each taking up similar problems, but in the light of a
different fundamental º. For example, both physicians and phil-
osophers were concerned with the moderation of the passions, with
the health of soul and/or body as a proper balancing of its elements,
and ﬁnding practices or regimens that might bring the practitioner to
a better state.24 The physician, as much as the philosopher, might
be concerned with the nature of the soul, whose problems could
also be addressed by a medicinal regime. It would be a mistake, for
example, to suggest that the philosopher tends to the soul, while the
doctor to the body, in the Greek mindset more generally. Instead,
both medicine and philosophy sought to look to the well-being of the
whole of the person, and even to the relationship between body
and soul.
22 See chapter 12 of Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 227.
23 Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 235–8.
24 See Pierre Pellegrin, ‘Ancient Medicine and its Contribution to the Philosophical
Tradition’, in Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (eds.), A Companion to Ancient
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).
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Brill has argued that the medical imagery in the Republic exten-
sively informs the language of its argument.25 Medical terms are used
to describe epistemological states and ethical and political concerns,
especially insofar as medical language is used to distinguish the health
of the philosopher from the diseased soul of the tyrant. Even meta-
physical passages in the Republic contain medicinal language. For
example, the language of the divided line concerning the visible and
intelligible realms closely parallels passages in the Hippocratic corpus
that note two ways of diagnosing: through the disease being visible to
the doctor, or through the doctor’s seeking an intelligible cause for
what is not directly visible.26
Philosophy and medicine are both also concerned with relation-
ships; in the case of medicine, a relationship between doctor and
patient that extends far beyond the treatment of a disease to the
treatment of the person. Hippocrates’ treatises on medicine, while
theoretical at moments, are also deeply attentive to the care of the
person. Hippocrates offers a philosophical component to medicine.
Conversely, philosophy could be understood as a kind of ŁæÆÆ
for the soul. Nussbaum has treated this concept of the philosopher
as a kind of caring and compassionate physician in her work The
Therapy of Desire. For Nussbaum, the philosopher does not concern
himself solely with the intellectual difﬁculties of his interlocutor,
but also with their emotional lives: what they love, fear, and desire.
Since beliefs are closely linked to our affective lives, reshaping one’s
beliefs also reshapes our desires.27
While Nussbaum’s own emphasis is on later Hellenistic philosophy,
Socrates also might be an exemplar of a caregiver for the soul. Indeed,
in the Charmides, Socrates even compares himself to a doctor practis-
ing Zalmoxian medicine when he offers to treat Charmides’ head-
ache.28 Not only the contemporary psychologists, but also ancient
25 Sarah Brill, ‘Diagnosis and the Divided Line: Pharmacological Concerns in
Plato’s Republic’, Epoché 9 (2) (2005), 297–315.
26 For the full argument, see Brill, ‘Diagnosis and the Divided Line’, 302–9.
27 Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic
Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
28 Elsewhere, I argue that the ‘incantation’ that Socrates provides to Charmides is
found in his philosophical questioning of Charmides’ beliefs. See Marina McCoy,
‘Philosophy, Elenchus, and Charmides’s Deﬁnitions of Sophrosune’, Arethusa 38
(2005), 133–59. An extensive analysis of the links between medicine and philosophy
in the Charmides can be found in Francis P. Coolidge, Jr., ‘The Relation of Philosophy
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practitioners were aware that in cases of mental disturbance, talk and
‘philosophical therapy’ of a certain kindmight beneﬁt the patient.29 Both
philosophy and medicine require a certain kind of engagement with the
other as vulnerable—whether physically wounded or wounded in
soul—as well as acknowledging one’s own limits, for example, the
doctor’s limits as healer. As Brill notes, Hippocratic medicine ‘requires
both investment and detachment’.30 The healer must be invested in the
care of his patient, but also detached enough to make a critically
informed diagnosis. Socrates, too, possesses such a combination of
care and detachment in his attitude toward his interlocutors. Both
qualities are needed, insofar as he has limits in his roles as questioner,
midwife, and even friend.
We also ﬁnd physical vulnerability at the heart of many scenes in
the Platonic dialogues. Alcibiades will be poisoned. Socrates’ body
will gradually become numbed as he drinks the hemlock. Theaetetus
in that dialogue’s prologue is being carried away on a stretcher from
injury in the battleﬁeld to Athens so that he may fulﬁl his wish to die
in his home city. Philosophy ignores the body at its peril, just as an
understanding of medicine that overlooked questions of meaning
would be incomplete. When we hear Socrates in the Republic speak
of justice as the harmony of the soul, it is not a far cry from the
Hippocratic theory of humours, which stated that health was to be
found in the balance of all the interior elements of the human body.
In the Timaeus, Critias even describes all soul sickness in terms of
bodily imbalance: after describing the nature of some bodily dis-
orders, he moves on to the nature of disorders of the soul:
The disorders of the soul, which depend upon the body, originate as follows.
We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a want of intelligence; and of
this there are two kinds; to wit, madness and ignorance. In whatever state a
man experiences either of them, that state may be called disease; and
excessive pains and pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases
to which the soul is liable. . . .He who has the seed about the spinal marrow
too plentiful and overﬂowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has many
throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and their offspring, and
to Sophrosune: Zalmoxian Medicine in Plato’s Charmides’, Ancient Philosophy 13 (1)
(1993), 23–36.
29 Frede, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 227.
30 Sarah Brill, ‘Medical Moderation in Plato’s Symposium’, Studies in the History of
Ethics, Symposium on Bioethics, accessed online at <http://www.historyofethics.org>,
2006.
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is for the most part of his life deranged, because his pleasures and pains are so
very great; his soul is rendered foolish and disordered by his body; yet he is
regarded not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is a
mistake. (Timaeus 86b–c)31
In approaching the question of medicine, Hippocrates was well
known for searching for causes of disorders as fundamental to the
medical practice; he is often remembered for his theoretical bent in
medicine. However, as his essay ‘On Injuries of the Head’ demon-
strates, Hippocratic medicine starts with the particular patient. Not-
withstanding the ways in which a Hippocratic treatise is a general
treatise on rules and even causes that can be applied in order to
understand many cases, his ﬁrst words are about consideration of
the particular other before the physician: ‘Men’s heads are by no
means all like to one another, nor are the sutures of the head of all
men constructed in the same form.’32 A physician cannot look at the
wounds of all identically, for not only the wounds themselves, but the
underlying state of the physical body that the patient brings along
with the wound varies from person to person. Hippocrates says, ‘In
the ﬁrst place, one must examine the wounded person (10)’, and this
principle, that the person is ﬁrst, and the wound or the condition is
later, runs throughout his work. The Hippocratic injunction to ‘do no
harm’ implicitly recognizes the limits of the physician in treating a
patient.
Hippocrates also emphasizes that the doctor must recognize his
own limits. Hippocrates cautions that many supposed cures for head
wounds cause more harm than doing nothing at all. He warns:
In a wound of the head, you must not apply anything liquid, not even wine,
but as little as possible, nor a cataplasm, nor conduct the treatment with
tents, nor apply a bandage to an ulcer on the head, unless it be situated on the
forehead, in the part which is bare of hairs, or about the eyebrow and eye, for
wounds occurring there require cataplasms and bandages more than upon
any other part of the head. (‘Injuries’ 13)
Underlying this understanding of non-intervention in certain cases is
the belief in the idea that a body is often better situated to restore itself
to health than is the doctor. Hippocratic medicine relies upon the idea
31 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Mineola, NY: Dover, n.d.).
32 Hippocrates, ‘On Injuries of the Head’, trans. Francis Adams, ebooks@Adelaide,
2007 <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hippocrates/head>.
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of health as an imbalance that the body seeks to naturally restore
when out of balance; at best, a doctor is the facilitator of the process
that allows this natural healing to take place. Many of the procedures
that Hippocrates outlines in his work are to remove dead skin, scrape
at infected bone, or take apart that which would threaten healing, but
his work is not to cause the healing itself. Rather, his actions simply
leave the room for the body to heal what ails it, through a closing of
the wound, and restoration of balance to the humours.
A similar kind of concern for persons in their particularity is
present in Socrates’ interactions with his interlocutors. For example,
Socrates is harsh with Callicles in his arrogance, more playful with his
friends in the party-like atmosphere of the Symposium, and someone
who ‘bites at’ Alcibiades like a snake (in Alcibiades’ view) in an
attempt to awaken him from his political slumber of soul. He does
not apply a universal method to all souls at all times; as Gary Scott has
recently suggested, 	Ł in the dialogues is more likely to mean
‘way’ or ‘path’ than a precise method.33
Medicine, too, cared for the soul, along with the body. As Bartos has
argued, throughout the Hippocratic corpus, the body and soul are
treated as part of a single, indissoluble unity, and not as two distinct
kinds of substances. Body and soul alike are part of a deeper unity of
the human being who is the patient, and so there could be no false
separation of treating the person’s body but not his soul. Even when
we ordinarily talk about our physical experiences of suffering, we
speak of ourselves as intimately connected to those experiences. I do
not say, if I really hurt, ‘My body has this pain,’ but rather, ‘I am in
pain.’ On the Hippocratic model, too, the physician, must treat the
person, not only his body, as a uniﬁed whole, understanding both
body and soul to be manifestations of a unity that in a state of health
reﬂects balance and wholeness. Democritus extended this idea of
unity of body and soul even further when he argued that it is better
to treat the soul, the psyche, than the body: ‘It is ﬁtting for people to
take account of the soul rather than the body. For perfection of the
soul puts right the bad state of the dwelling, but strength of the
dwelling without thought (ºª	) does not make the soul any
better.’34 As Bartos explains, since a housekeeper cares for his house
33 See Introduction to Gary Scott (ed.), Philosophy in Dialogue: Plato’s Many
Devices (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007).
34 Hynek Bartos, ‘Varieties of the Ancient Greek Body–Soul Distinction’, Rhizai 3
(1) (2006), 72.
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but not vice versa, care of the soul has positive consequences for the
well-being of both body and soul. Democritus saw speech and
reasoning as the best way of driving out suffering from a soul, a parallel
to the Socratic practice of dialogue as a kind of ŁæÆÆ.
To this extent, medicine is an excellent place where we can look at
the intersections of theory and practice, in the context of wounded-
ness. For Socrates, to speak is already a kind of practice, a practice of
caring for the soul, and so also for the whole of the human being,
body and soul. Because the soul, as the source of the person’s choices
and actions, is primary, there can be no treatment of certain kinds of
wounds or diseases without the patient’s cooperation, and so without
attending to his soul. Even Gorgias admits this is so, when he argues
that he is better suited to persuade a patient to take his medicine or to
undergo painful surgery than his brother the doctor, for he can
motivate action with persuasive devices in a way that the doctor’s
technical art cannot. Thus, philosophy as a ŁæÆÆ ﬁnds its roots in
the earlier practices of the rhetoricians and even sophists, although
with a different purpose in mind.
In many dialogues, the Platonic view seems to be sceptical as to
whether such a transformation is always possible through º
ª.
Notably, Socrates is not successful in his changing Charmides, even
after he promises to try to heal him, and Charmides agrees. The end
of the dialogue features thinly veiled jokes about a ‘plot’ of force
against Socrates, an apparent allusion to Charmides and Critias’
participation as especially notorious members of the Thirty Tyrants
in the oligarchic revolution and overthrow of Athenian democracy
(Charmides 176c–d). Callicles is not converted to the practice of
virtue as far as we know, despite Socrates’ concerted efforts. Still, we
can understand Socrates’ philosophy to be a form of ŁæÆÆ, albeit
one that is not always successful with its patients, any more than a
doctor’s treatments can guarantee the health of his. Indeed, Socrates
cannot guarantee a successful outcome in his interlocutor. To possess
self-knowledge in understanding his limits as healer is part of his
art.35 Because he recognizes his own limits in affecting his interlocu-
tors, Socrates refuses to be called a teacher.
35 Brill makes the point in relation to medicine that restraint and decision not to
treat when a patient cannot be aided are constitutive of the doctor’s art in a way that is
not true for other åÆØ such as carpentry. Brill, ‘Medical Moderation’, 11.
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Here we might ﬁnd an avenue for questioning Nussbaum’s claim
that Plato seeks the perfectionism of the city and of the human person
through philosophy. To be sure, Plato suggests that the ordinary ways
of the many can be mistaken, especially in their understanding of
whether the lives they advocate, for example, of bodily pleasure or
political power alone, can really make us happy. The Republic’s claim
that the chronically ill ought not be treated remains morally prob-
lematic. However, this is not to suggest an overarching theory for the
perfectibility of human nature. If anything, Plato emphasizes that
Socrates is limited, so limited that even at the end of his long and
apparently just life, he can still say that his greatest wisdom is that he
knows nothing. He is also limited as a practitioner of º
ª, limited in
what he can and cannot say to convert others to this life of virtue and
a more expansive understanding of human wholeness than that
found in the ideas of a Callicles.
Not all wounds are curable. In such a case, the doctor nonetheless
has a role in responding to his patient’s woundedness. Hippocrates
somewhat cryptically remarks, ‘When a person has sustained a mortal
wound on the head, which cannot be cured, nor his life preserved, you
may form an opinion of his approaching dissolution, and foretell
what is to happen from the following symptoms which such a person
experiences’ (emphasis mine, 19). In the myth of judgement at the
end of the Gorgias, Socrates seems also to provide such an opinion
about Callicles—not even because he is conﬁdent that such an opin-
ion will change the outcome, but because he is responsible to state the
truth about his patient’s condition. Socrates’ own ŁæÆÆ has limits
with a soul that is already scarred and that refuses to look at its own
state with candour.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates identiﬁes himself as another kind of
medical practitioner, this time not the physician of the Charmides,
but instead as a midwife. The image of a midwife presents a rather
comical picture of a Socrates, who describes himself like a woman
who is barren but fruitful in his ability to help others to give birth. He
describes himself also as a matchmaker who can bring together the
best so that their children might ﬂourish, alluding to his uncanny
ability to ﬁnd the right ﬁgure, whether it be Homer, Protagoras,
Sappho, or others who provide the ‘seed’ for his interlocutor to give
birth to his own, new idea. The midwife’s task is even humbler than
that of the physician; while the physician seeks to heal the soul
through diagnosis and treatment according to his art, the midwife
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places trust in the human being’s own innate generative abilities. The
midwife is only there to assist, and to help determine if this is a real
birth, or only a false one.36
While Socrates is not always a model of gentleness in disposition,
we can nonetheless say that his speech at least includes an under-
standing of the human being as vulnerable, fallible, yet also respon-
sible. One must, of course, acknowledge Socrates’ seemingly inhuman
episodes of walking in the snow barefoot; being the only one who
does not cry at his own death scene; his immovability to Alcibiades;
and his annoying, gadﬂy-like questioning of his fellow citizens and
even friends. But perhaps his friends were attracted to him, and could
tolerate the more challenging aspects of Socrates’ personality because
they knew that Socrates knew what the human being was like under-
neath the clothing of social status, wealth, and crafty speech, and yet,
never shirked that nakedness. As one who knew of his own limited-
ness, he knew how to speak to others in theirs. In this way, Socrates
exercised his own form of the political art.
36 For an excellent account of Socratic midwifery, see Scott Hemmenway, ‘Philo-
sophical Apology in the Theaetetus’, Interpretation 17 (1990), 323–46.
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5Eros, Woundedness, and Creativity
in Plato’s Symposium
Plato’s Symposium speaks to the vulnerability of eros. Among the
topics addressed is that of love’s incompleteness and the vulnerability
that arises from incompleteness. While Socrates’ claim that love is the
offspring of Poverty and Means is undisputed, many question
whether the incompleteness of eros is overcome, or remains perpetu-
ally a lack within us, and whether overcoming such a lack completely
would be good on Socrates’ view. This question of incompleteness
also extends to the question of whether the desire for the universal
means also to leave behind the particular. Scholars have been of two
minds as to whether the ascent to the good, as described by Diotima,
is one that takes up and incorporates the previous objects of love, or
leaves them behind in order to focus solely on the good. More
precisely, one might ask whether the vulnerability to another person
that we experience in falling in love is left behind when we fall in love
with, and ascend to, ‘the good’, or whether the two somehow coalesce.
If one loves the good, and is vulnerable to it, is such a person still also
vulnerable to other human beings? Or does Plato intend that we
achieve contemplation of the good, and so overcome vulnerability?
The well-known ascent passage in Plato’s Symposium seems to
advocate leaving behind the particulars of this world in order to
achieve love of the most ‘real’ objects of all, namely the forms. The
form of beauty is the ultimate º of love, and each previous step
described as a means to ascend to this ﬁnal good.1 Diotima suggests
1 As Payne has argued, however, this teleology is not of the sort where an action is
performed for the sake of an end, for the lover lower on the ascent has no idea of what
awaits at the ascent’s end; he is unaware of the nature of Beauty itself, which
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that all the other loves of our lives are ultimately for the sake of that
ﬁnal love, Beauty itself, which is its primary motivating force. How-
ever, critics have also seen her presentation of love as being a little too
‘other worldly’. If the ladder of love is for the sake of the forms, then it
seems that once we reach them, we need neither the ladder nor the
many loves that helped us to arrive at the forms. We also then leave
behind our vulnerability to other persons. Vlastos famously writes
that Plato’s understanding of love leaves behind any care for the
particularity of the individual person: ‘The individual, in the unique-
ness and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object
of our love.’2 Nietzsche even saw in Plato’s metaphysics the root of
nihilism: in loving the (for him, invented) forms instead of worldly
things, we end up loving nothing at all.3
However, I shall argue that Plato does not present us with an
impoverished or ‘other worldly’ understanding of love. Instead, he
offers a rich series of accounts that are attentive both to the goods of
this world and to the good of the loving soul itself. My argument will
have two parts. First, I will argue that for Socrates, eros is always
relational. Eros is never only about the lover or the object of love, but
always about a lover, a beloved, and the creative acts that result from
the encounter between lover and beloved. Such a triadic understand-
ing of love suggests that not only the forms, but also others in the
world, are participants in the activity of loving. This triadic notion of
eros requires ongoing vulnerability by lovers to others outside of
themselves. Diotima’s account of love preserves love’s complexity in
focusing on reproduction as the key to eros. While vulnerability could
be understood only as a lack or an impoverishment, Diotima instead
presents incompleteness as the very source of human creativity.
Indeed, creative love born out of vulnerability transforms the
nonetheless is pulling him along in his unknowing pursuit. See Andrew Payne, ‘The
Teleology of the Ascent in Plato’s Symposium’, Apeiron 41 (2008), 123–46.
2 Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato’, in G. Vlastos,
Platonic Studies, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 39. Against
this view, Nehamas writes, ‘The philosophic lover does not reject the beauty of what
he leaves behind as he rises toward the Form. Although he discovers beauties that
exceed anything he has already seen, the beauty of what he leaves behind does not
disappear; only its brilliance diminishes, as the moon’s radiance wanes in the light of
the sun.’ See Alexander Nehamas, ‘ “Only in the contemplation of beauty is human life
worth living”, Plato Symposium 211d’, European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3) (2007).
3 E.g. Friedrich Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York:
Vintage, 1967).
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neediness of the lover into a creative force that is outwardly oriented
toward the world and others in it, rather than inwardly oriented
toward oneself. Paradoxically, lack and longing lead not to narcis-
sism, but rather to a relational and creative orientation to the world.
Second, I examine the scene in the Symposium in which Alcibiades
declares himself to be wounded by a ‘snakebite’ in his time with
Socrates. The relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates complicates
the picture of eros laid out in Diotima’s speech. Alcibiades questions
whether Socrates is able to love others in their particularity, and
suggests there is a problemwith Socrates’ universal and even somewhat
detached approach to loving others. Further, while Alcibiades is open
to eros and even to a sense of his own limit at times, he fails to ascend
along the kind of path that Socrates envisions for a lover. Alcibiades
admits his vulnerability to the forces of erotic love, shame, and even old
age. To this extent, he is more vulnerable than many other characters in
the dialogue. However, Alcibiades is unable to transform his vulner-
ability from awareness into action. Plato’s inclusion of this Alcibi-
ades—who possesses some self-knowledge, yet is unable to transform
his life accordingly—suggests Plato’s sensitivity to the tragic.
I
Plato’s critics have had good reason to worry about the ‘other worldly’
nature of Platonic love. For example, Diotima’s ascent passage does
seem to advocate moving from love of particular things to things that
are more and more general: a particular boy’s body is no longer seen
as beautiful when one realizes the beauty of all bodies. Presumably
when one cares more for Ø (laws), political institutions, learning,
and so on, the value of these beautiful bodies is lessened even further.
The universal seems to be valued at the expense of the concrete and
interpersonal. This other worldly sentiment seems to culminate when
Diotima ﬁnally describes the form of Beauty itself as something apart
from the ordinary world. One of the most striking passages in this
regard is near the conclusion of Diotima’s teaching:
What then do we suppose it would be like, she said, if it were possible for
someone to see the Beautiful itself, pure, unalloyed, unmixed, not full of
human ﬂesh and colors, and the many other kinds of nonsense that attach to
mortality, but if he could behold the divine Beauty itself, single in nature?
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Do you think it a worthless life, she said, for a man to look there and
contemplate that with that by which one must contemplate it, and to be
with it? (211e–212a)4
While the ordinary world might be the needful route to the forms,
once the forms have been accessed, then the world of the ordinary
seems not just inadequate, but a mere imitation, pale, in contrast to
the vivid reality of the form which is most worthy of love.
However, Diotima’s ideas here must be contextualized in the whole
of her speech and the series of other speeches in the Symposium. In
recent years in Platonic scholarship, much has been made about the
importance of distinguishing Socrates’ words in the dialogue from
Plato’s own meaning as author.5 Diotima is a single voice, one of the
most persuasive voices in the dialogue, but her voice is mediated not
only through Socrates, but also through the storytelling that frames
the dialogue, as Apollodorus narrates the discussion to an unnamed
friend.6 We are not even certain that the story is entirely faithful to
the reality, as Apollodorus admits that he has forgotten some parts.7
But the presence of the framing device highlights that each account of
love takes place in a larger context of interchange between different
people with different understandings. Later speakers at the sympo-
sium explicitly address the ideas of earlier ones, sometimes rejecting
them and sometimes reincorporating them at a newer and more
complex level. Plato’s presentation of love is found in the whole of
the Symposium and not in the ascent passage alone.
Two elements within the ascent speech suggest a more nuanced
approach to the interrelation of love of others and love of Beauty itself.
First, Diotima’s speech uses the language of fertility and reproduction
to discuss human love, precisely at the point at which the person on the
ascent begins to approach the form of Beauty, but has not yet attained
4 Translations are from Plato, Symposium, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1991), with permission.
5 Charles Griswold, ‘Irony in the Platonic Dialogues’, Philosophy and Literature 26
(1) (April 2002), 84–106.
6 For a thorough account of the philosophical importance of narration in the
dialogues, see Ann-Marie Bowery, ‘Know Thyself: Socrates as Storyteller’, in Gary
Scott (ed.), Philosophy in Dialogue Form: Plato’s Many Devices (Evanston, Ill.: North-
western University Press, 2007), 82–109.
7 Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glasov-Corrigan, Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Argument,
Structure, and Myth in the Symposium (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2004).
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the ﬁnal goal. Diotima herself does not reject love of particulars in
favour of contemplation, because it is precisely in the encounter of
human lover and beloved that creative acts take place. Second, if we
compare her account to earlier accounts of love of the particular and its
role in reproduction, Diotima most of all emphasizes the creativity
inherent in love, a creativity that is fruitful for the human world, and
not the world of the forms. The speeches that precede Socrates’ speech
are deﬁcient for their inattention to the creative and fruitful tension
inherent in love. Socrates’ speech alone preserves the importance of not
only lover and beloved, but also ‘reproduction’ in loving.
In determining whether love of the forms is other worldly, it is
necessary to understand the relation between loving the forms and
loving individuals. If, for example, individuals are loved only as
reﬂections of the forms, then it would seem that love of the forms is
by its nature an abandonment of love of individuals as individuals. In
such a case, the lover does not love his beloved’s beauty, but only a
reﬂection of Beauty itself in the beloved. However, articulating how
one loves an individual beloved even in ‘ordinary’ accounts of eros,
excluding the forms, proves to be philosophically difﬁcult.
One way to understand erotic love for an individual is as love of his
or her qualities. On this account, one loves another because of her
compassion, or wry sense of humour, or because she enjoys the same
sports. This seems true even in cases of non-erotic love. Even if one
loves one’s child apart from his particular qualities (e.g. a mother
might love a literary child just as much if he had been an athletically
driven competitor), one might still argue that this love is driven by the
child’s speciﬁc qualities, albeit at a different level. She loves him
because he is her child. Still, love of a person for his qualities can
seem trivial when one contemplates the temporary nature of many
personal traits. As Stern-Gillett notes, Pascal pointed out the difﬁculty
at hand in his Pensées:
What is the self ? A man goes to the window to see the people passing by; if
I pass by, can I say he went there to see me? No, for he is not thinking of me
in particular. But what about a person who loves someone for the sake of her
beauty; does he love her? No, for smallpox, which will destroy her beauty
without destroying the person, will put an end to his love for her.8
8 Pascal, Pensees, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1995), 688. I am
indebted to Stern-Gillett’s book Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship for drawing
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Pascal goes on to point out that even if we were to say that we love a
multiplicity of qualities in another, we still love only qualities and not
some ‘essential’ person. After all, what else is the self other than body
and soul, each of which has qualities?
However, to love someone only as a means for seeing the forms
would seem to have a parallel problem: if one loves the beauty of the
beloved’s body because it is reminiscent of the forms, he is apparently
loved only as an instantiation of the Form of Beauty, and not in his
particularity. The lover does not love his beauty, but rather how his
beauty reﬂects real Beauty. Put together this idea with Diotima’s
claim that the forms are unpolluted, unmixed, and pure, and one
might even conclude that Plato ﬁnds the love of a particular body to
be somewhat tainted.
An alternative picture might say that to love an individual is to love
him for ‘himself ’, with the claim that the self is a being that is impos-
sible to describe adequately. On this model, one loves not simply the
beloved’s qualities, good and bad, but ‘something essential’ and indes-
cribable about him that makes him unique. This position has at least
two difﬁculties: ﬁrst, this way of thinking seems mysterious and incap-
able of full expression in a ºª; it does not really provide for the
possibility of a philosophical account of love at all. Second, the descrip-
tion seems counterfactual, insofar as at least some of the time, love of
another is expressed by extolling his or her good qualities, and even
how those qualities are related to one’s own needs or desires.
Perhaps what is being said when one claims that we do not merely
love someone else for their qualities, is that we do not love them only
for their good qualities. That is, in the most profound experiences of
love, one loves the whole person, including his or her ﬂaws; that is, the
person’s vulnerabilities and even errors become the objects of our
love. At times these imperfections are related to other goods. For
example, we might see how these ﬂaws are linked to other aspects of
the person that we consider to be good: she is neurotically picky about
a neat house, but also excellent at getting the details right in her
projects at work. Or, one loves a certain quirk (for example, unusually
shaped ears) because it reminds the lover of the beloved as a whole
and what is beautiful. In this case, one loves a human being still for his
attention to this passage in the context of the discussion of love in ancient thought. See
Suzanne Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship (New York: SUNY Press,
1995), 60–1.
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or her qualities, but is simply more generous in how we understand
how particular qualities ﬁt together into a coherent and lovable
whole.
In the above analysis, the description of love focuses on the nature
of the beloved: the qualities or characteristics that he or she possesses
such that he or she becomes ‘worthy’ of love. However, Diotima’s
speech focuses on how creativity overcomes the mutual incomplete-
ness of both a lover and a beloved. Diotima does not view eros as
being about the qualities of a beloved alone, or of a lover alone, or
even simply the relationship between lover and beloved. Rather,
central to a love relationship is the lover, the beloved, their relation-
ship, and the creative activity that stems from their eros for one
another. After all, Diotima’s speech is not primarily an account of
Beauty, but rather an account of eros. Her speech is not a metaphys-
ical description of the nature of the forms. Rather, the focus of her
speech is to convey what it means to love. Eros, for Diotima, is about a
well-spring of creativity and reproduction that allows the lovers to go
beyond their own and their beloved’s personal need.
Diotima’s speech begins with a mythical description of the genesis
of the god Eros from Poros and Penia. Eros is born of both want and
plenty; therefore, Eros cannot be understood as either fullness or
complete lack. Eros is always in between the complete and the
incomplete; he is therefore neither god nor mortal, but in between
mortal and immortal (203e). Diotima even describes Eros as always
coming to be and dying away: at night, Eros withers away, but by day
is regenerated again (203e). Eros is always vulnerable to loss. How-
ever, along with diminishment, Diotima emphasizes the re-genesis of
love. We should not regard Diotima’s speech with attention exclu-
sively to its ultimate º in the form of Beauty, but rather with
attention to themovement of love and love’s activities throughout the
entire speech. Diotima’s speech is not primarily an account of Being,
or even of particular beings, but instead about becoming, the becom-
ing of love and love’s creative activities.
Diotima’s focus upon the genesis and reproduction that occur
through love is clear from her choice of words. Diotima’s language
is positively fecund: her speech is ﬁlled with the use of terms such as
Œ (childbirth or child; 206b; 206c; and 206e) and 	Œ
Ø (to give
birth; twice at 206c; 206d; and 208e; 209a; 209c; 210b; 210c; twice at
212a), while the more abstract and less metaphorically vivid term
ª
ŁÆØ occurs only once in her speeches (204d). In addition, the
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term Œª, child or offspring, occurs twice (at 190a and 209c).
Diotima relies heavily upon the language of childbirth to describe
eros. Childbirth is the ultimate image for becoming, since it refers to
the creation of a new being, rather than a mere change in the state
of already existent beings. The vast majority of Diotima’s speech
discusses eros and its role in creation, making (	ÅØ), birth,
death, and immortality (205a–210e). In contrast to her discussion
of reproduction, Diotima’s discussion of Beauty itself is relatively
short, running just a little under one and a half Stephanos pages
(210e–212a).
Diotima’s speech refers to six kinds of erotic reproduction in the
following order: (1) the begetting of Eros himself by Poros and Penia
(203a–e); (2) the way in which any genesis in the arts is a kind of
	ÅØ in the arts (205b–e); (3) giving birth to physical children for
the sake of immortality (207b–208b); (4) giving birth to noble acts, even
to the point of death, for the sake of glory, as in Achilles’ sacriﬁce
(208c–208e); (5) giving birth to practical wisdom and excellence, par-
ticularly in the right ordering of cities and households (208e–209a);
and (6) giving birth to discourses (ºªØ) (210d). A remarkable feature
of Diotima’s speech is the variety and multiplicity of sorts of things that
are produced through eros in her view: not only physical children, but
also poems, inventions, noble deaths, glorious acts, and philosophical
speeches are all different ways in which eros manifests itself. Repro-
duction includes, but is in no way limited to, physical reproduction.
Eros is presented as enormously fruitful and multiple in the sorts of
fruits it bears. All six of these sorts of genesis or giving birth require
others: we need another person with whom to bear physical children,
but also need to love those in our city in order to give them good laws,
or to die nobly for them; philosophical discourse requires someone
with whom to talk, as we see in the conversation at hand in the
Symposium.
The description of the end of the ascent, however, brings to a close
Diotima’s description of the ‘becoming’ of the erotic person: once a
person has reached knowledge of Beauty itself, his desires are sud-
denly markedly different from what they were prior to the end of the
ascent. While the description of Beauty itself is presented in an
overwhelmingly positive light, Diotima also emphasizes the enor-
mous gap between a life that is lived pursuing the creation of beauty
and striving for immortality, and a life that is spent gazing at the
forms:
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If ever you see it [Beauty], it will not seem to you as gold or raiment or
beautiful boys and youths, which you now look upon as dumbstruck; you
and many another are ready to gaze on those you love and dwell with them
forever, if somehow it were possible, not to eat or drink but only to watch and
be with them. (211d–e)
One who has seen Beauty itself will lack interest in the ordinary things
of this world, just as those in love with boys lack an interest in plain
food and drink. Diotima suggests that one who beholds Beauty itself
will want to do nothing but watch and be with the forms: eternal
contemplation of Beauty is all that a lover who has discovered the
forms will want. There is no going back to an old life once the
contemplation of true Beauty takes place. ‘Human ﬂesh and colors’,
and the ‘nonsense’ of human mortal life, now are irrelevant to the
former lover of these things. According to Diotima, all else that came
before the end of the ascent seems not to matter to the person who
has reached the ﬁnal goal. One might venture to say that such a
person loves only the perfect and invulnerable.
However, if eros is intermediate between wisdom and ignorance, as
Diotima emphasizes at 202a, then by deﬁnition the one who has
become wholly wise is no longer erotic. He has instead reached a
ﬁnal happiness that needs no further explanation for its pursuit
(205a). He who contemplates Beauty lacks eros, being already satis-
ﬁed with complete Beauty—or is only erotic insofar as she wishes to
continue having what she already possesses. Either way, the person
has reached the end of the ascent: he has nowhere further to go, and
lacks the restlessness endemic to those who are still becoming in eros.
Eros has not just changed one object for another, but has itself been
transformed by this encounter with Beauty. Diotima’s speech there-
fore seems to contain two different accounts of love in tension with
one another: an account of love that emphasizes its genesis, move-
ment, and its generative effects in a changing world, and a second
account in which love ﬁnds completeness and satisfaction.
Ionescu has argued that in Diotima’s account of procreation there
are two different sorts of immortality: at the lower levels of the ladder,
the immortality comes through substitution, in which though the
lover dies, something else, a child, an idea, a law, exists after the
death. At the higher levels, however, the idea of a substitutional
immortality is replaced by an eternity of the ‘always’, that is, by the
idea that Beauty itself is unending and eternal, due to the perfection of
the object itself. In these later stages the object’s eternal nature is what
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offers solace to the limited, mortal human being, rather than the
prospect of some further mortal reproduction that grants a sense of
longevity after death. In addition, at the lower levels, human know-
ledge is understood to be imperfect and temporary, while in later
stages it is possible to speak of knowledge that is ‘permanent and
stable’.9 It would seem that the later stages call for a human being to
be outwardly focused, less on himself and upon his own immortality
than upon the object of his love.
While at a lower level the person who procreates in order to gain a
sense of personal immortality ‘loves’ the other, such a love retains a
moment of selﬁshness. Although the child, physical or spiritual, may
be genuinely an object of care (not cared for solely as a means to
immortality), still, the presence of the other on Diotima’s account is
at least in part to fulﬁl a sense of the desire to be immortal, in the
absence of the possibility of temporal immortality. At least to some
small extent, the other exists in part for the sake of one’s personal
fulﬁlment. However, the human being who progresses along the
ascent undergoes a transformation of self and the very nature of his
desires. The lover at the highest level of the ascent, who loves Beauty
itself for its immortality, and not his own, has undergone a funda-
mental reshaping of his own values. He now loves the Other (Beauty
itself ) for its own sake, on account of its own qualities; one might say
that the very existence of this other good in its perfection makes the
loss of the mortal self somehowmore bearable. Eros at its ﬁnal stage is
more fully ecstatic.10
At the same time, the life of philosophy takes place not only at the
ﬁnal level of contemplation. Philosophy, as we see it practised by
Socrates, takes place at the intermediate levels in which all forms of
spiritual procreation take place, for this is where conversation takes
place. Those at the highest level of the ascent no longer procreate, but
9 Cristina Ionescu, ‘The Transition from the Lower to the Higher Mysteries of
Love in Plato’s Symposium’, Dialogue 46 (1) (2007), 29. Ionescu argues that the theory
of recollection is present here as the link between the two levels.
10 D. C. Schindler, ‘Plato on the Problem of Love: On the Nature of Eros in the
Symposium’, Apeiron 40 (3) (2007), 199–220, persuasively argues that in the ﬁnal
stages of eros, desire is ‘naturally ecstatic’, not selﬁsh. Against this reading, Kosman
argues for a view of Platonic love that is essentially a form of self-love. See
L. A. Kosman, ‘Platonic Love’, inW. H. Werkmeister (ed.), Facets of Plato’s Philosophy
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976), 53–69; Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip
S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953); and Gerasimos Santas, ‘Plato’s
Theory of Eros in the Symposium’, Nous 13 (1979), 67–75.
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instead contemplate. But Socrates likes to talk. In conversation, one
gives birth to some sort of wisdom—or more often, what Socrates in
the Theaetetus says turns out to be a ‘phantom’ (Theaetetus 150c). But
philosophy is only philosophy instead of wisdom so long as it is
incomplete, and still en route to its ﬁnal goal. Conversation can
only take place when one is open to the other, and becomes aware
of one’s own lack and need for the other to inform and even trans-
form one’s self. Conversation that is open to transformation requires
a kind of vulnerable openness that risks the self. Socrates the philoso-
pher is a lover, not a wise man, as evidenced by the fact that he has not
reached the end of his ascent, but only heard of it from a mysterious,
feminine ﬁgure, a kind of philosophical prophetess.
Socrates’ description of himself as a midwife in the Theaetetus
picks up on the language of procreation. Midwifery seemingly uniﬁes
Socrates’ love of the good and love of another person, insofar as
Socrates’ attending each person’s birth of ideas is both a care for the
integrity of the good (and casting out false goods) and the good of the
person who ‘gives birth’. Indeed, midwifery is a kind of selﬂess and
generous love, since Socrates’ aim is not to give birth to his own ideas,
nor to attend to his own needs. Rather, his focus is on the other with
whom he speaks, and his relation to the good. While, strictly speak-
ing, a triadic relationship exists between the interlocutor, the good,
and Socrates, his aim is to cultivate the other person’s relationship to
the good. If Socrates also grows in love and understanding of the good
in his role as midwife, so much the better, but his fundamental locus
of concern is for the other.
Human eros, then, for Socrates, is never about only one person who
loves; it is nearly always about a lover and a beloved and the ways in
which their love affects the larger world in which they live. Eros gives
birth in beauty to beautiful things, but these beautiful things only
come into being when there is another present with whom to beget
beautiful discourses, art, laws, or children. To those who say that eros
is ‘really’ about certain qualities in the beloved, Socrates might object
that trying to understand such love in terms of its object alone is too
constricted a view of eros in the ﬁrst place. Eros is always about a
tension and a relation, between lover and beloved, and also between
those lovers and what they create as a result of their love: it is a triadic
relation between lover, beloved, and the resulting creativity of the pair.
Vulnerability and creativity are intertwined, for the creativity arises
from lack and from opening one’s self and one’s need to another.
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Artiﬁcially separating out the beloved object’s qualities from this
greater set of relationships is also a distortion of the lover’s self-
understanding, if he sees his own eros as entirely about the beloved
and his qualities. For Socrates presents the lover’s eros as being the
result also of the incompleteness of the self, its longing, and the effect
of that longing in desiring the beloved. In Socrates’ account, a self-
aware lover sees in his beloved more than a set of qualities if he
understands his own eros properly. He sees in his beloved the belo-
ved’s qualities, but also something about himself, and something
about what the lover and beloved might make or do together. To
the extent that such vulnerability gives rise to creativity, the love also
brings the individual out of himself and more focused on what is
outside of himself. Diotima’s account of eros is generously and even
lavishly productive and re-productive; these relations between lover
and beloved, the things created in love and the longing for more
creation to ﬁnd one’s immortality, are more fundamental to the nature
of love than static qualities in the object of the beloved. The creative
nature of eros, in these penultimate stages on the ladder of love, begins
with individual lack and need, but results in the lover’s reorientation of
his energy and focus on the beloved, outside of himself. Eros that
begins with lack, then, does not end in a lover’s simple desire to ﬁll
his lack. Rather, the lover who is willing to be vulnerable to the beloved
is transformed from being simply a needy being, to a being whose
creative energies are an outpouring of the self to the beloved and the
larger world. To this extent, the fecundity of love at this stage is also
ecstatic, in the sense of bringing oneself out of oneself, although
focused on the ‘ordinary’ world and not the world of the forms.
II
Let us turn to a few brief comparisons of Diotima’s speech to earlier
speeches in the dialogue in praise of love, for the speeches build on
one another, sometimes rejecting and sometimes taking up and
elaborating on the ideas of previous speakers.11 Phaedrus emphasizes
11 Rangos characterizes the speeches as akin to a series of stepping stones. Spyridon
Rangos, ‘On Diotima’s Allusions to Earlier Speakers in Plato’s Symposium’, Skepsis 16
(1) (2005), 168.
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the lover above all else. Although Phaedrus’ speech is a speech in
praise of Eros the god, his illustrations and examples are all about
particular couples; very little is said about the god himself. Phaedrus
emphasizes the lover who is willing to die for his beloved. As Diotima
will also do later, Phaedrus attributes the valorous actions of warriors
to their eros for their beloveds. However, in doing so he claims that
the lover is more divine than the beloved (180d). Phaedrus empha-
sizes the virtue of the lover such that the beloved receives almost no
mention in his speech except as a means to the lover’s achievements.
While it might seem that the beloved is loved in all his particularity,
since the lover is willing to sacriﬁce so much for him, in fact, Phaedrus’
speech is an encomium to the lover alone. Eros is good for the lover,
and the qualities of the beloved are not that important so long as the
lover acts virtuously.
Pausanius’ account of eros divides it into two kinds of love, the
heavenly and the vulgar. It corrects Phaedrus’ overemphasis on the
lover by looking at love’s different objects. Pausanius claims that
heavenly love has a better object than vulgar eros, namely, the best
love is of boys who show themselves to have worthy characters. Love
of body is inferior to the love of the right kind of soul. Pausanius tries
to differentiate between what sorts of actions are good and appropri-
ate in love and what form of gratiﬁcation is base, but in the end he
concludes it is not the type of action performed per se, but rather the
beloved’s understanding of his lover’s character that matters. Even if
the beloved makes a mistake, and thinks that his lover is good when
he is really bad, this is acceptable. For what matters is that the beloved
attempts to act for the sake of his own virtue and self-improvement.
While Pausanius reintroduces the importance of the beloved in this
speech, his view of eros is no less narcissistic than that of Phaedrus;
only this time, the beloved is the centre of erotic desire, and not the
lover or his intentions. Again, the relational aspect of the lover–
beloved relationship is overlooked in this dyadic (not triadic) account
of eros.
One would expect that if any of the speakers present were to
discuss the role of reproduction and birth in love, it would be
Eryximachus, the physician. Strikingly, his account of love contains
almost no reference to the reproductive powers of love, even as it
emphasizes çØ (nature) throughout. Eros, for Eryximachus, is
about the concord and attunement of different elements, as in
the case of different elements in the body in the case of health, or
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the attunement and right rhythm of beautiful music. Eryximachus
expands upon the previous notions of eros by making them rela-
tional; eros is never about only a lover, or a beloved, or even virtue,
but is always about the bond and harmony between at least two
things. However, in emphasizing the ways in which parts ﬁt together
into coherent wholes in nature, Eryximachus says nothing about
death, birth, or the generative power of love to overcome human
limitations. He ignores what Phaedrus and Pausanius say about the
valorous results of love altogether. Neither does he suggest that love
plays a role in biological generation, or the regeneration of living
things through the art of medicine. Thus, while relational, Eryxima-
chus’ account of eros lacks attention to vulnerability or need.
In contrast, Aristophanes presents a relational understanding of
eros that does take account of the vulnerability of persons who love.
Eros, for him, is a matter of ﬁnding one’s other half and being
reunited to a more primary and primal whole. Since human beings
are literally only half of our original selves, we are by our very nature
erotic, driven to ﬁnd the rest of ourselves in the other. Aristophanes
makes both halves of this loving relation important; each half is a
lover, but each half is a beloved, too. Eros involves lack and neediness,
even woundedness, and to understand ourselves we have to also
understand what we lack. In this way, Aristophanes’ view of eros is
more complex and nuanced than in the previous speeches: eros is best
understood by looking at both the beloved and the lover’s experience
of longing. However, Aristophanes also suggests that this erotic drive
can never be wholly satisﬁed, as the lovers never do permanently
become one again (although this is their wish). Neither does the
human being ever fully understand his own motivations in loving.
When the two halves ﬁnally meet one another:
they are then marvelously struck by friendship and kinship and Eros, and
scarcely willing to be separated from one another for even a little time. These
are the people who pass their whole lives with each other, but who can’t even
say what they wish for themselves by being with each other. No one can think
that it is for the sake of sexual intercourse that the one so eagerly delights in
being with the other. Instead the soul of each clearly wishes for something
else it can’t put into words; it divines what it wishes, and obscurely hints at it.
(192c–d)
In other words, eros never fully satisﬁes. For Aristophanes, the
incompleteness of eros is fundamental, and his descriptions of the
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experience of eros’ incompleteness seem right: we do not want our
beloved merely to talk, to make love, or even to spend a life together,
though we might want each of these activities. There is something
deeper, a nameless ‘more’ that speaks to the incomplete and restless
nature of ourselves as human beings, and that leads each lover and
beloved to seek and to ﬁnd not an end to restlessness, but a kind of
dialectical movement between more or less incompleteness, and more
or less fulﬁlment, through the intimacy with another.
The lovers are literally cut in two, wounded, torn in their individual
existences. These lovers experience the world as fundamentally rup-
tured and each senses that the rupture is within himself. Indeed,
Aristophanes even describes individuals as not wholes, but ‘slices’ of
wholes (191e). The navel comes to signify this primal wound, an
outward sign of the inner sense that each lover feels of his own
incompleteness. Zeus says that the wound remains, while others are
healed, in order that ‘man would be more orderly by contemplating
his own division’ (190e). Just as Socrates will later point to the need to
acknowledge limit, Aristophanes here points to woundedness as a
divine corrective against hubris. The navel, while healed over, always
leaves its trace as a reminder of one’s own limit. In the mythic
account, the navel signiﬁes the wound suffered as a result of hubris,
but of course in ordinary human life, it signiﬁes each human being’s
prior dependence on his or her own mother.12 No one enters the
world except by being part of a prior whole, from which they later
become separated. Thus, themyth reﬂects a kind of genuine truth about
one’s own natality as rooted in dependence, a dependence that suffers a
rupture that leaves behind a reminder of the prior dependence.
Surprisingly, Aristophanes says little about erotic love and its
relation to birth. Aristophanes’ lovers reproduce, but Aristophanes
only brieﬂy mentions reproduction as a consequence of eros (1911c).
Most couples are only interested in the other partner as a means to
self-completion, but Aristophanes makes no mention of children or
any other sort of creative endeavour as part of the lovers’ happiness.
Aristophanes’ lovers are passionate, but still mostly self-interested as
a couple, or interested in their beloved alone, but only themselves and
their beloved, as if they were a small cosmos unto themselves. Their
love remains an unsatisfying, if compelling, seeking of reunion.
12 Thanks to Jill Gordon for pointing out this connection between the navel and
dependence on the mother as implicit in the myth.
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In contrast, Diotima’s account of love signiﬁcantly widens the cre-
ative aspect of love, both in the seeking and in the satisfaction a lover
has in being a creative, generative being.13 The world of the lover
expands on Diotima’s view beyond the longings of one person for
another to complete him.
Agathon’s account praises love more than lovers or beloveds. In
this way, his description of Eros the god is not unlike Diotima’s
description of Beauty. Eros is simply perfect: young, wise, just, beau-
tiful, and best in every way. Agathon even mentions the reproductive
nature of love explicitly in a multiplicity of ways: eros makes animals
have children, makes us poets, makes us craftsmen, and in short, is
responsible for a wide variety of beautiful and good human activities.
Agathon, like Diotima, connects the creative activities of human
beings to love, and makes the relation of Eros (understood as a god)
more important than beloved or lover alone. But the deﬁciency that
Socrates sees in Agathon’s view of eros is that it overlooks its ‘in
between’ nature, i.e. the lack, the desire, and what is not had, in favour
of what is achieved, satisﬁed, and possessed. Socrates reminds Aga-
thon that this, too, is a crucial part of eros. Eros is not eros without
poverty and incompleteness.
But if Socrates is right, then the account of the ﬁnal contemplation
of Beauty itself cannot be read in isolation from the rest of Diotima’s
speeches about eros’s movement. Eros, for Diotima, is about the
experience of moving towards an object that can satisfy our desire
and not leave us empty handed (in contrast to Aristophanes’ lovers).
However, at the same time, eros is in that movement and in that
relation of self to other, of lover to beloved, and beloved to lover, and
also in the relation of each of these to what is created in the encounter
with eros. Eros, for Diotima, is about a state of becoming, not only the
becoming of the lover and beloved, but also the becoming of the
world as the lovers fruitfully contribute to it with their philosophical
discussion, their poetry, their children, laws, and other creative acts.
The beloved is always incomplete, and imperfect in his qualities, as
much as the lover is; however, the creative acts of eros help us to
13 Fussi shows the sense in which Diotima’s speech is a response to Aristophanes’
speech, not refutative in nature, but rather a more complex development of how love
is a response to incompleteness and mortality. See Alessandra Fussi, ‘Love of the
Good, Love of the Whole: Diotima’s Response to Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium’,
Epoche 13 (2) (2009), 267–90.
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overcome our incompleteness and our mortality. In fact, it is because
we are incomplete that eros is so productive. Ascent to the forms is a
genuine good, but certain kinds of goods (such as philosophy) only
come about because we have not yet reached our destination.
III
If there is any critique of Socrates’ and Diotima’s views in the
dialogue, it is found in Alcibiades’ speech. For it seems that as
much as Socrates loves the forms, he cannot bring himself to love
the particularities of Alcibiades: he seems unmoved by Alcibiades’
beauty, unaffected and even dispassionate. And yet, as Nussbaum
emphasizes, throughout the Symposium we ﬁnd allusions to Alcibi-
ades, the passionate lover, who both understood something about
eros and yet, needs his eros to be puriﬁed. Alcibiades has many
identities, writes Nussbaum:
A man who died shot by an arrow will speak of the words of love as arrows,
or bolts, wounding the soul (219b). A man who inﬂuentially denounced the
ﬂute as an instrument unworthy of a free man’s dignity will describe himself
as a slave to the enchanting ﬂute-playing of a certain satyr (215b–d, 216c,
219c). A man who will deface holy statues compares the soul of Socrates to a
set of god-statues, and speaks of the injustice of rubbing out, or defacing,
Socratic virtues (213e, 215b, 216d, 217e, 222a).14
With Alcibiades’ arrival, what was seemingly a private dialogue, a
matter of entertainment among a small group of friends who enjoyed
discussing and debating eros, suddenly takes on enormous political
signiﬁcance. For Alcibiades’ discussion of eros here is reminiscent of
his other famous association with eros, namely, the accusation that he
defamed the hermai. Such defamation was a political act, an iconic
representation of Alcibiades’ apparent disdain for the city and its
religious and political institutions, as a result of his own corrupting
political ambition. While Socrates may have cared for and sought to
teach Alcibiades, Plato’s dialogue was composed long after his death,
and after the dire consequences of his betrayal of Athens and the
14 Martha Nussbaum, ‘The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium’,
Philosophy and Literature 3 (2) (1979), 133.
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results for Athens’s decline in regional power had become clear. For
Plato’s audience, to understand Alcibiades’ speech on love here
cannot have the apolitical associations that it seems to have had for
the characters internal to the dialogue; his claim that he was never
able to resolve his unhappiness with himself and his ambitions takes
on an especial poignancy closely linked to the poignancy of Athens’s
larger political losses.
Alcibiades, however, understands his account of love to be acutely
personal. Alcibiades describes himself as not only vulnerable to love,
but already wounded. He says of himself:
I’m almost like a man who’s been bitten by a snake. They say that anyone
who’s suffered it is unwilling to tell what it was like except to those who have
been bitten, because they alone will sympathize and understand if one was
driven to do and say everything in his pain. Well, I’d been bitten by
something more painful, and in the most painful place one can be bitten—
in the heart or soul or whatever one should name it, struck and bitten by
arguments in philosophy that hold more ﬁercely than a serpent, when they
take hold of a young and not ill-endowed soul and make him do and say
anything whatever. (217e–218a)
While Alcibiades had thought he ‘had loosed his arrows and wounded
him [Socrates]’ (219b), Socrates turns out to be invulnerable not only
to Alcibiades’ seductive words, but also to the inebriating effect of
wine (220a), to money (219e), and even snow on bare feet (220b).15
Alcibiades wants from Socrates the passion of a lover, but instead
receives the affection of a father ﬁgure. When Alcibiades speaks of his
uneventful night under the covers with Socrates, one senses not so
much sexual frustration, as a desire to be special to Socrates, to be
something more than a person whom Socrates wishes to bring to the
‘good’. Insofar as Alcibiades feels treated by Socrates as simply ‘one
who ought to ascend to Beauty’, as a potential philosopher, he feels
Socrates has not loved him as himself, his particular, quirky, passion-
ate, ﬂawed, ambitious, handsome, confused, particular self. Howland
notes the similarity between Alcibiades’ understanding of Socrates as
satyr-like, and the satyr in Euripides’ Cyclops, who delights in mocking
others just after he has succeeded in getting them to be their most
exposed and vulnerable. Alcibiades’ comparison of Socrates to a satyr
15 Jacob Howland, ‘Plato’s Dionysian Music: A Reading of the Symposium’, Epoche
12 (1) (2007), 31.
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indicates his sense of Socrates’ strangeness and seeming removal from
the ordinary passions of other human beings.16
Alcibiades even implies that if only Socrates would love him in the
way that he wants to be loved, he might be inspired to live a better life.
Socrates seems only to care about loving knowledge and seeking the
truth through conversation; the speech of Alcibiades calls into ques-
tion whether this is really enough. Alcibiades is drunk, and his speech
is about the drunken, manic, possessed aspects of love entirely over-
looked by other characters so far. For Alcibiades, eros is painful,
crazed, as much about Bacchic possession as about valorous action.
Alcibiades says that part of why he loves Socrates is that Socrates is
full of beautiful ºªØ that contain images of virtue (222a), but loving
a virtuous beloved turns out to be insufﬁcient to make Alcibiades
virtuous. For him, eros is not only a source of beauty and creation, but
also—if frustrated—a source of suffering and destruction.17
While Socrates emphasizes the importance of care for the soul
through the pursuit of the philosophical life, Alcibiades raises the
question of the sufﬁciency of this view. He asks, Socrates may love the
others as partners in conversation, but can he say of anyone (as
Alcibiades says of him) that there is absolutely no one who has
affected him in this way, that there is another of whom he can say,
‘I will never ﬁnd another one just like him’? Is Socrates open to an
eros that can weaken and transform him as a ‘whole’ human being,
and not only as a seeker of Beauty itself ?
Here Alcibiades displays his vulnerability, not only admitting to his
desire for Socrates (contrary to the Greek expectation that the beloved
ought to resist his lover while the lover pursues with open desire). He
knows of his shortcomings and of his need to transform his life from
an ambitious political life to a virtuous, philosophically informed care
for his soul:
For he compels me to agree that though I am much myself in need (K
c),
I neglect myself and attend to the affairs of Athens. So I stop my ears by force
as if against the Sirens and run away (ç
ªø) in order that I may not grow
old sitting here beside him. Before him alone among men I suffer what one
might not have supposed is in me—shame before anyone. Before him alone
I feel ashamed (ÆNåÆØ). (216a–b)
16 Howland, ‘Plato’s Dionysian Music’, 32.
17 Jill Gordon brings out the tragic element of Alcibiades in the Symposium in her
book Plato’s Erotic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 180–3.
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Alcibiades is unrestrained in his ambition and concern for the praise
of the multitude, except around Socrates. Socrates’ presence to him as
a lover makes him, the beloved, aware of a latent sense of shame. That
shame arises from a desire to look good in the eyes of Socrates, but
also explains his awareness of his own need. His use of the verb Kø,
translated here as ‘need’, indicates a lack or falling short, of which
Alcibiades is self-aware. Unlike the Aristophanic lovers, who know
only that they lack ‘something’ and so seek a lover without full self-
awareness, Alcibiades even knows that the solution is to care for his
soul and to stop attending to the attention of the multitude.
Alcibiades here reveals his great desire not to be vulnerable in three
key ways in which he might show weakness: personal need; old age;
and shame. These three forms of vulnerability that Alcibiades wishes
to avoid are interrelated. Alcibiades must ‘stop up his ears’ (literally
close himself off to prevent Socrates’ words from entering into his
inner being) because if he were truly honest with his neglect of his
own soul even when apart from Socrates, shame would be a natural
result.18 Even his admitted fear of growing old, being a philosopher
like Socrates instead of an active man of the city, reﬂects the idea
behind Diotima’s claim that we seek immortality in accomplishment,
knowing that life comes to an end. Alcibiades hints that his lack of
shame and lack of care for his own soul comes from a fear of old age
and even death, which leads him to ignore these difﬁcult, but import-
ant, truths about human existence, in favour of an active political life
and Dionysian approach to eros. His entrance into the symposium,
drunk, crowned with ivy and violets, is suggestive of this Dionysian
element in Alcibiades.19
Other ancient authors also describe Alcibiades as possessing an
overinﬂated sense of pride. Thucydides, for example, writes that
Alcibiades defended his expenditures at the Olympics by saying that
he was ‘arrogant’ (ªÆ çæ
E) in ways not equalled by others
(Thucydides 6. 16. 2).20 But Thucydides also makes clear that Alcibi-
ades lived beyond his means, always having greater desires than
18 Scott and Welton suggest that it is Alcibiades’ desire to avoid shame that leads
him to make his speech at the symposium, in order to knock down Socrates from
his pedestal. See Gary Scott and William Welton, ‘An Overlooked Motive in
Alcibiades’ Symposium Speech’, Interpretation 24 (1) (1996), 70.
19 Corrigan and Gazov-Corrigan, Dialectic at Play, 163.
20 See D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 14–15 and chapter 3.
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means to fulﬁl them. Thucydides even speciﬁes that Alcibiades’
excessive desires caused the downfall of the state when they made
the multitude reject him (Thuc. 6. 15. 3–4).21 Socrates in Alcibiades I,
too, presents Alcibiades as enormously ambitious, desiring to make
himself not only ruler of Athens, but also over all of Greece and most
of Asia (104–5).22 At least one forensic work presents Alcibiades as a
threat to the community on account of his overinﬂated sense of pride,
as well as his ÆæÆØÆ (lawlessness of desire). A fragment from
Eupolis even jokes that Alcibiades ought to be credited with the
invention of drinking alcohol in the morning (frag 385K-).23 Demos-
thenes in his Against Meidias seeks to associate Meidias with Alici-
biades in order to encourage the jurors to punish him. He warns that
in the past, the city tolerated and excused the ‘insolence’ of ﬁgures
such as Alcibiades, with the result of threatening genuine democracy
(143–6). Alcibiades is a man who tries to live without limit, always
pushing against his own vulnerability, even while such living
threatened the well-being of the city. His self-awareness of his vul-
nerability, while it exceeds that of many others at the symposium, still
does not translate into action. When Socrates disappears and Alcibi-
ades ﬁnds himself before a crowd again, he admits that his shame
dissipates and worldly ambition returns. Alcibiades’ downfall is that
he was not vulnerable enough to Socrates’ ºªØ. While he describes
those arguments as biting words that wounded him, he ﬂees (ç
ª
Ø)
from the source of the pain, rather than face it.
In Eros the Bittersweet, Anne Carson suggests that eros makes us
aware of our own boundaries as limited human beings. When one
feels eros for another, the desire to overcome separation and to
become one with the object of one’s love is impossible to realize:
‘[I]t is only, suddenly, at the moment when I would dissolve that
boundary, I realize I never can.’24 In the mix of desire for an impos-
sible unity and awareness of one’s own boundaries, the lover becomes
more profoundly aware of her own limit. One temptation is to blur
the line between the self and Other, or to consider the Other only in
terms of how he or she can ﬁll the lack in oneself.25 Perhaps this is
21 Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 69–70.
22 Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 17.
23 Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 79.
24 Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet (Champaign, Ill.: Dalkey, 1998), 30.
25 Carson, Eros the Bittersweet, 34–5.
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why Alcibiades feels such anger that Socrates treats him only as a
father would a son, when he desires the touch of a lover. He is not
simply frustrated that Socrates does not reciprocate his love. He
seems to feel upset that Socrates as a person is not deﬁned by
Alcibiades’ own need of him, which he admits to be substantial.
Thus, he blames Socrates for not making him better than he is, in
his illusory belief that Socrates’ identity can be deﬁned in terms of his
own lack.
While Socrates and Alcibiades are both aware of their own limit, in
a sense, Alcibiades will not claim his limit as his own. Perhaps this is
the key difference between the two of them: Socrates takes on a kind
of responsibility for responding to his own limit while Alcibiades
expects others such as Socrates somehow to care for and to tend to
those limits adequately. However, Socrates is right that there is a
certain kind of aloneness, perhaps inevitably even loneliness, in
taking on responsibility for one’s weaknesses as well as strengths.
Unlike the Aristophanic notion of a primal wound that can be healed
if only the ‘right’match is found, Socrates’ picture of human limit and
loving is not solved by another person’s actions or presence, and
perhaps not even soluble. Instead, Socrates emphasizes a constant
attentiveness to the limits of one’s own humanity and staying with
one’s responsibility to respond constructively to one’s own limits.
The Phaedo puts it most starkly in Socrates’ claim that all philo-
sophy is ‘practicing for death’ (81a), the ultimate insoluble limit. The
philosopher must not avoid the hard truth of death’s inevitability, but
rather live with the understanding that death is not something to be
avoided at the expense of other goods. Socrates, then, while invulner-
able to snow, money, bodily beauty, and status, is nonetheless one
who places a great deal of emphasis on being vulnerable to the words
and arguments of others. Indeed, his account of how the prophetess
Diotima taught and corrected him provides a paradigm for the
signiﬁcance of receiving teaching from outside oneself and acknow-
ledging the need to learn.26 Socrates does not say that he has made the
ascent himself, only that Diotima has ‘persuaded me’ of the account
of eros.27 While Socrates and Diotima were not lovers in a strict sense,
they do ﬁt the model of reproduction of beautiful ideas that Diotima
26 Ionescu, ‘The Transition from the Lower’, 9.
27 William J. Prior, ‘The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium’, inOxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy Vol. XXXI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 147.
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sets out: Diotima has shared something of her knowledge of love’s
nature with Socrates, who recognizes his need for such a teaching. He
describes his encounter with her as a matter of having been ‘cross-
examined’ (IÆŒæ	ıÆ; 201e). Given the near absence of women
from political and philosophical discourse, the admission of being
cross-examined by a woman, and found wanting, is particularly
humbling. But Socrates’ response was to learn, and to praise Diotima
for her wisdom, not to get angry at his own insufﬁciency.
Further, in this conversation at the symposium, Socrates partici-
pates again in a conversation in which the knowledge is reproduced,
again handed on to others, who may or may not respond to it with a
sense of their own neediness (or its persuasiveness as an account). But
it is Socrates’ sense of his own limit, the ‘knowledge of his own
ignorance’, that he characterizes as his ‘true wisdom’ in the Apology,
a wisdom that makes possible both learning and passing on what he
has learned, but a form of wisdom which also makes him vulnerable
to the charges of those who feel humiliated by his questioning
attempts to get others to feel their own neediness. This mode of
questioning in order to make others understand their ‘lack’ will
eventually contribute to his being put to death, but also to his
creativity here in contributing to the ongoing discussion of love.28
Socrates’ justice and Alcibiades’ injustice are the respective conse-
quences of different responses they each have to their own vulner-
ability. The previous chapter explored how in the Gorgias, Callicles
sees Socrates’ inattentiveness to political and pragmatic concerns as
potentially harmful. However, the Symposium suggests that there are
tremendous costs in too great a concern with political pressure. While
Socrates’ death is the consequence of choosing philosophy, a life of
enquiry and of questioning of others, as his response, Alcibiades
avoids his own vulnerability with the resulting peril of losing a
sense of his own virtue. If we contrast Socrates’ relative placidity
and acceptance of his own death in both the Phaedo and the Apology,
to the inner turmoil and confusion that we see in Alcibiades’ speech,
as well as the outward tumult of his political actions, Socrates’
response seems to result in greater happiness. Indeed, his recognition
28 Socrates suggests that the real reason that others became angry with him was
that they redirected their frustration at their inability to answer his questions at him:
‘those who are examined are angry with me, instead of angry with themselves’
(Apology 23c).
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of his limit seems to be the very source of his own freedom, for
without fear of death or loss of status, Socrates can speak truthfully
and authentically about all matters.29 Socrates’ death is not something
that he regards as evil, given that he has been as just as possible in the
course of his life. In contrast, Alcibiades seems to struggle with the
good of his own activities and his self-understanding, with peace
never quite in reach.
But Socrates’ response to vulnerability does not only have conse-
quences for personal happiness as an individual. For this openness to
language and its transformative potential is true also for some others
in the dialogue. Dialogue is made possible because Socrates and
others take seriously the need to be vulnerable to ºªØ, in ways
that Alcibiades refuses. Eros drives the philosophical conversation
of this meeting of friends and acquaintances. For some of the same
themes in the individual speeches about eros are recapitulated in this
particular symposium’s interactions in deed. While the ﬂute girls
have been sent away, and speeches have supplanted (at least to
some extent) kisses and heavy drinking, after a previous night’s excess
(176a–e), eros still abounds at the party. Aristodemus attends the
party because he is, according to Apollodorus in the dialogue’s
opening, ‘obsessed’ with Socrates. But Socrates is clearly not bothered
by Aristodemus’ attention; instead, he invites him along to the party,
which only Socrates had been asked to attend. Because Socrates
becomes lost in thought, Aristodemus ends up accidentally at the
party without Socrates, and so experiences the awkward unpleasant-
ness of being an uninvited guest. Eros itself is something like that
experience, of being an ‘uninvited guest’; such a moment takes us off
guard, and interferes in the ordering of our best, most carefully laid
out plans. This sense of eros as an interruption continues in the
dialogue’s action when Aristophanes gets the hiccups, and so Erix-
ymachus takes over his place in the speechmaking. Alcibiades’
sudden, drunken entrance is its most powerful interruption.30
Eros is also present in the philosophical conversation itself, in the
mixture of Poverty and Plenty, 
	Æ, and æ, in the quest to
understand love’s nature. Love is not only the topic of conversation;
29 Scott and Welton, ‘An Overlooked Motive’, 74–7.
30 Nussbaum points to the signiﬁcance of the dialogue’s dating as an allusion to
Alcibiades’ later mutilation of the hermai as well. See Nussbaum, ‘The Speech of
Alcibiades’, 171.
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it is its motive, when we understand eros in its wider dimension as
that which gives birth to, among other creative goods, beautiful
speeches. These speeches also bind the participants in this conversa-
tion together, to one another, so that they are also like the lover and
beloved of Plato’s Phaedrus, whose love for each other leads to the
sprouting of wings and ascent to that which they both love outside of
one another. Diotima and Socrates might be one such pairing, as her
questioning of him fruitfully contributes to his further growth and
development.31 But instead of philosophy existing only between the
lover–beloved dyad, the Symposium makes the whole community,
whose speeches build dialectically upon one another in conversation,
the means of the ascent. While Socrates can fall prey to his temptation
to turn away from the world and its interactions, and get lost in his
thoughts while leaving poor Aristodemus at the door, the larger
community of philosophers and poets, doctors and politicians also
ensures that he does not remain standing there in contemplation. The
incompleteness, longing, and even wounded nature of souls such as
Alcibiades ensures that Socrates remains an active part of the life of
the community, not only a contemplator, but also as a moral and
political actor, and friend.
31 Corrigan and Glasov-Corrigan note the importance of balance between the
feminine and masculine, as well as between Diotima’s Plenty and Socrates’ Poverty,
as creative forces in the dialogue. See Corrigan and Glasov-Corrigan, Dialectic at Play,
111–18.
Eros, Woundedness, and Creativity 139
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
6Friendship and Moral Failure
in Aristotle’s Ethics
Aristotle’s account of friendship (çØºÆ) extends over nearly two
books of the Nicomachean Ethics, granting friendship a central
place in his account of an ethical life. Aristotle writes, ‘No one
would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other
goods’ (N. Ethics 1155a).1 Whatever value Aristotle grants to the
necessity of friendship for exercise of the moral and political virtues,
his account of friendship is not limited to such necessity. Instead, we
ﬁnd Aristotle speaking of a true friend as a refuge in times of trouble;
as a person whom we can trust; as one who knows one’s self more
deeply than anyone else; and in the best cases, even as ‘another self ’.
Aristotle opens his account of çØºÆ in Book VIII with a brief
statement of its essentiality. He does not require that extensive argu-
ment be given for friendship’s centrality to human nature, noting
only that çØºÆ is so basic to both our earliest bonds to our mothers
and our most civilized and highly developed political institutions that
its natural origin cannot be denied. Aristotle grants friendship the
status as the noblest of human relationships, a relationship of not
only necessity, but also honour.
Working out the details as to why Aristotle grants such centrality
to friendship has been something of a puzzle for commentators, for
Aristotle clearly claims that the virtuous man is by deﬁnition self-
sufﬁcient. Commentators have wondered about the relationship
1 Translations used for the Ethics in this chapter are from Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1985). Greek consulted in
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. J. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), ac-
cessed online at the Perseus Digital Library, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0053>, 2010–12.
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between Aristotle’s claim to the self-sufﬁciency of virtue, and his
remarks about the centrality of friendship to a life well lived, given
the contingencies involved in friendship. Cooper, for example, asserts
that if the virtuous man does not need others in order to be virtuous,
we might have little reason yet to understand why the virtuous man
would even choose to make friendships of virtue. But Aristotle clearly
makes such friendships essential to the ﬂourishing of the human
person. Cooper ﬁnds the answer in Aristotle’s claim that friends
help to increase our self-knowledge, for they show us a reﬂection of
our own lives so that we might be able to study (ŁøæE) it in another
(Magna Moralia 1213a). Such self-knowledge is part of human ﬂour-
ishing.2 Nussbaum persuasively argues that relational goods such as
friendship are both essential to human ﬂourishing and yet inherently
vulnerable to a variety of contingent circumstances that can diminish
such relationships and the happiness that they bring. Friendship is
central to human life, both because we are political beings by nature
whose humanity is bound up with relationality, and because human
virtues such as justice and generosity are by nature connected to
human neediness.3 Generosity exists only as a virtue because we
have need of one another’s generosity as human beings who cannot
ﬂourish alone. Yet, a wide variety of contingencies make the develop-
ment of such friendships difﬁcult, such as the luck involved in ﬁnding
another of high character and aspiration, or the ability to trust in
others. Friendships can be lost to departures, distrust, and inevitably
to the death of the other friend.4
Relatively little attention has been paid to Aristotle’s discussion of
how to respond to the moral failure of a friend. To the extent that this
topic has been addressed, commentators have mostly focused on his
discussion as an example of Aristotle’s over-reliance on good character
as central to true friendship. Some, for example, object that Aristotle
requires far too much of friendships by eliminating the possibility of
friendship with those who lack virtue. He even argues for the aban-
donment of a friend who no longer possesses virtue. However much it
may be the case that Aristotle is not generous enough in his respon-
siveness to the good of loving the other in his imperfection, I would
2 John Cooper, Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),
341–3.
3 Nussbaum, Fragility, 350, 357. 4 Nussbaum, Fragility, 359–61.
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argue that Aristotle expresses a remarkable care and sensitivity for the
genuine loss of such friendships. Aristotle’s sensitive discussion of
moral failures among friends deepens our understanding of his open-
ness to the difﬁculties of human vulnerability in relationships. Indeed,
his understanding of friendship accounts for a certain degree of con-
tingency and even love of other individuals in their particularity that is
not often emphasized in commentaries.5
I shall focus on Aristotle’s account of how one properly reacts
to the loss of a friend who has turned bad, in order to explore
more deeply Aristotle’s sense in which friendship extends mutual
dependence and even increases our vulnerability to one another.6
Such vulnerability moderates somewhat his claims that the vir-
tuous man is self-sufﬁcient. While the good man is self-sufﬁcient
in virtue, his friendships not only are necessary for his full ﬂour-
ishing as a good person, but also leave him with genuine loss when
such friendships come to an end. Aristotle’s care for the self-
sufﬁciency of virtue is also balanced by a realistic and sensitive
acknowledgement of the virtuous man’s vulnerability to loss in
engaging in intimate relationships. Such loss includes not only the
loss of another with whom to spend time and to exercise the
virtues, but also the loss of the particular and irreplaceable nature
of the friend as an individual.
I next argue that Aristotle’s recognition of the relative limits of
close friendships, family relationships, and even civic laws suggests
his acknowledgement of human limits and the need to care for one
another in the midst of human ﬁnitude. Precisely because no single
set of relationships—including friendships of virtue—can provide
for all human needs all the time, Aristotle emphasizes the need
for multiple sources of care in community. We ﬁnd in his discussion
of friendship, then, a readiness to acknowledge human limits in
guaranteeing PÆØÆ. Political communities must develop mul-
tiple forms of care if they are to be successful in developing good
citizens.
5 Here I am particularly thinking of Stern-Gillett’s argument that Aristotle’s notion
of friendship centres on loving the rationality of another, thus excluding his particu-
larity and contingent goods from what is loved in the friend. See Stern-Gillett,
Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, especially chapter 3.
6 Cooper also sees vulnerability, particularly psychological vulnerability, in such
relationships. See Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 351.
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IFriendship plays an important, though limited, role in ongoing
moral development. Aristotle grounds all forms of friendship in
our most basic human dependencies: ‘[T]he young need it to keep
from error. The old need it to care for them and support the actions
that fail because of weakness. And those in their prime need it to do
ﬁne actions; for when “two go together . . .” they are more capable of
understanding and acting’ (N. Ethics 1115a). While Aristotle goes on
to argue that the best forms of çØºÆ occur between two virtuous
individuals, its origin lies in human weakness. Power, honour, and
prosperity are all goods that are subject to risk, and the more that
one possesses such goods, the greater the need when they are taken
away. Childhood and old age, both times of weakness, are balanced
by the strength of friendship. Even in the best part of life, with the
fewest weaknesses, friendship is required: not only to have someone
with whom to practise the virtues, but also someone with whom to
discover how to live them.
Aristotle’s above use of the proverbial ‘two go together’ refers to the
events of Homer’s Iliad in which Odysseus and Diomedes plan to spy
on the Trojans to see how far the Trojans have advanced into Greek
territory. Their mission takes place during a time of great Greek
military risk, and so is especially fearful. Diomedes asks for a com-
panion who might accompany them with the idea that two people are
better suited to discover the truth, since an individual mind does not
reach as far as two together. Socrates, in the Protagoras, quotes the
same passage: ‘Protagoras, please don’t think that I have any other
desire in our discussion than to examine the things that are difﬁculties
for me each time. For I think that there is a great deal in what Homer
says: “When two go together, and one sees it before the other.” For
somehow we human beings are all more resourceful (Pæ	
æØ)
this way, in each deed, word, or thought; but if someone observes
something alone, he has to go around searching until he discovers
somebody to whom he can show it and who will conﬁrm it’ (Prot.
348c–d).
Aristotle takes up the theme of ‘resourcefulness’ and extends it to
the realm of friendship. In friendship, an individual who lacks some-
thing ﬁnds the means he needs to accomplish good action with the
presence of another alongside of him. A friend provides not only
concrete resources to accomplish ends (means for the elderly to
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survive, or good advice for the young); friendship also seems to
enhance one’s own internal resources. When Aristotle suggests that
friends aid in both ‘thinking and acting’, the implication is that in the
presence of a friend, one’s own abilities are enhanced through the
shared experience of pursuing a goal alongside another. For example,
the presence of a courageous friend in the heat of battle not only
protects another from bodily harm, but ideally also inspires the other
to persevere and to continue to draw upon his own resources for
courage in the face of a threat. Friendship provides for human need in
a quite different way from material resources. While food satiates
hunger and weapons preserve a threatened man’s welfare, friendship
does not merely ﬁll a need. Instead, friendship cultivates the develop-
ment of one’s capacities. Virtues such as generosity, courage, and
wittiness require others as models for learning how to cultivate and
live such virtues in particular situations. But even once such virtues
are ﬁrmly rooted in character, we need others with whom to be
generous, courageous, or witty. The ongoing existence of such virtues
as active parts of our lives requires others; nor can courage be a
meaningful part of life unless my courage is exercised on behalf of
others. To this extent, one’s own happiness is fundamentally inter-
twined with the presence and shared activity of other friends, whose
existence allows my own excellence (and also their excellence) to
ﬂourish.7
Nussbaum has argued for the centrality of luck or 
åÅ in Aris-
totle’s ethical thought. While the life of virtue is stable and has some
resistance to the experience of unlucky circumstances, this resistance
is not endless. For example, one might say that a person in an
irreversible coma as a result of a terrible accident is unlucky and
unhappy. This is not to say that he or she lacks value, only that we can
say there is something fundamentally missing from an unconscious
life that makes it ‘unhappy’, or at least signiﬁcantly unhappier than a
life of vibrant activity (KæªØÆ). However, many causes of such
7 Annas argues that the primary good of a friendship of virtue is to contemplate the
goodness of one’s friend, on the grounds that the self-sufﬁcient man has enough in his
own virtue that he is not in need of others there. See Julia Annas, ‘Plato and Aristotle
on Friendship and Altruism’, Mind 86 (1977), 532–54. However, since happiness
includes the activity associated with the virtues, and not only their possession, to have
others with whom to share this activity is central to our ability to do it more easily and
more often. See also Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1993), chapter 12. See also Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 345–51.
Friendship and Moral Failure 145
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
unhappiness are beyond our control. Aristotle, in particular, was
concerned with large upheavals in the community, such as those
found in enslavement after lost wars, or political turmoil within
one’s own community.8
Friendship, too, is subject to luck, insofar as many factors can limit
or end friendships. Aristotle emphasizes that friendships of virtue are
less likely to come to an end than friendships of utility or pleasure,
which remain only as long as the usefulness or the pleasure of the
friend is of beneﬁt. If two people are friends as a result of utility, for
example, work together as study partners for a university class, and
then the class terminates, the friendship itself must terminate, or else
the reason for its continued existence must transform. The friends in
question might ﬁnd that they also share a common love of sports, and
so continue in their friendship now as friends of pleasure. Or they
may be in another class and so remain friends of utility whose
primary relationship stems from the human dependence upon others
to learn and to grow intellectually. Friendships of pleasure and of
utility are less stable and lasting than other forms of friendship
because the raison d’être for such a friendship is likely to change.
To this extent, they are incomplete forms of friendship.9
Aristotle understands friendships of virtue to be signiﬁcantly less
likely to change or to end, insofar as the reason for their existence—
the pursuit of a life of moral excellence—does not terminate so long as
both persons live. Moral virtue, by its deﬁnition, is a stable and
abiding character, a characteristic of soul that takes much time to
develop, but once established is unlikely to be lost. Nonetheless,
Aristotle grapples with the possibility of a friendship in which one
friend is faced with the moral failure of the other friend, a moral
failure that tests the very resilience of friendship. Aristotle’s explanation
of the difﬁculties with deciding how philosophically to resolve this
problem exhibits the complexity and nuance of his understanding of
human dependency. Indeed, despite his claim that the best form of
friendship displays ‘complete’ virtue, Aristotle exhibits a tremendous
sensitivity to human moral weakness in his account of friendship.
Aristotle’s notion of friendship is grounded in the premiss that
human beings love only what is lovable, that is, that which is worthy
8 Nussbaum, Fragility, 345.
9 Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 39.
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of love or appears to be so: ‘For, it seems, not everything is loved but
[only] what is lovable, and this is either good or pleasant or useful’
(N. Ethics 1155b). The familiar typology of three types of friendship
categorizes friendship according to what is loved about the friend,
that is, whether he is useful to one’s self, gives pleasure in being a
friend, or is a good human being. While the ﬁrst two forms of
friendship are forms of love in which the object of friendship is
loved for the sake of what is good for the one who loves; a friend
who makes another laugh is pleasant and so is loved for how the
character of wittiness produces a feeling of pleasure in oneself. In the
case of perfect friendship, however, each friend loves the other be-
cause he is good—not only good for one’s self, but also good in
himself: ‘Now those who wish goods to their friend for the friend’s
own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of
the friend himself, not coincidentally. Hence, these people’s friendship
lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring’ (N. Ethics 1156b).
Here Aristotle asserts an identity between the good of the friend for
one’s self and for the sake of the other. The good of the friend is not
simply ‘added on’ to the beneﬁt that one receives in friendship. Rather,
his goodness is essential both to him and to why he is loved and
lovable, namely, for himself. Although Aristotle emphasizes that vir-
tuous friends are both pleasant and beneﬁcial, what is loved in the
virtuous friend is his selfhood, which in a deep way is constitutive of
the human person.10
Unlike later models of ethical behaviour, such as Kant’s ethical
theory, which locates the good of the self in a single faculty such as the
will, Aristotle’s understanding of what it means to be good permeates
the whole of human nature. Book I, particularly Chapter 7, lays out
10 In contrast, Dale Jacquette argues that even friendships of virtue are good
primarily because of the personal beneﬁt that results in having them, for example,
through encouraging the growth of one’s own virtue. Peter Drum instead argues that
Aristotle understands çØºÆ in friendships of virtue to serve ‘the good’ and sees good
friendships as part of loving the good. But for Aristotle, the very point of virtuous
friendship is that love of the good and love of the friend coalesce: in loving a person
who is truly an exemplar of what it means to be human, I love the good in him. To
suggest that loving him is a means of loving ‘the good’ introduces an element of
Platonism foreign to Aristotle’s understanding of the good as inhering in particular
types of beings, and even in relations between these beings. See Peter Drum, ‘What is
the Motivation of Morality for Friendship in Aristotle?’, Journal of Value Inquiry 37
(2003), 97–9 and Dale Jacquette, ‘Aristotle on the Value of Friendship as a Moral
Motivation’, Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001), 387.
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the Aristotelian model of excellence as grounded in the fulﬁlment of
human nature. Just as excellence in a plant lies in the good functioning
of its nutrition and growth, and animal excellence lies in sense percep-
tion, to be a person of virtue requires that one exercise one’s work, or
æª, one’s activity, in a way that is fulﬁlling of a distinctively human
existence. To this extent, perfect friendship possesses a complete har-
mony of love of the other for his virtue, but also for himself, for the two
are identical for Aristotle: to be good is to be most fully and authentic-
ally human. Given that the friend who loves is also a person of virtue,
he loves what is good by his own nature. As Annas has argued, Aristotle
argues that to be çºÆı
 (self-loving) is to be virtuous, insofar as the
man who is becoming virtuous comes to love his true (i.e. virtuous) self
more and more, and to love less virtuous aspects of himself less and
less.11 Thus, in friendships of virtue, there is a tight unity between the
good; the friend’s good; and the fulﬁlment of one’s own desires.
For this reason, wicked men cannot be friends for long, since their
love lacks both steadfastness and completion. Aristotle attributes the
inconstancy of friendship between wicked persons to an internal lack
of steadfastness of desire, ‘since they do not even remain similar to
what they were’, but are changeable in what sorts of objects of desire
are pursued (N. Ethics 1159b). In such cases, there can be no unity of
the fulﬁlment of one’s own aims and objectives and the true love of
another for himself, for the wicked man by deﬁnition does not love
that which is truly good, but only that which is apparently good in his
own eyes. Even if two friends share a common aim, there are constant
threats to the persistence of such friendship. Take the example of two
wicked men who work together in order to rob a bank. Those who
lack virtue are likely to betray one another, for they do not possess
constancy in courage, generosity, pursuit of honour, or the other
virtues. In addition, the friendship exists for the sake of the achieve-
ment of some other good external to the friends, not the friend’s own
good. Once the money has been stolen, one easily imagines that one
thief may wish to ‘take the money and run’ now that the friend does
not continue to be useful. Even those who delight in one another’s
wickedness are not likely to remain friends for long, for such delight
will be short-lived. Fundamentally, Aristotle’s conception of the virtue
is that it alone provides for lasting and complete pleasure. While
11 Annas, Morality of Happiness, 261.
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superﬁcially other kinds of goods might provide short-term pleasure,
only ‘real’ goods allow for the lasting pleasure that the human being
seeks. While Aristotle does not reduce pleasure to the good, he does
regard pleasure as that which ‘completes’ the good.12 Thus, the
vicious who cannot participate in the highest forms of friendship
also lack the most signiﬁcant and lasting pleasures of life.
However, a deeper set of issues arise when only one friend in a pair
of apparently virtuous friends turns out not to be good. Aristotle asks
what he takes to be a difﬁcult, but common, question: ‘But if we accept
a friend as a good person, and then he becomes vicious, and seems so,
should we still love him?’ (N. Ethics 1165b). Aristotle’s answer is
complex and exhibits especially well the difﬁculty with the problem
of moral education, given human vulnerability to harm from those
who lack virtue. Aristotle’s most basic answer is that ‘what is bad is
not lovable’, but only that which is good (N. Ethics 1165b). Philo-
sophically, Aristotle understands the human person to be capable
only of loving what he understands or opines to be good. What is bad
is not lovable by us, unless we mistakenly believe it to be good.
Therefore, it is not possible to love an evil man, if one is good, for
one will love the good and not the evil, according to one’s own
character. Nonetheless, in his additional remarks, Aristotle expresses
hesitancy as to whether such careful and neat philosophical categories
can capture the full extent of the experience of choosing whether to
continue in friendship with a friend who repeatedly fails morally.
One consideration is whether one might have an obligation to love
someone who is not good. Aristotle argues that if a friend has become
bad, but not incurably so, we have even more of a duty to assist him
than before his failure: ‘If someone can be set right, we should try
harder to rescue his character than his property, in so far as character
is both better and more proper to friendship’ (N. Ethics 1165b).
Indeed, Aristotle suggests that the true friend will only abandon the
relationship when it becomes clear to him that there is no possibility
of its restoration, in which case it is understandable if he gives it up.
However, such a loss is understood to be difﬁcult; even in cases where
the virtue of one person leaves behind the other, Aristotle says that in
12 David Bostock, ‘Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Phronesis 333 (1998),
251–72; Peter Hadreas, ‘The Functions of Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics x 4–5’,
Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 155–67; and Gary Gurtler, SJ, ‘The Activity of Happi-
ness in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Review of Metaphysics 56 (June 2003), 801–34.
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memory, a kind of çØºÆ continues, as a friend will keep a ‘memory of
the familiarity they had’, as a sign of what the friendship once meant
to each person (N. Ethics 1165b). Aristotle’s statement here is quite
important, for it shows that the intimacy of the friendship is itself a
good, and not only the qualities that the friend possesses or once
possessed. Memories of past friends continue to have signiﬁcance for
us because of the intimate connection enjoyed, as well as for the
particular qualities that our friends had.
Aristotle here points to the interdependency of happiness in the
context of friendships of virtue. Friendships of trust and shared living,
in which another’s self is the primary object of love, affect the
development of the virtue of the one who loves (and who is loved).
Positively, this means that two friends of virtue can support one
another in living well and reinforcing their mutual love of what is
virtuous, and their ongoing virtuous action as exhibited in moral and
intellectual virtues.13 A wicked person can also inﬂuence another’s
character, though perhaps is less likely to do so in the case of a person
of fully formed virtue, who will not be inclined to alter since he is (by
deﬁnition) of a ﬁrm and unchanging character.
Aristotle also denies the possibility of loving a bad man in his
badness. If one means that one friend ought to love an evil friend,
even in his evil, no such duty can be possible, for it is not a duty to
love evil. Indeed, there is not a simple absence of such an obligation,
but in fact a positive danger that might arise were one to love even the
wickedness in a wicked man. Aristotle asserts that ‘we ought neither
to love what is bad nor to become similar to a bad person, and we
have said that similar is friend to similar (N. Ethics 1165b).’ That is,
insofar as we love what is evil, the evil object of love does not only
reﬂect an ongoing distortion of desire. To love an evil object can also
seemingly become a cause of further distortion of desire in oneself. If
a man loves a wicked person, Aristotle implies, the love of a wicked
object makes the lover like that which he loves, that is, potentially
more akin to the wicked man whom he loves. Thus, it might be
necessary for the sake of one’s own ﬂourishing to end a relationship
with another who threatens it—even a former friend.
And yet, Aristotle also takes pains to emphasize the genuine
experience of loss in the end of such a friendship. In lesser forms
13 Annas, Morality of Happiness, 251–2.
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of friendship, because less of the self has been offered to the
friendship, the loss at its termination is accordingly less deeply
felt.14 In the case of a friendship of virtue that dissolves when one
of the friends is seen to lack virtue, one has lost not only someone
of pleasure or of use, but ‘another self ’.15 Here, the philosophical
tensions inherent in the term ‘another self ’ become especially ap-
parent. As Stern-Gillett has argued, the idea of a friend as another
self raises difﬁculties with the notion of selfhood.16 How to charac-
terize the idea of the friend as also one’s self is notoriously difﬁcult.
In the Magna Moralia, the friend is presented as like a mirror,
which reﬂects back to us something about one’s self, since one
cannot see the self without it (1213a). However, if the ‘other self ’
is only a mirror that reﬂects one’s own characteristics back to one’s
self, then the other seems only to be loved for selﬁsh reasons, and
not ‘seen’ at all in his otherness and independence, as the seat of his
own moral actions and choices. If the other friend is truly ‘another’,
then there must be a sense of separateness of each friend. Distinct-
ness of some sort is required for relations to exist, for without two
independent persons, no relation between them can come to be,
only the use (or misuse) of one by another.
One way to resolve this difﬁculty is to focus on the friends’ shared
activity and shared goals as constitutive of their bond. As two people
walking on a path to a common destination are uniﬁed by their
common goal and method of attaining that goal, friends of virtue
participate in shared activity (KæªØÆ) as part of the pursuit of a
good life.17 Still, solely attending to their shared activity also misses
something of the intimacy that Aristotle wishes to communicate
through the phrase ‘other self ’: a friend who is somehow both ‘other’
and yet also so intimately loved that the boundaries between care for
self, and care for other, are not ﬁxed and ﬁrm. Thus, one friend wishes
to assist another, Aristotle says, not only for one’s own sake, but rather
for his sake (Rhetoric 1380b–1381a).18 Moreover, the friends’ love for
one another is not simply a reﬂection of their love for the good.
Aristotle emphasizes that no one would wish for his friend to become
14 Pangle, Friendship, 50.
15 Thus, Annas says, when a friend is lost upon death or leaving town, we naturally
feel exposed. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 252.
16 Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, chapter 1.
17 Pangle, Friendship, 146.
18 Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, 59.
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a god, but only to be as happy and virtuous a human being as a human
being can be (N. Ethics 1159a).19 Thus, Aristotle suggests that one loves a
friend not as an embodiment of perfection, but as a human being, even
when one takes into account the limited nature of another’s humanity.
Annas has argued that one strong motivation for the love of
another in his goodness is that it allows us to contemplate (ŁæE)
the good in another, since to do so in another is easier than to do so in
oneself (N. Ethics 1168b2–4).20 One difﬁculty with such a view is that
it seems to make the beloved lovable only insofar as he ‘shows’ the
good to us. This would seem, then, to make the good, but not the
friend himself the real object of love. Annas suggests limitedness in
Aristotle’s approach to friendship on these grounds. She writes,
‘Aristotle is wrongly insisting that friendship involves approval of
and respect for the friend’s character, and ignoring the irrational
element in friendship, which can lead us to like and love people of
whom we strongly disapprove. And to the extent that he runs these
ideas together, he could be said not to have fully attained the notion of
loving someone truly as an individual, rather than as a bearer of
desired qualities.’21 However, Aristotle’s discussion of the loss of a
friend who has become bad shows that there is something much more
in the loss than the grief associated with, for example, fewer oppor-
tunities to contemplate the good for oneself. For Aristotle’s claim that
one ought to come to the assistance of a friend more than a non-
friend because of the intimacy of the friendship conveys the signiﬁ-
cance of intimacy as a good of friendship. The friend is not loved for
his qualities alone, but also as one with whom one has shared past
activity and with whom one has shared oneself.
Stern-Gillett argues that the ‘other self ’ loved in a perfect friend-
ship is limited to the rational self. Her argument relies upon the
development of the notion that practical virtue is the ‘hub’ around
which the rest of the self is formed; to the extent that practical wisdom
is responsible for the ordering and arrangement of the person’s self,
the Aristotelian ‘self ’ is such a rational faculty.22 She writes, ‘Since
human beings are to be identiﬁed with their nous, those who fail to
be rational will correspondingly fail to be fully themselves. To that
19 Pangle, Friendship, 147.
20 Annas, ‘Plato and Aristotle’, 532–4.
21 Annas, Morality of Friendship, 548–9.
22 Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, 26–7.
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extent, they cannot be loved in themselves.’23 And yet, we ﬁnd this
claim difﬁcult to maintain in the light of Aristotle’s description of the
centrality of memory in cases of friendships lost to moral failure. As
I will argue below, Aristotle’s account of memory allows for a kind of
retention of the friendship. The presence of a friend in memory and
the development of a narrative about the meaning of the lost friend-
ship preserves the care present in the friendship, as well as retaining
elements of the vulnerability therein.
II
Aristotle’s description of the centrality of memory as a mechanism for
maintaining a connection to a lost friend, even after the friendship
has been dissolved, suggests a different object of love from the friend’s
virtue alone. Indeed, that Aristotle ﬁnds a need for a copingmechanism
at all suggests that the love of a friend who was once good, but now is
not, involves much more than a mere intellectual assent to the friend’s
good, or a regret about the loss of an abstract good (for example,
regretting the mere loss of having around oneself a good friend).
Memory becomes an important faculty for dealing with such losses
because such losses are not limited to the loss of an abstract good, nor
even to a disinterested regret on behalf of the friend (e.g. sorrow that he
no longer has the good for himself ). Instead, in the loss of ‘another self ’
one ﬁnds the loss of some portion of one’s own selfhood.
What is beloved in the memory of the lost friendship is not only the
recollection of how the friend once exhibited virtue, though this might
well be part of such a memory. Nor is there simple regret of the contrast
between the past good and the present lack of such a good in the friend,
though again this sense of loss might be part of such a memory. Instead,
Aristotle claims that the memory of the past experiences of the self and
one’s lost friend are to form a part of one’s present love for the friend.
Why might such care for memory be of such importance?
One reason might be that the memory of the friend’s past goodness
continues to inform the present attitude toward the friend as a greater
whole than his current character and lived action seem to embody.
23 Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, 41.
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While others might regard the friend’s current activity—for example,
bad behaviour in the midst of an addiction—to be the whole of the
friend’s selfhood, the Aristotelian emphasis on memory serves to
connect his current deﬁciencies to a larger picture of the friend in
his wholeness. While those who lack deep knowledge of the friend
might regard his current activity as indicative of his entire nature, the
former friend of virtue can understand a larger context and may even
be able to contextualize the friend’s shift of character in terms of a
larger narrative that is lacking for those who do not know the friend
well. For example, a friend who behaves poorly as a result of a reaction
to a traumatic experience (as in a wartime trauma), but who has been
known to be brave or generous in other circumstances, is not reducible
to his current behaviour. His life as a whole communicates a different
reality from what his current activity or character seems to do. Memory
allows for the possibility of an overarching narrative about the friend
that incorporates speciﬁc moments in the person’s life into a larger
meaningful whole.
Likewise, the indeterminate future makes an evaluation of the
goodness of a person’s life difﬁcult to evaluate once and for all,
although a virtuous man’s character is more likely to be stable and
consistent (N. Ethics 1101a–b). Just as past exemplary actions of a
friend’s once-good character make current judgements of his worth
incomplete, so too does the friend’s current bad behaviour not limit
his future behaviour entirely. Memory of the friend provides a greater
context for a more accurate, and more generous, understanding of the
lost friend’s worth and the possibility of his future self ’s virtue.
The presence of memory as signiﬁcant in Aristotle’s account of lost
friendship also suggests that the particularity of the friend is crucial in
the care experienced after loss. Memory itself is not a faculty of nous,
Aristotle argues in ‘On Memory and Reminiscence’; instead, memory
essentially belongs to the faculty of sense perception. The person who,
in a sense, continues in friendship with his friend through the faculty
of memory relies on his prior sense perceptions, and not only upon an
intellectual judgement that his friend was good or could be good
again. If memory focuses upon sense perception, then one would
expect Aristotle to include among such memories of friendship par-
ticular contingent experiences of the friend—experiences that were
speciﬁc to the pair, and not only memories of general characteristics
that the friend once possessed. For example, there is a signiﬁcant
difference between remembering abstractly that my friend once used
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to be ‘generous’, but now has become rather closed in upon himself,
and recollecting particular moments of generosity that I witnessed
him exhibit, such as when he offered to buy a meal for an individual
who lacked the means. An old shared joke takes on a distinct and
particular value among friends that exceeds the way in which the joke
exempliﬁes the virtue of wittiness. Such shared experiences are ‘ex-
cessive’; that is, their value exceeds the way in which the event
exhibits an abstract judgement about the good. Instead, such experi-
ences are constitutive of the goods shared in friendship, which are
concrete and lived experiences known through sense perception and
recollected through memory’s revitalizations of such experiences.
Indeed, memory and narrative together tend to reshape and to
reformulate the value of such experiences: a joke told many times
among friends, or word play understood only among intimates who
understand the reference, has a deeper value than a similar joke
outside of the context of its presentation in friendship. The memory
of such witty moments becomes a reminder of the past bond of
friendship and of the particular moments shared in friendship.
Thus, even if one’s current love for a friend diminishes when a
friendship ceases, nonetheless, not only his past virtue as an objective
attribute of him, but also, particular past, contingent moments in a
virtuous friendship remain alive in memory and in narrative retell-
ings of the experience. Thus, Aristotle emphasizes in his discussion of
memory that it is not merely a case of contemplating my own experi-
ence. I also possess an awareness of the object of contemplation as a
presentation of the other (real) object:
Just in the same way we have to conceive that the mnemonic presentation
within us is something which by itself is merely an object of contemplation,
while, in relation to something else, it is also a presentation of that other
thing. In so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an object of contemplation,
or a presentation; but when considered as relative to something else, e.g. as its
likeness, it is also a mnemonic token. (OnMemory and Reminiscence 450b)24
In other words, memories are not Cartesian inner experiences, nor are
they simply reproductions or copies of past experiences. Ordinarily,
memories are understood by the subject to be tokens of the original
24 Translation of On Memory and Reminiscence from The Basic Works of Aristotle,
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 2001), translations by Rhys Roberts
and Ingram Bywater.
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object to which the memory has a likeness, if not identity. In the case of
friendship, amemory ofmy friend is notmerely a re-experiencing ofmy
own affection or knowledge of her, or what I knew through her, but
rather the memory about her, in her very being. Thus, Aristotle’s
emphasis onmemory in the case of lost friendship indicates the import-
ance of faculties other than F in the love extended in friendship; sense
experience, memory, and other faculties not only work in the present
moments of friendship, but also continue to play a role in the meaning
of the friendship long after the friendship itself may have ceased.
Indeed, because the activity recalled through memory is often
shared activity, whenever I remember a past incident with my friend
in which I also shared, my own selfhood is also the object of reference.
Memories of friendship are both mnemonic tokens of another and of
one’s self in relation to the other. Practical activity, exercise of my
human faculties, takes place not only alongside other rational beings,
but also with and in relation to them in a strong sense. Memories of
those activities constitute a part of my selfhood. To some extent, it
can even be the dissonance between one’s past memories of a beloved
friend and one’s self, and a current lack of friendship that inevitably
cause the grief, pain, and especially sense of loss of one’s self within
the current grief. In such experiences of loss, one beholds not only a
lost friend, but also an aspect of one’s self that has been lost. For, the
present moment cannot match past memories of shared experiences
of çØºÆ, and yet the latter are still present as ‘reminders’ or tokens of
what has been lost. Indeed, to the extent that memory memorializes
the lost friend, it also keeps present the vulnerability experienced in
the loss itself. However, memory also can assist in positively reconsti-
tuting the meaning of the loss, as in the case of developing a narrative
about my friend’s larger experiences, or in using memory as grounds
for hope that he will eventually live better.
Rather than characterizing the notion of the ‘other self ’ as a logical
paradox, the phrase might best be understood as communicating a
truth about human interdependence: namely, that those closest to us
in friendship both dissolve some of our sense of independence and
separateness as we come to care for them, and yet always maintain a
degree of alterity that shows us to be distinct beings whose characters,
choices, and preferences can veer away from our own.25 In the case of
25 Nussbaum, Fragility, 351.
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friends of virtue who ﬁnd that one friend has repeatedly failed
morally, such alterity suddenly comes to light, replacing the sensibil-
ity of connectedness and shared ‘selfhood’ that had been experienced
until the discovery. In friendships of virtue that are going well, the
harmony between oneself and the other is a source of ongoing
pleasure. While the otherness of a friend can delight by its comple-
mentarity, such alterity is held in balance with a sense of abiding and
shared values. The otherness of the other friend is not a threat, but a
welcome addition to one’s own range of experiences and interests.
However, when major differences of value appear, and indeed, these
values concern not mere preferences (for example, for sports or mu-
sical interests), but affect deeply held conceptions of the good life, the
friend’s alterity suddenly comes into relief. Indeed, in the case of a
friend of apparent virtue who now reveals himself to be capable of
major, repeated moral failure, the possibility that one’s true self will no
longer be fully received in friendship also becomes apparent.
The decision to leave a friendship when one’s friend has repeatedly
failed morally, when his character seems to be beyond repair, is not
only a practical decision for a friend. Such a decision involves genuine
loss for him, even if the decision is right. It is not simply that the
person with whom one wishes to share activity, to develop one’s
virtues, and to enjoy for himself is no longer there. One’s sense of
trust is also diminished. Aristotle suggests that older people can so
often suffer such losses that in time, many older individuals are
shaped by a pervading sense of distrust for the imperfections of
human nature (N. Ethics 1157b–1158a). Such distrust diminishes
their capacity for happiness, but Aristotle does not suggest that
their judgements are thereby mistaken. Rather, along with the great
possibilities for happiness that intimate friendship opens up, so too is
the possibility of diminished happiness brought on by repeated loss or
betrayal.
Contemporary theorists have conceptually distinguished trust
from reliance: while reliance implies only a belief that another person
will follow through on a particular activity—for example, providing
money for a trip home, or showing up to teach a class—trust implies a
great set of interpersonal attitudes that guide one’s very orientation
toward being in relationship.26 Trust can involve, for example, a belief
26 Margaret Walker, Moral Repair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 74–5.
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in the other person’s good will and integrity, a disposition to interpret
the other’s actions favourably when they are in doubt, and an ‘en-
trusting’ of one’s vulnerabilities to another with the expectation that
they will be reliably received.27 Aristotle’s conception of friendship
requires that trust be built up in order for perfect friendship to
develop, precisely because the self is being entrusted to another. It is
not only the promise of shared activity, or shared conversation, that
takes place in the promise of friendship, but also the choice to give
over oneself to another and to receive the other as ‘another self ’ that
requires such trust. Violations of trust, then, are also felt to be
violations of the self, or at least of belief that one is valued as ‘another
self ’ to another, and can reliably be entrusted to the other, in the
context of friendship. Such violations are not escapable, but instead
part of the human condition. While Aristotle advises that friends
must share many meals together before trust is given, his advice is
descriptive and not prescriptive. The development of trust is de-
pendent upon many factors, including one’s own past experience,
and can only arise when the right conditions are met. To this
extent, Aristotle values a balance between self-sufﬁciency and de-
pendency that takes account of ongoing human vulnerability in
friendship.
III
The interdependency of human beings in moral development poses
another kind of paradox for Aristotle, one with social and political
consequences. For, if the goodness of one person can profoundly
reinforce and even assist those still growing in virtue, then there
would seem to be a duty to assist another person, even a wicked
person, in growing to become a better person. As we have seen, such
assistance potentially poses dangers for the friend who takes on this
task, if it detracts from the good of his own virtuous and lived activity
or simply seems impossible to accomplish. But because the develop-
ment of virtue depends on others for its very possibility, there ought
to exist some social resources that would allow a man who has morally
27 Walker, Moral Repair, 74–9.
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failed to regain his character. Virtue is far more important than
property. And yet, the presence of such a vicious or incontinent
person in public life also produces problems for the ﬂourishing of
the community, and especially for those with whom he is in closest
relation. A former criminal, for example, who especially needs social
resources that might lead him to live better, is also a potential threat
to that community; and yet, to exclude him from participation within
society and its goods is likely to make him grow worse, not better.
Here Aristotle recognizes a deep problematic in the nature of the
development of virtue: to become good is partly a matter of personal
responsibility, but also partly conditioned by those with whom we
surround ourselves. In the case of a man who already lacks virtue, the
only real possibility of his reform lies in exposure to and education by
those who possess virtue. This is especially true in the case of the
vicious, who believe what is bad to be good, and so lack an under-
standing of the good, not only an ability to follow through on it in
action. However, those who possess virtue, seemingly, will not love
those who lack it, for by their character they only love what is good
and wish to pursue the good along with other good people. At most,
they will only love the other for who he or she might someday
become, or who they once were, but not for their currently bad
state. Aristotle thus encounters the problem of how and whether
friendship or other analogous relationships can sufﬁciently address
the need for the community to engage with those who lack virtue.
At the purely theoretical level, Aristotle’s account of friendship is
consistent. To understand the end of what had seemed to be a
friendship of virtue, on account of a friend’s repeated moral failures,
one friend need only see that the other was not the virtuous person he
was believed to be. The virtuous friend who had loved, discovers that
the beloved friend is, in fact, not even the person he had at ﬁrst
thought him to be. When the formerly good man is now seen to be
bad, that person’s self is no longer identical to the person who was
once the object of çØºÆ. Indeed, for Aristotle, one can not love what
one does not understand to be good. Even in the case of a friend
hesitant as to whether to continue a friendship with one who has
failed morally, the remaining love for the friend concerns what is still
good or lovable about him.28 For example, a drug addict working to
28 Cooper argues that friends love one another for moral properties of character; in
his view, such motivation does not make friendship utilitarian, for a person’s character
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turn around his life and live cleanly is loved not for his drug
addiction, but rather for his potential for living better. To this extent,
Aristotle is not inconsistent in his account of virtuous friendship.
However, the notion of moral failure in friendship raises an add-
itional practical and political problem, namely, how societies are to
care for those who fail at a moral level when rehabilitation of such
character depends upon engagement and the care of others who
surround them. In other words, if we are vulnerable to harm from
those who lack virtue, and yet also ought to care for the cultivation of
virtue in others more than any other good, then vulnerability to harm
becomes a political and ethical problem. For Aristotle, to be self-
sufﬁcient (Æh
ÆæŒ) also means to live a life among family, friends,
and fellow citizens (N. Ethics 1097b7–11).29 However, no one of these
types of relationships alone sufﬁces for the expression or develop-
ment of a virtuous and happy life. Particularly when it comes to the
question of moral development or rehabilitation, we ﬁnd in Aristotle
a continual need for dialectical interplay between the role of the
family and of the law for the possibility of establishing virtue in its
citizens. Neither resource is adequate alone, and each one is subject to
the possibility of misfortune. For Aristotle, the role of parents is
signiﬁcant, but limited, insofar as moral development continues
long past the period of childhood or formal education (N. Ethics
1103b). The role of law, while commendable, is also limited in the
extent to which it can shape virtue.
In Book X of the Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of
laws that can reinforce the nurture and the earlier habits of temper-
ance provided by parents (N. Ethics 1180a). Such laws are crucial to
education itself, since the city’s ﬂourishing requires that all of its
citizens have a similar orientation to the civic good, rather than the
happenstance education that any given parent might choose on his
own for a child (Politics 1337a). Without some shared idea of the goal
of education for children, individual moral upbringing cannot be
harmonized into a civic morality.30 Such goals need to be continually
lived out in the course of adult relationships as well, so that the law
continues to assist its citizens in their moral development by setting
is essential to his being in a way that utilitarian goods are not. See John Cooper,
‘Friendship and the Good in Aristotle’, Philosophical Review 86 (1977), 290–315.
29 Nussbaum, Fragility, 344–5. 30 Nussbaum, Fragility, 346.
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the proper conditions for the cultivation of good habits (N. Ethics
1180a).
The law, however, is imperfect as an instrument to shape moral
growth, insofar as it can chastise those who are bad, but cannot
provide the bonds of natural affection and individual attention to a
speciﬁc person’s needs that take place within the context of a family.
Just as a doctor can best address an individual’s illness by attending to
the particulars of his illness, a person with moral deﬁciencies requires
attention to his particular circumstances, which the law in its gener-
ality cannot legislate (N. Ethics 1180a–b). To this extent, the law is a
second-order kind of institutional ‘insurance’ for the moral education
of its citizens. The law can legislate how to educate children, but does
not itself act as the primary educator. The law can punish those it
deems to need fear as a motivator against bad action, but cannot
single-handedly cultivate good internal motivation to seek the good
and to reform one’s habits. But the sorts of resources that can provide
such motivations—family, friends, political peers, and smaller com-
munities within the ºØ—are even more subject to 
åÅ precisely
because of their more intimate nature. The family and class to which
one belongs, the education one receives, and the stability of the
political parties that might support such education are subject to
chance and prone to instability. And yet, it is precisely the interde-
pendent nature of the human being that both leads to such vulner-
ability to luck, and also vulnerability that makes çØºÆ and other love
relationships possible in the ﬁrst place.
Moreover, certain moral states seem to arise not only from the
inﬂuence of education, but also from luck. For Aristotle, the brutish
state, one step below vice, in which there is hardly even a moral
sensibility, seems to be a result of bad luck. He writes, ‘some bestial
features also result from diseases and deformities’ (N. Ethics 1145a),
such as the cases of a slave who ate the liver of another fellow human
being (N. Ethics 1148b), indicating that the brute is not brutish or
amoral by virtue of his own choice, but as a result of a defect. We can
therefore say that the case of the brute is less evil, but more alarming,
precisely because no choice is involved (N. Ethics 1150a). Even the
incontinent man who is incontinent by virtue of strong passion is
overcome by his bodily state, and akin to a person who is asleep, mad,
or drunk. Aristotle explains the possibility of incontinence in a state
of knowledge as acting in the presence of perceptual knowledge (such
as ‘this is sweet’ and ‘sweet things are pleasant to eat’), rather than in
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the presence of universal knowledge (‘Sweet things are unhealthy’).
But although Aristotle mostly emphasizes that incontinence is the
result of many habitual incontinent acts, he also allows for the possi-
bility that some forms of incontinence may be present from birth:
Incontinents through habituation are more easily cured than the natural
incontinents; for habit is easier than nature to change. Indeed the reason why
habit is also difﬁcult to change is that it is like nature, as Euenus says: ‘Habit,
I say, is longtime training, my friend, and in the end training is nature for
human beings.’ (N. Ethics 1152a)
Aristotle thus suggests that there are at least two obstacles to moral
freedom, two different types of vulnerability to moral weakness: the
presence of incontinence from birth, or from a state that, after enough
time, so resembles the inborn state that it is immutable, though it may
not have once been so.
For Aristotle, the family is natural, and the procreative bonds and
relations between couples, parents, and children are found even in the
animal world (N. Ethics 1162a17–19). Parents seem to love their
children with an intensity that is unmatched in other forms of
relationship, while children owe their parents a debt that cannot be
repaid (N. Ethics 1161b–1163b). However, the family alone is limited
in the moral and social goods that it can provide, while the ºØ
provides for the possibility of not just living, but living well (Politics
1252b12–13).31 The family, while attentive to the needs that individ-
uals have of one another in certain respects, is itself limited and
partial in its possibilities. The ºØ is not merely a collection of
families and associations, but rather a greater whole that offers
more than the sum of its parts. The ºØ offer its participants not
only the advantages of laws and of extra-familial connections, but also
opportunities for magnanimity, shared religious-political experi-
ences, and the intimate connections between others found in friend-
ships of virtue and even friendships of pleasure.
Moreover, the care that any given family provides is limited by the
virtues and abilities of the parents, who may themselves be limited in
the moral structure and nurture that they can provide for their
children. As the contemporary ethical theorist Gheaus has suggested,
we might consider such care to be a primary good that limits the
possibility of political egalitarianism, as advocated by political
31 Pangle, Friendship, 86–7.
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theorists such as Rawls.32 While Rawls argues that the distribution of
basic goods in society must be provided, Gheaus argues that ‘care’,
broadly construed, is subject to unequal distribution in society. Under
the category of care, Gheaus includes: the care required to come into
existence; to be sustained through food and physical care through
childhood; care as an attitude that teaches self-care, for example,
receiving good nurture during illness or encouragement in studies
that lead the grown individual to provide good care for herself as an
adult who has experienced such modelling of care; networks of care,
such as social networks, like those who assist one’s immediate family
with job connections, or other forms of favouritism; and deeper social
connections such as friendship or extended family. All of these forms
of care signiﬁcantly contribute to the development of character and to
the ability to exercise virtue, and yet are subject to a great deal of
moral luck, and not moral choice. Children do not choose their
families of origin, the communities into which they are born, and
whether they are strong or weak social networks. While some social
institutions can help to mitigate bad moral luck, institutional care
cannot replace personal, one-on-one care that stems from deep,
personal relationships of family and friendship, so Gheaus suggests
a certain degree of caution in thinking that institutional care can be a
sufﬁcient response to moral luck. Her conclusion is to state that
egalitarian political theories can never adequately accommodate the
ethics of care, that is, no political system can really prevent the
contingencies of moral luck that affect care relationships.
Aristotle’s strength is to acknowledge the signiﬁcant role of such
luck in ethical formation. Aristotle admits to a certain kind of weak-
ness in those who are incontinent as a result of birth or as a result of
how they are educated. Care or nurture (
æç) can enhance or
diminish the possibility of becoming a virtuous person, and yet,
Aristotle is well aware that they are not equally distributed. Aristotle
does not discount the possibility that some forms of human unhappi-
ness are beyond our control, insofar as being born prone to incontin-
ence, or being poorly raised by inadequate parents or inadequate
laws, is partly a matter beyond individual choice. To this extent,
Nussbaum is right to identify in Aristotle a sensitivity to the tragic
32 Anca Gheaus, ‘The Challenge of Care to Idealizing Theories of Distributive
Justice’, in Lisa Tessman (ed.), Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy:
Theorizing the Non-Ideal (Springer), 105–19.
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element in human life; this tragic element exists not only for those
who are like Priam (virtuous, but then hit hard by loss), but also those
who are unable through circumstance to get to Priam’s level of virtue
in the ﬁrst place. Especially if we concede that care is fundamental to
the development of virtue, and yet unequally distributed, Aristotle’s
theory is attentive to the role of chance in moral development.
Despite this acknowledgement of unequal beginnings, Aristotle
ultimately places most of the responsibility for particular moral
choices on the individual. Even in the case of vice, a moral actor
must make those choices that can reshape his own character in order
to become more virtuous. Book III’s explanation of the voluntary and
involuntary begins with the basic claim that virtue and vice are in our
power. Virtue and vice alike develop in our characters as a result of
repeated, chosen actions. Habitually acting generously makes us
generous; habitually acting courageously makes us courageous.
While it might be possible for a person to choose to live poorly so
often that eventually he lacks the freedom to choose otherwise,
Aristotle still places the burden on the moral actor: like someone
who has cast a stone away, and cannot now recover it, a moral actor
acted in ways that once were in his own power, and so he is morally
responsible for who he has become: ‘The same is true of weakness or
maiming; for everyone would pity, not reproach someone if he were
blind by nature or because of a disease or a wound, but would censure
him if his heavy drinking or some other form of intemperance made
him blind’ (N. Ethics 1114a).
However, the case of the person who was raised poorly raises
certain difﬁculties. If Aristotle thinks that the incontinent person is
incontinent and unable to control his impulses because of past edu-
cation and upbringing, how do we expect him to act virtuously now?
If those who lack good experiences of early care and nurture can act
in ways that only increase vice as a result of early experiences, how do
we get them to act in a more virtuous manner now? Put succinctly, if
one needs virtue in order to act virtuously, then it seems problematic
to ask that the person who lacks virtue as a result of moral luck take
responsibility for his moral failure, if its possession is what is required
for a proper response. There seems to be a problem of circularity: one
would need virtue to act virtuously, and need to act virtuously, in
order to be virtuous; yet, this is precisely what has been harmed
through moral luck.
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Aristotle’s strength is to recognize the ongoing reality of this
paradox, and not to seek to escape it through theoretical machin-
ations. Aristotle’s understanding of the difﬁculty of moral education
includes sensitivity to the ways in which human beings are mutually
dependent upon one another for their moral care, as well as physical
and emotional care. The circular connection between being virtuous
in character, and acting virtuously out of that state, is not necessarily a
vicious circle. We do not ﬁnd in Aristotle a logical problem with the
mutual dependence of virtuous action on character, but instead a
practical one. In some cases of incontinence (IŒæÆÆ), even the
practical limitations might be overcome. While it is true that the
generous person will ﬁnd pleasure in generous acts, and these acts
continually reinforce his generosity, it is also the case that a non-
generous person can choose to become more generous through
repeated, deliberate practice of generosity. Even if now it is uncom-
fortable, eventually through repetition, he will ﬁnd pleasure in it when
he does become a generous person. Indeed, he might already ﬁnd a
certain kind of pleasure in the anticipation of becoming such a
person. This is how we raise children to become generous, through
small steps, where we reinforce the child’s acts of sharing—for
example, praising a young child with even the smallest act of sharing
a toy with another. The same might be said in the case of an adult who
experienced a lack of care, or a Philoctetes who feels damaged by a
long abandonment: a certain degree of choice to perform the virtuous
act over the non-virtuous act can be fostered and nourished over a
longer period of time. Not only individuals like Neoptolemus, but also
entire societies can take on the role of encouraging and supporting
such choices in others.
The deeper difﬁculty arises with cases of vice, in which the moral
actor not only cannot act virtuously, but even understands the bad to
be good. In such cases, there will be no motivation to act in accord-
ance with virtue, for the ends toward which the moral actor is
oriented are mistaken. Here Aristotle argues that the law must take
over where family and friends are unable to develop proper sensibil-
ities about moral virtue, by at least punishing those who act without
care for the good either of themselves or of society. However, the law
and institutional support of such moral choice can never substitute
for the individual responsibility to participate in the process of
developing virtue.
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Political bonds between those who are neither intimate friends, nor
merely formalized legal relationships, are also a necessary presence
for the moral education of the citizens. Notably, Aristotle does not
rely on the phrase º
ØŒÅ çØºÆ, or ‘civic friendship’, in developing
his Politics.33 Neither is concord primarily a bond based in virtue;
instead, concord concerns shared interests of a utilitarian nature.34
His avoidance of çØºÆ as the grounding of political relationships rests
in part on his recognition that the kind of care that takes place in an
interpersonal relationship of çØºÆ is qualitatively distinct from the
care that legislators can offer to the citizens of the ºØ. For Aristotle,
çØºÆ provides a sort of intimacy of care that is generally lacking in
institutionalized forms of care. Such a human need for çØºÆ suggests
that there are limitations to political systems, such as that in Plato’s
Republic, which seek to make the city and public life the primary
source of care and ‘brotherly love’. While the law’s primary motivator
is punishment, the motivation for friendship consists of genuine love
of the other in a one-on-one relationship.
Nonetheless, the grounding of the community’s bonds with one
another exists as the result of social bonds that are analogous to
friendship. Aristotle asserts that while the city initially comes into
being for the sake of life, its ultimate purpose is for the sake of living
well (Politics 1252b29–30). Civic relationships, as well as laws, are
part of the means by which the city assists its members in ﬂourishing,
and not simply surviving. As opposed to contemporary rights based
on liberal systems of government, Aristotle’s political system requires
a strongly experienced feeling of community.35 The bonds between
citizens are not understood as respect for rights, equally given to all
citizens. Instead, the political community is grounded in active par-
ticipation in a variety of associations, both formal and informal.
The bonds between various forms of association are variable in
both intensity and intimacy, and do not always manifest equality
between all citizens. Book VIII describes all political associations as
aiming at a particular advantage for their members. Such associations
simultaneously bind together their members, while also separating
those who do not belong from the particular form of friendship and
care engendered by such association. Inevitably, different groups of
associations will cause conﬂicting loyalties, and can even threaten
33 Stern-Gillett, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, 149.
34 Pangle, Friendship, 158. 35 Pangle, Friendship, 81.
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political cohesion if taken too far. Competition for honours, too, can
cause division.36 However, precisely because Aristotle’s ºØ is
grounded in more intensely felt relationships and interdependencies
than those found in formal legal bonds, it also deeply engenders an
experience of belonging. Aristotle’s description of concord, for
example, includes the experience of genuine good will for others,
beyond the simple utility that agreement brings for one’s self interest.37
One cares not only for the common good in abstraction, but also for
those whomone knows to be a part of the same political community, in
their concreteness, as those who share similar opinions and goals. And
while competition for honour can be factious, honour is interpersonal
by nature. Honour binds together those who participate inmerit-based
competitions and in the giving and receiving of honour.
Political friendships and intimate friendships are distinct, but
powerful, motivators for the moral development of human beings,
because of the need that human beings have of one another, and the
limits of any single form of relationship for all forms of moral and
political growth. Aristotle keeps alive the tensions inherent in our
interpersonal relationships: for example, between the desire for
friends to care for one another, even in the midst of moral failure,
and the importance of recognizing the other as other, even as some-
times beyond our ability to help. The community, too, must play a
role in the care of those still growing in virtue, or who suffer in lacking
it and the accompanying PÆØÆ that virtue brings. Indeed, it is
precisely at points where individual relations of friendship or family
fail that the larger community must step in to assist its citizens. At the
same time, law and the larger community can never replace such
intimacies, as contingent, imperfect, or powerless as they can be. For
Aristotle, to be human is to require the vulnerability of being in
relationship with family and friends, imperfect though they may be.
36 Pangle, Friendship, 84–5. 37 Pangle, Friendship, 156–7.
Friendship and Moral Failure 167
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
7Tragedy, Katharsis, and Community
in Aristotle’s Poetics
In these past chapters, I have developed a concept of vulnerability and
its importance to community. I have also argued that myth and
narrative play an important role in allowing both individuals and a
community to be responsive to vulnerability. To this point, my focus
on narrative has been through how speciﬁc works of Homer, Sopho-
cles, or Plato explore vulnerability, and how their narratives are
important to achieving this end. Achilles, Philoctetes, Alcibiades,
Oedipus, and others all struggle with both real and symbolic wounds
and come to terms with such wounds, at least in part, through
narrative. The authors themselves are also engaged in storytelling in
ways that assist their own audiences in coming to terms with vulner-
ability. For example, Socrates’ narration of the myth of judgement in
the Gorgias is as much of value for the audience of the Platonic
dialogue in their own grappling with questions of justice and the
wounds suffered through injustice, as it is for Callicles. Aristotle adds
further to this picture in his account of friendship and its vulnerabil-
ities, as those who lose friendships to vice must themselves ﬁnd ways
to assimilate the loss through a kind of revised narrative about the
friendship and its meaning.
Aristotle’s Poetics further contributes to a deeper understanding of
how narrative can assist in the proper response of the human person
to vulnerability. In this chapter, I focus speciﬁcally on the question of
the value of performed tragedy for the community of those who
witness its performance, as a way of deepening this question about
how and why narrative is helpful for responding to vulnerability.
Not only the Poetics, but also the De Anima and the Rhetoric, make
helpful contributions in understanding how narrative can help both
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individuals and the larger political community to be responsive to
vulnerability. I ﬁrst argue that the performance of tragedy has not
only a personal, but also a political function in assisting a community
to respond to the vulnerable in its midst. I then develop ways in which
Aristotle’s psychology is helpful for understanding how audiences
might become more responsive to vulnerability through the witness-
ing of tragic performance. Last, I examine the concept of ŒŁÆæØ.
˚ŁÆæØ need not be understood as the mere purgation of pity and
fear, for Aristotle makes clear that both of those emotions have
positive value. Instead, I argue that ŒŁÆæØ ought to be understood
as a kind of ‘rebalancing’ of the individual and also the community.
Careful reading of Aristotelian texts on ŒŁÆæØ suggests that he does
not simply intend the mere purgation of feeling, but rather a deeper
sense of rebalancing of the soul, as found in Greek medicinal theory.
Tragedy can also assist the community in being more responsive to
the vulnerable by enlarging its vision of ‘what is’; tragedy enlarges the
community’s political reality and helps to reshape its responsiveness
to suffering in its own midst. Two different strands of tragedy thus
emerge as forces that attend to human vulnerability: the ŒŁÆæØ of
tragedy as a rebalancing of the community, and an accompanying
epistemological reorientation of the community’s self-understanding
to include those who have previously been excluded from the ﬁeld of
vision.
I
In Chapter 1, I argued that Homer’s narrative accounts of human
mortality frame the lives of its characters in such a way that human
life is given narrative shape and meaning precisely because of the
ﬁnality of death. Only a temporal end provides for the possibility of a
teleological account of life, since the end of a story signiﬁcantly shapes
its interpretation and meaning. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
takes up a similar puzzle about human happiness, namely, whether it
is possible to call a person’s life happy until that life has come to an
end. Those whose lives end as did Priam’s, with ruin of family and
kingdom, cannot be said to be happy overall, despite genuine
moments of well-being in their lives, and their unfortunate ends
make their lives unhappy. Good or bad fortune can increase or
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decrease a person’s blessedness (N. Ethics 1100b), but such events
cannot be anticipated. Yet, it would seem strange to say that a man
could only be happy after his death. Aristotle addresses this problem
by suggesting that PÆØ	
Æ does not depend upon such fortune;
but the result is that one can possess PÆØ	
Æ and yet still suffer.
Thus, Aristotle remarks: ‘And yet, even here what is ﬁne shines
through, whenever someone bears many severe misfortunes with
good temper, not because he feels no distress, but because he is
noble and magnanimous’ (N. Ethics 1100b).1
¯PÆØ	
Æ is stable because character is stable, so that even a
person who suffers greatly can be said to be ‘happy’, insofar as he
will bear his suffering well. Suffering will not be decisive for his overall
possession of happiness, though it will bring moments of pain
(N. Ethics 1100b–1101a). In other words, the virtuous person who
suffers well will himself incorporate his suffering into the larger
picture of his life. He is not brought down by any one misfortune,
because as a virtuous person he can better bear that misfortune than
he would have otherwise. Character traits such as courage, temper-
ance, generosity, and even wit can make such circumstances easier to
bear, and since there is pleasure in their very exercise, the virtuous
man can continue to experience some pleasure simply through being
who he is. But for Aristotle, narrative can also play a role in bearing
misfortune, especially through the witnessing of performed tragedy.
Tragedy must contain Ł, according to Aristotle: painful events
that are beyond repair, or at least that leave a deep and unalterable
change (1452b).
While contemporary students of Greek drama are often readers of
texts, dramas were experienced as performances. Tragedy’s location
in the Dionysian theatre below the Acropolis placed it at the centre of
Athenian life, not far from the Iªæ and the discourses of the council
(ıº), as well as commercial and religious activity.2 As performa-
tive pieces, these works were not essentially verbal, but active. Even
the most sophisticated verbal content in ancient drama was enacted
such that the deliberative speech and practical embodiment of those
1 All translations of the Nicomachean Ethics in this chapter are from Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1985).
2 Neal Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, in J. Gregory (ed.), A Companion to Greek
Tragedy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 60–1. Croally observes that the very language of
placing events es meson, or ‘at the centre’, is signiﬁcant for its links to the democratic.
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articulated ideas were not separable.3 Tragedy as performance
expresses the link between the rational, imaginative, and active elem-
ents of human nature through unifying them before an audience that
understands the performance to be a deliberate act of communication
to them, in a speciﬁc and ritualized context.4 Tragedy was not per-
formed for only one individual, much less for the reader of a text, but
rather for a community in an overtly political context. The Dionysian
festival was political in many of its non-dramatic events: for example,
the presence of generals, the public display of tributes from other
cities, awards given to those who had served the state, and the
procession of orphans of war educated at state expense, all indicate
the centrality of politics to the festival.5
The festival was also understood to be religious, in ways that
overtly united the political and the sacramental. Martin writes of
the procession of phalluses during the festival: ‘In a typically Athen-
ian melding, this too was political: in the ﬁfth century bce, each
colony of the expanding empire sent a phallus for the procession.
The announcement of honours to citizens and foreigners, the recog-
nition of children of fallen warriors, the parading of subject states’
monetary contributions—all made the festival into civic theatre, a
spectacle of optimism and celebration counter-balanced by the darker
tragedies on view.’6 Even within the performance of a particular
tragedy, an audience may have experienced the enactment of speciﬁc
religious rituals. Sourvinou-Inwood, for example, has suggested that
the ritualized elements of the end of the Eumenides were experienced
as the performance of religious ritual in the present, and not only as a
story at a distance.7 While during the ordinary course of the year, the
wooden statue representing Dionysius was kept safely outside the
city’s limits, during the Dionysia it was processed to the Theatre of
Dionysius. The religious devotion to Dionysius granted the audience
the possibility of exploring elements of human experience, both
personal and political, that at other times might be outside the normal
3 Richard Martin, ‘Ancient Theatre and Performance Culture’, in Maryanne
McDonald and Michael Walton (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and
Roman Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 36.
4 Martin, ‘Ancient Theatre’, 38.
5 Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, 62.
6 Martin, ‘Ancient Theatre’, 49.
7 Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Tragedy and Anthropology’, in Gregory (ed.),
Companion to Greek Tragedy, 297–8.
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boundaries of propriety. In comedy, politicians were mocked, and
political questions such as the justice of the enslavement of other
Greeks undertaken. In addition, the emotional experiences of
laughing, weeping, or even being shocked by dramatic events took
place in a context that was socially and divinely sanctioned. Thus,
while the sort of analysis that we have undertaken in the previous
chapters is a valuable practice for us as contemporary commentators,
the classical Athenian’s experience of tragedy would have been more
immediate, visceral, and closely connected to religious, social, and
overtly political considerations.
According to Aristotle, tragedy’s aim is to arouse pity (º) and
fear (ç) (1452b). It is thus a form of ºª overtly concerned with
the arousal of feeling in the audience. Pity and fear are made possible
through 
ÅØ, imitation of ‘what is’; members of an audience can
experience such powerful emotions only because the play imitates
what is ‘possible’. Aristotle somewhat cryptically states that one of the
features of a good character in tragedy is ‘likeness’ (1454a). While he
does not specify what he has in mind, I suggest that Aristotle may
refer in part to a likeness between the character and the audience,
sufﬁcient for the audience to have the proper experience of the drama.
In other words, tragic heroes are those for whom we can feel pity or
fear, because we know that, to some extent or another, we are like
them.
Aristotle’s thoughts in the Rhetoric further illuminate the idea of
‘likeness’ of the tragic hero in the Poetics. There, we ﬁnd insights into
the psychology of exactly how ºª can produce fear and pity in an
audience. The Poetics states that recognition and reversal together
cause the audience to experience fear or pity, in the case of tragedy,
and which one is experienced is likely to depend on whether the
audience member can imagine herself to experience the same kind of
reversal. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle deﬁnes fear as a pain or disturbance
due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the
future (1382b). We are much more likely to see a particular event as
fearful under certain conditions: if the outcome is imminent, i.e.
sooner, rather than later; when those who can cause the harm are
more powerful than we are; when we have already experienced a
particular type of harm; and in the case of events that we cannot easily
control. However, if these experiences are thought of as more likely to
happen to others than to ourselves, then we might experience pity
instead of fear (1382b). So, whether we feel fear or pity if we see a man
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such as Oedipus move from honour to exile in an unexpected reversal
of fortune will depend very much on our own experiences of being
vulnerable. For example, if an audience member has personally felt
the threat of exile and is reminded that he could experience it again,
he might be more likely to feel fearful; if he ﬁnds it quite difﬁcult or
impossible to believe that this sort of an event could occur to him, he
might instead feel pity for the character.
Of course, both emotions might coexist in a single individual:
I could simultaneously pity another for his suffering and also fear
for myself. Still, the close connection between the two senses of ç
as a ‘ﬂight’ and as ‘fear’ reveal something signiﬁcant about how fear
affects us. In an experience of fear for myself, my focus is on escaping
or eluding the fearful object, or even a suffering person who reminds
me of my own fears. Pity might draw me nearer to suffering, or at
least minimize my desire to ﬂee from it, out of a sense of connection
to the other’s need. In either case, Aristotle’s suggestion is that the
sorts of emotions that predominate in us depend very much on our
sensibility of our own vulnerability to harm, and our experiential
sense of closeness to or distance from those who suffer harm.
Aristotle’s pairing of pity and fear in both the Rhetoric and the
Poetics is signiﬁcant. Their connection in the Rhetoric suggests that in
Aristotle’s view of tragedy, the two experiences are closely related for
an audience and may coexist together, yet are important to keep
conceptually distinct for the sake of differentiating between subtleties
within a larger audience’s experiences. If our own present belief as to
the likelihood of experiencing harm informs whether we experience
fear or pity, then it is likely that with any given audience, different
individual members may experience a greater predominance of fear
or pity. For example, a young male citizen who has little ﬁrst-hand
experience in war may be more likely to experience pity in response to
the pleadings of the mothers in Euripides’ Suppliants, especially if he
identiﬁes with Theseus’ on-stage verbalization of such pity. However,
a woman or foreign metic who has a different set of experiences
concerning the treatment of non-citizens might have a response
closer to fear, if he or she can identify closely enough with the
powerlessness of the women. She may recollect prior experiences
that indicate to her reliance upon others for the safe return of bodies
after battle and proper treatment of the dead abroad; or her prior
experience might intensify her pity in such a way that it becomes close
to the experience of sympathy. While the question as to whether
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women, slaves, or children were present at the festival is a quite
controversial one, there is some evidence that the festival was inclu-
sive.8 At minimum, it was not restricted to male citizens. Resident
metics who lacked citizenship, and foreigners to Athens, were cer-
tainly present among those in the audience. One fourth-century
comedy title, ‘Women Celebrating the Dionysia’, implies some female
participation in the Dionysian festival. Plato’s Symposium suggests an
audience size of as many as 30,000 individuals, though later analyses
have suggested that the theatre held only 14,000 to 17,000.9 Any
audience of such a size and variety is likely to have a wide range of
backgrounds, and of emotional experiences of the play. As will
become clearer below, this diversity of feelings is key for producing
a diversity of opinions in discussions of a play, and so also for
assisting in the development of rational deliberation of social and
political matters. Indeed, the possibility of a rebalancing of the ºØ
to accommodate points of view that have not been previously accom-
modated depends upon the ability of tragedy to introduce and to
bring to awareness such standpoints to a range of members in its
audience.
Aristotle asserts that tragedy, by its nature, requires the presence of
Ł, that is, the undergoing of suffering of signiﬁcant magnitude
and lasting effect. Among the central features of audience experience,
then, is to confront vulnerability in the characters and events being
performed before them.10 Such vulnerability may include larger,
abstract truths about mortality or sudden reversals of fortune that
lead an individual to think of himself and his own vulnerability to
suffering. A variety of particular feelings arise in relation to such
suffering aside from fear and pity, however. Careful analysis of
these accompanying feelings helps to illuminate how tragedy func-
tions to elicit the deepening of care and concern for the vulnerable.
8 For details in the controversy, see Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, 62–3; E. Csapo
and W. Slater, The Context of Ancient Drama (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1995), 286–93; and Jeffrey Henderson, ‘Women and the Athenian Dramatic
Festivals’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 121 (1991), 133–47.
9 A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens, 2nd edn. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), 236; Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, 62–3.
10 See Ruth Scodel, ‘Sophoclean Tragedy’, in Gregory (ed.), Companion to Greek
Tragedy, 233–49. Scodel notes that Sophocles, in particular among the tragedians,
communicates the importance of compassion for those who suffer.
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Ironically, since imitation is pleasurable not only to perform, but
also to witness, even seeing a terrible scene of suffering in a play has a
kind of pleasantness to it. A tragedy’s ‘scene of suffering’—‘a destruc-
tive or painful action, such as death on the stage, bodily agony,
wounds, and the like’ (Poetics, 1452b)—is pleasant to behold, Aris-
totle states, even as it makes us feel some unpleasant emotions at the
same time.11 (Thus, today we may experience the appeal of a movie
that scares us, or makes us cry.) Since suffering is unpleasant to
experience and to witness in others, in ordinary life humans tend to
avoid its presence. Others have suggested that a person may even
rationalize its existence in order to exclude it from one’s ﬁeld of
vision. For example, Rousseau remarks on the human ability to
reason ourselves away from natural sympathy:
Nothing but such general evils as threaten the whole community can disturb
the tranquil sleep of the philosopher, or tear him from his bed. A murder
may with impunity be committed under his window; he has only to put his
hands to his ears and argue a little with himself, to prevent nature, which is
shocked within him, from identifying itself with the unfortunate sufferer.12
Tragedy draws upon the pleasure of imitation in drawing us closer to,
rather than further away from, suffering. In order to produce such
pleasure, however, tragedy must strike a balance between sufﬁcient
likeness of its characters to us, and a certain degree of distance from
our current circumstances. Tragedy must mediate our experience of
suffering sufﬁciently to make its experience pleasurable. At some
level, the audience must always remain aware of the artiﬁce of the
play. Such distance is necessary for a tragedy to have success; at least,
known instances of tragedies that directly referred to recent events
seem to have been poorly received by Athenian audiences. For
example, in 493/2 bce Phrynichus was ﬁned 1,000 drachmas for his
Capture of Miletus, due to its directness about the difﬁcult title event
only two years before.13 Direct discussion of recent political events or
social upheaval risks alienating one’s audience, who may ﬁnd the
emotions aroused to be overwhelming or may ﬁnd their intellectual
11 Translations of the Poetics are from Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S. H. Bucher
(London: MacMillan, 1895), accessed online at the MIT Internet Classics Archive
<http://www.classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.html>, 2010–11.
12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Cambridge, Mass.:
Hackett, 1992), 49.
13 Herodotus 6. 21. See Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, 67.
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and moral commitments too deeply rooted to be comfortably
affected.
Tragedy must also strike a balance in presenting a hero who is
neither too good nor too deeply ﬂawed. Aristotle’s claim that reversal
ought to arise neither from a man’s villainy nor from a man of
complete and perfect virtue is sensible, for most persons are unlikely
to identify with either extreme. Regardless of the accuracy of our self-
assessments, none of us imagines ourselves to be either complete
villains or paradigms of perfection. However, an audience member
can easily imagine himself to be ‘good, but not perfect’, and so
identify with the downfall of another person who is like us, or a little
better or worse than us in particular respects. Thus, Oedipus as king
may strike us as both cleverer than us in solving the riddle of the
Sphinx, and yet maddeningly blind in his inability to see his own role
in his downfall.
The enactment of episodes of suffering is itself a way in which an
audience can identify with vulnerability, for Aristotle sees the imagin-
ation as a faculty that exists for the purpose of helping us to ﬂourish
through assisting our practical reasoning. The imagination suggests
different possibilities to us from our present circumstances and
suggests alternatives to practical reasoning.14 Below, I will offer a
more detailed textual analysis of the role of the imagination, but for
the moment, an intuitive example of the relation between imagin-
ation and practical reasoning may sufﬁce. If we witness a scene of
suffering that is seemingly unavoidable, such a scene triggers our own
natural disposition to escape suffering and to ﬁnd ways to act, so that
we might be happy again. When a character on stage is deprived of
such means, and an audience is made to imagine that he cannot and
will not possess such means to escape, then we even more strongly
identify with the character’s suffering by virtue of being practical
reasoners, like him. Our own practical reasoning is, in a sense,
frustrated. Were his suffering real, our own sympathetic response
might be intolerable; we might just not want to see it any more. But
resting assured that such a scene is ‘only’ imaginary also allows an
audience member to engage more deeply with such suffering, pre-
cisely because the scene is not real.
14 See Christopher Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 86–96.
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Tragedy thus brings together our desire for happiness as imagina-
tive, practical reasoners and an imagined reality in which another’s
existence is denied the same kind of happiness that all human beings
desire. We thus are made more deeply aware of our own frailty and
the possibility that the happiness that we desire, imagine, and act to
attain might not always be achieved. Further, through seeing this
limit exhibited by another whose circumstances draw upon our own
feelings and imagination, there is also political value in each person
becoming more aware of the vulnerability of others.
Effective plays often feature characters who are sufﬁciently unlike
many audience members, such that they enact ıŁØÆ in its most
literal sense, that is, a shared Ł with someone whose actual
condition is distinct from my own. As discussed in an earlier chapter,
ıŁØÆ can only take place when the ‘other’ with whom I share
feeling is not in an identical situation to my own (the latter being
commiseration). Yet, he must be sufﬁciently similar to me that I could
see myself in his position. For example, an audience member who
feels distress at Oedipus’ self-blinding partly shares in that character’s
suffering, though not in a way that is identical to the physical pain or
the intensity of the emotional suffering of the character. He may
dread blindness or self-harm, even if he does not see himself as one
who could pollute through incest or parricide. Even here, Sophocles
may connect a spectator to Oedipus in ways that are unexpected.
Consider an audience member of Oedipus Rex who strongly identiﬁes
with Oedipus’ own sense that he ‘could not’ be a person who would
murder his father or commit incest, and yet knows the myth’s truth
that Oedipus is indeed such a man. That spectator will probably
experience some cognitive dissonance between his identiﬁcation with
Oedipus’s denial, and the knowledge that Oedipus is the offender. It
is precisely in the dissonance between these two sets of feelings
and thoughts, i.e. both through identiﬁcation with the character and
separation from him, that a movement toward greater sympathy,
even for the polluter, can take place. Someone who experiences
such dissonance may ask herself, for example, if Oedipus thought
he could not be one who unknowingly creates pollution, how can I be
certain that I could not also do so?
Signiﬁcantly, this Ł for suffering is a shared Ł with others,
and in two directions: what I will call the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
dimensions. First, when an audience member shares at least partly in
the feelings of a character (as when Neoptolemus takes pity on
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Philoctetes), we ﬁnd a ‘vertical’ connection between character and
audience, one that is asymmetrical. (A spectator feels along with a
character but not vice versa.) Second, there is an additional set of
shared feelings between audience members who are simultaneously
experiencing the performance of a tragedy together. Witnessing a
play as part of a community includes this ‘horizontal’ dimension of
ıŁØÆ across social and political boundaries that otherwise exist
in the community. Shared feelings and experiences, brought on
through the experience of strong feeling in response to art, serve as
uniﬁers of the community. At times, the connections between lived
experience and tragic events might be striking. Knox notes that in the
light of the fragility of the political situation at the time of the
performance of Oedipus Rex, and its recent experience of the plague,
‘The audience which watched Oedipus in the theater of Dionysus was
watching itself.’15 Such shared feelings may unite and more closely
connect those within the community who are reminded of shared
experiences in times of suffering, such as war or plague.
Tragedy also may include a wide range of characters that expand
the sense of who constitutes the community, through its own inclu-
sion of slaves, women, children, foreigners, and those defeated in war
among its characters. As Hall has argued, members of groups that
were excluded from overt political participation on the basis of
gender, ethnicity, or status were included among the voices of char-
acters in tragedy.16 Croally suggests that tragedy then serves the
function of questioning the ideology of the society, where ideology
is understood to mean ‘the authorized self-deﬁnition of the dominant
group, that is, the citizen body.’17 Watching Euripides’ Trojan
Women, a play that raises serious questions about the legitimacy of
enslavement, would be a particularly intense experience if a slave
were watching the tragedy along with his master. In such cases,
spectators may not only be engaged with their own responses to the
staged events, but also with how others in the community are res-
ponding to them. A spectator’s ıŁØÆ, in such cases, would be
not only for the enslaved women on stage, but also even for his own
15 Bernard Knox, Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles’ Tragic Hero and his Time (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 77.
16 Edith Hall, Greek Tragedy and the British Theatre 1660–1914 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 123.
17 Croally, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’, 67.
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slave. Even if slaves were not present in the audience, the articulations
and thoughts and feelings on stage may sympathetically expand a
citizen’s understanding of his slave’s own experience.
We see then the possibility of theatrical experience as a way of
mediating social and political relationships through its production of
ıŁØÆ and dissonance, especially to the extent that Athenian
theatre was a gathering of many in the larger community, across
social differences. Spectators may also wonder about differences in
others’ responses to a tragedy. For example, if a spectator ﬁnds herself
unexpectedly feeling anger along with Medea against Jason, despite
her horriﬁc crimes, she may wonder whether others similarly experi-
ence such sympathy for Medea. Or she may feel incapable of such
sympathy, and wonder at its existence in others. If we bring together
both these directions of ıŁØÆ—between character and spectator,
and across audience members—we ﬁnd that the dissonances between
audience members, as much as the shared feelings, are necessary to
encourage moral and political questioning.18 For, on an Aristotelian
account, moral feeling, imagination, and practical reasoning are intim-
ately linked. Tragedy draws upon reason as well as feeling, and these
two faculties are integrated through the exercise of the imagination.
In his Poetics, Aristotle offers the insight that 
ÅØ is more
philosophical than history, for the poet can deal with the general
and the necessary, while the historical concerns the particular and
contingent (Poetics 1451b). That is, the historian is bound by the facts
of the matter; if a particular historical ﬁgure was motivated to begin
or end a war for a particular reason, the historian must be accountable
to that fact.—
ÅØ, however, has fewer limits. The poet can invent a
character, his motivations, and the events that surround him, in order
to point to whatever more general and universal claim he wishes to
make, and show what is ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ (1451b). Aristotle
does not seem to have in mind realistic plots. Nowhere does he
criticize a play for being too fantastical in its machinations of plot
(for example, asking whether Philoctetes could survive on an aban-
doned island for ten years, whether Herakles could appear from
heaven, or whether the curse on the house of Thebes could take just
18 On this point, see also A. M. Bowie, ‘Pity, Fear and Citizenship: The Politics of
Aristotle’s Poetics’, in Derek Barker (ed.), Tragedy and Citizenship: Conﬂict, Recon-
ciliation, and Democracy from Haemon to Hegel (New York: SUNY Press, 2008),
56–9.
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as it did). Rather, when Aristotle discusses the ‘necessity’ of tragedy,
he focuses on the actions of the character with respect to his or her
tragic choices. The poet can express ‘what such and such a kind of
man will probably or necessarily say or do’ (1451b).
For example, althoughOedipus Rex has an improbable element, the
logic of its characters and their actions remains intact; the lack of logic
is ‘outside of the tragedy’ (1454b). Tragic characters must be good;
ﬁtting to the types of persons they are; ‘like the reality’; and consistent
(1454a). Although Aristotle is often said to prioritize action (æAØ)
over character, and so to be less ‘psychological’ than many more
recent playwrights,19 he does state the importance of a proper app-
roach to character in tragedy. The play must have an internal logic to
its action, and that logic is character driven. The characters must
choose and act in ways that seem naturally to arise from who they are,
both in general (male, female, noble, or slave) and in particular ways:
for example, Antigone in her passionate devotion to family, Oedipus
in the wisdom he accords himself, and so on.
Tragedy engages our ethical judgement about more universal
questions, since an audience member must consider whether the
suffering of its characters is justly deserved or not, often in the light
of circumstances in which the character is subject to signiﬁcant and
conﬂicting pressures. For example, Antigone’s and Creon’s conﬂicts
between family and ºØ, or Orestes’ conﬂicting obligations to his
dead father, mother, and the gods, engage our own questions about
vulnerability to suffering in the light of conﬂicting sets of moral and
religious obligations. A character such as Orestes who takes up the
decision to enact revenge may stand in contrast with the lived experi-
ences of the ﬁfth-century Athenian world, which would require the
law, and not vengeance, as a proper response. However, as Cairns has
argued, such a narrative still provides ample room for exploring
whether Athens’s own system of justice adequately addresses the
difﬁculty of normal human feelings of desire for revenge after
harm.20 Or one may wonder how to respond adequately to the
experiences of others whose families have been victimized in the
context of a system that removes a degree of subjective preference
from the enactment of justice.
19 See, for example, Martin, ‘Ancient Theatre’, 36–54.
20 Douglas Cairns, ‘Values’, in Gregory (ed.), Companion to Greek Tragedy,
305–20.
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The invented narratives of tragedy may also sharpen insights into
issues of more immediate and speciﬁc political relevance. Bowie has
suggested strong parallels between the question of Philoctetes’ return
in the Philoctetes and the question as to the justice of Alcibiades’
return to Athens shortly before the 409 bce production. He connects
Alcibiades’ desecration of the hermai and the question as to whether
he could safely return to Athens to Philoctetes’ exclusion from the
political community as a result of his own desecration of sacred
ground.21 In response, Debnar importantly notes that there is not a
single one-to-one analogy between the characters of the Philoctetes
and political ﬁgures. Odysseus also shares certain traits with Alcibi-
ades, as much as does Philoctetes—such as the desire to use language
for the sake of power.22 Nonetheless, the play’s deep engagement with
issues surrounding the justice of rhetorical manoeuvring, the return
of men who have desecrated sacred territory, and the proper res-
ponse, are all signiﬁcant to the community’s coming to be more
capable of debating the justice of Alcibiades’ participation in the
community, or the future treatment of like cases. Or, to return to
the example of the Suppliants, Bowie has argued that the refusal of the
Thebans to return the bodies of the dead would have recollected the
bitter defeat against the Boetians at the Battle of Delium only a couple
of years before the play was produced.23 Were the viewing of tragedy
to be followed by discussion of its content among those who had
viewed it, such an experience provides the groundwork for additional
broadening of understanding human experience through engage-
ments with others about the topic of the tragedy. Tragic theatre
thus can become a part of the process of learning how to debate
and act in a democracy, through the debates that can arise from
viewing and responding to drama as a community.24
21 A. M. Bowie, ‘Tragic Filters for History: Euripides’ Supplices and Sophocles’
Philoctetes’, in B. R. Pelling (ed.), Greek Tragedy and the Historian (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 56–8.
22 See Paula Debnar, ‘Fifth Century Athenian History and Tragedy’, in Gregory
(ed.), Companion to Greek Tragedy, 18–20. Bowie himself also makes the connection
between Odysseus and Alcibiades. See Bowie, ‘Tragic Filters for History’, 58–9.
23 Bowie, ‘Tragic Filters for History’, 45–56.
24 Paul Cartledge, ‘Deep Plays: Theatre as Process in Athenian Civic Life’, in
P. E. Easterling (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3–35.
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Tragedy gives licence to a community to explore difﬁcult issues in a
mediated way through moving its audience back and forth between
experiences of closeness to and distance from the experiences of the
characters and events of the tragedy. Sourvinou-Inwood has identi-
ﬁed those devices that bring the world of the play closer to that of
classical Athens as ‘zooming devices’ and those that separate the two
worlds as ‘distancing devices’.25 For example, in the Antigone, Creon’s
assertion to Haemon that his son has a duty to obey his father
strongly echoes the ephebic oath that all youth swore at the age of
18, to obey the laws of the state and be pious.26 Such verbal echoes
suddenly move the social and political ﬁeld of the play signiﬁcantly
closer to the audience. Fantastical elements, such as the machinations
involved in Oedipus’ birth, abandonment, adoptions, and subsequent
move to Thebes that lead to his incest, distance the audience from
the play.
Such distancing is necessary for the fullness of an audience’s
engagement with a tragedy. First, the audience depends upon the
idea that the scene before him or her is a performance if he or she is to
engage more deeply with the difﬁcult emotional upheaval of witness-
ing suffering. Paradoxically, knowing that the actor playing Oedipus
on stage is not blind at his own hand, but rather wears a mask that
signiﬁes his blindness, allows the spectator to look more closely. The
distance afforded to the spectator by the knowledge that the play is
‘only a play’ provides the space for entering into the experience and
remaining with it. Aulus Gellius tells the story about Polus’ use of his
own son’s ashes in a play as a prop in a fourth-century tragedy.27 His
objection that it was not truly a performance, but actual grief, is not
simply that of a critic evaluating good or bad acting. Rather, he
implies that the actor has violated audience expectations about arti-
ﬁce. The boundaries provided by the play’s removal from the reality
25 Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Tragedy and Anthropology’, in Gregory (ed.),
Companion to Greek Tragedy, 297–8. See also C. Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Assumptions
and the Creation of Meaning: Reading Sophocles’ Antigone’, Journal of Hellenic
Studies 109 (1989), 134–48.
26 Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘Assumptions’, 144.
27 See Attic Nights 6. 5–7. 8, trans. J. C. Rolfe (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1927) and
Ismene Lada-Richards, ‘Greek Tragedy and Western Perceptions of Acting’, in Greg-
ory (ed.), Companion to Greek Tragedy, 400. As Lada-Richards explains, contempor-
ary actors, especially method actors, might have a quite different view of how
characters are mediated through the ‘self ’ that each actor brings to bear on a role.
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of the actors’ lives and even the audience’s particular experiences
provide a safe space for the encounter of difﬁcult issues. At minimum,
the audience need not worry about the actor behind the mask, for his
wearing of the mask makes clear at every moment that this is a
performance for him. Spectators can more fully spectate, that is,
observe, free of the obligation to act in response to another’s sorrow.
The freedom from action is also a way of deepening his or her focus in
observing, imagining, feeling, and thinking about the play.
The vulnerability of speciﬁc groups within one’s own ºØmay be
among such sensitive issues that require this mixture of involvement
and detachment in order to more fully ‘see’. Athens, more than any
other city-state, prided itself on its democratic procedures, breadth of
culture, courage, and fortitude, as the tradition of funeral orations
makes clear. The acknowledgement of social or political shortcom-
ings is more difﬁcult; Socrates attributes his being put to death in part
to the anger of those who had been subject to his questions and
shown up in their ignorance (Apology 23c–24a). Tragedy gives voice
to those who are otherwise voiceless, for example, women and slaves,
although it often does so while also reinforcing at least some of the
authoritative structures that women, slaves, or metics found objec-
tionable.28 Nonetheless, many tragedies seek seriously to articulate the
concerns of those who would be considered ‘outsiders’ to Athenian
citizenship, those whom Zeitlin calls ‘marginal ﬁgures’.29 Tragedy
includes among its characters women, foreigners, slaves, bastards,
metics, children, and others who lack citizenship. These characters
are marginal, insofar as they are not understood by their own culture
to exist at the centre of human community, especially in the exercise of
its political power. Zeitlin argues that marginal ﬁgures serve the pur-
pose of the Other by which the Self is deﬁned, as those at the centre
of social and political power come to understand themselves better
28 For example, Antigone’s rebellion against male structures of power is also done for
the sake of her brother, for whom she is willing to sacriﬁce her own life so that she might
join him in the same grave.
29 See F. I. Zeitlin, Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and Mary Ebbott, ‘Marginal
Figures’, in Gregory (ed.), Companion to Greek Tragedy, 366–76. For reﬂections on
the role of women’s voices in tragedy, see especially H. P. Foley, ‘The Conception of
Women in Athenian Drama’, in H. P. Foley (ed.), Reﬂections of Women in Antiquity
(New York: Gordon and Breach, 1981), 127–68; and B. Seidensticker, ‘Women on
the Tragic Stage’, in B. Goff (ed.), History, Tragedy, Theory: Dialogues on Athenian
Drama (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1995), 151–73.
184 Tragedy, Katharsis, and Community
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
through understanding those who are at the margins of their society.
Such self-knowledge and self-deﬁnition occurs in complex ways.
Boundaries may be crossed between Self and Other. As Ebbott later
phrases it, ‘The Self is explored through theOther, but is not subsumed
by the Other.’30
In the chapters above, we ﬁnd a number of marginal ﬁgures. Some,
like Antigone or Ismene, are excluded from political power through
lacking the status of being a male citizen. However, many marginal
ﬁgures are not women, children, or slaves, and yet they occupy a
marginal space. In nearly all of the examples provided in the previous
chapters in this book, men who might otherwise be at the centre of
social power experience living at the margins. Philoctetes is literally a
liminal ﬁgure that is excluded from society, yet uses ﬁre, a bow, and
eventually ºª to maintain a connection to the community even in
his isolation. Neoptolemus develops his sense of Self as a noble
(ª		ÆE) person in part through his encounter with this Other,
and through fear of becoming an Other himself if he does not obey
Odysseus. The character of Philoctetes is one of a noble-born male
citizen. As such, his presence as a marginal ﬁgure in the context of the
play connects marginalization to those who normally possess power
and a degree of security in their power. Similarly, Oedipus’ fall from
kingship to being the ‘polluted one’ moves him from the centre, even
the pinnacle of the centre, to the margins. Even Socrates’ myth of
judgement implicitly takes the ﬁgure of Callicles and suggests that the
power he seeks as a politician will be lost with the ﬁnal judgement of
his soul. Alcibiades breaks into the party of the Symposium and its
order and reveals how he is at once in love with and disturbed by
Socrates and his effect on his soul. Alcibiades is at the height of his
own power, but shown to be brought down by his inability to live
virtuously.
In each of these examples, tragedy or dialogue suggests that the Self
is theOther, or potentially so. That is, these examples take persons who
one would normally expect to be at the centre of society and expose
them to circumstances (sometimes of their own choosing, but often
not) that result in their becoming the Other. Through juxtaposing the
experience of being Self and Other in a single character, tragedy invites
its audiencemembers to consider the same juxtaposition in themselves.
30 Ebbott, ‘Marginal Figures’, 366.
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Free male citizens are asked to experience a degree of dissonance in
themselves, insofar as they can identify with an individual who moves
from the centre to the margins of society. Such an experience may
make possible the recognition that those who are at the margins of real
Athenian society are also Selves, and not only Others against which to
develop one’s own concerns. In other words, tragedy breaks apart the
categories that normally separate Self and Other, those at the centre
and those at the margins, and suggests that those who are at the centre
of society have signiﬁcantly more in commonwith those at its outskirts
than they may have thought.
Of course, tragedy does not force an audience member to undergo
such an intellectual transformation; neither does philosophical dia-
logue. However, both create the space for the creation of dissonance,
pity, fear, and sympathy, which may lead to such intellectual consid-
erations. Indeed, in tragedy, we ﬁnd a strong link between the affect-
ive and the intellectual. Imagination is the key to linking these two
dimensions of human experiences, for through its exercise, affect and
practical reasoning are united.
II
Aristotle’s account of the imagination and its link to judgement
makes clear the importance of proper emotional responses in making
good rational judgements. Nussbaum has helpfully argued that Aris-
totle’s accounts of imagination (çÆ	Æ
Æ) and its relation to practical
judgement (çæ	ÅØ) and action in the De Anima Book III can help
us better to understand his account of tragedy in the Poetics.31 In
De Anima, Aristotle distinguishes between different faculties of the
soul. The human being is both like and unlike animals. He shares with
the animals the capacity for nutritive growth; locomotion; sensory
perception; and a discriminating power that allows him to distinguish
between sensory objects. At the same time, human beings are dis-
tinctive in their possession of speculative and practical thought—
although Aristotle also says that a small amount of the animal
world also possesses practical thought (427b). We also possess a
31 Nussbaum, Fragility, 264–89.
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faculty of imagination, which depends on the possession of sensory
faculties, but which is neither reducible to those faculties nor to
discursive thought.
According to Aristotle, çÆ	Æ
Æ is not a separate faculty, but
rather an activity that relies upon several faculties.32 Æ	Æ
Æ is
closely related to sense perception. If one thinks of an apple and the
apple is not present, one experiences sensation in the absence of the
object; for example, ‘seeing’ red or imagining its crunch. The senses
are ‘sensing’ in the absence of the object. The imagination presents
the object to the subject as a ç	ÆÆ, an image that in the absence
of the object becomes an interpreter of a prior sense experience. To
this extent, the imagination is also a rational and thinking faculty, in a
way. As Brann describes ç	ÆÆ, the image is not simply given by
the imagination, but rather is a ‘result that it achieves’.33 In other
words, Aristotle’s understanding of the imagination is an active
faculty, one that participates in the production of our understanding
of whatever is imagined. The imagination is not merely a passive
faculty that re-presents a prior experience. Neither does it simply
invent and give shape to a world that lacks its own structure. Instead,
çÆ	Æ
Æ is a rational faculty that is somewhere between the intellec-
tual and the sensory.
Christopher Long notes the sense in which activity of its root,
çÆ	ÇŁÆØ, must still be heard in ‘çÆ	Æ
Æ’. As he articulates it,
‘the term itself comes to designate a power of the soul that occupies a
kind of middle space—between expression and articulation, meaning
and intention, and at a yet deeper level, between perceiving and
thinking, object and subject, body and mind’.34 When tragedy (or
philosophical dialogue, for that matter) invokes the imagination, it
simultaneously draws upon our past, lived sensory experience and
our rational capacity. Drama makes new connections between old
experiences and our current reality, and opens up a new space in
which the rational as well as sensory faculties of the person can be
engaged. The çÆ	Æ
Æ engaged by tragedy literally creates a new
internal world in which not only sense experience, but also human
rationality, can work on new material. Drama’s engagement of our
32 Eva Brann, The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 1992), 40.
33 Brann, The World of the Imagination, 43.
34 Long, Nature of Truth, 83.
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imagination draws upon deeper recesses of our own experience and
lived reality than can abstract argumentation alone.
Aristotle takes pains to emphasize that the imagination is dependent
on animal sensory experience, and is a faculty shared with other
creatures. According to De Anima III. 9, the imagination is an aspect
of the animal soul that is necessary for animal motion. Aristotle’s
argument is that while animals are self-moving, we still must account
for what within the animal ‘makes’ it move. Appetite and imagination,
insofar as they lead to action, are inseparable. If I have an appetite for
something, like a fresh apple to eat, already there is an end in mind.
Aristotle says, ‘appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that
which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; and
that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the
action’ (De Anima III. 10).35 In other words, one cannot say that an
appetite is an appetite until it is an appetite for something. A general
grumbling in one’s stomach is not an appetite; a desire to eat an apple
is. But this end, the apple, for it to be the ‘stimulant of practical mind’
and lead to action, must be imagined if it is to lead to action. One must
think of an apple, imagine it, as that which might satisfy my hunger, at
least in a general way. Conversely, Aristotle says, ‘So, too, when
imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite’
(433a). That is, if one is moved to do something by way of my
imagination, there must be a desire that she wishes or hopes to fulﬁl.
One might imagine something that one is not especially moved to seek
to avoid; upon imagining a cloudy day upon reading the morning
news, a person might do nothing about it. But where action is involved,
animal appetite and imagination are closely linked.
For Aristotle, two kinds of imagination exist: perceptive and delib-
erative; while the latter belongs only to calculative animals, and the
perceptive to any of those that possess senses, even worms and the
like that have simple senses, deliberative imagination is also ‘animal’,
by which Aristotle means that it exists as an outgrowth of the
animated soul that seeks to achieve practical and moral ends. The
presence of calculation is a difference as to the sorts ofmeans that are
used in considering ends and whether or how to pursue them, but
both perceptive and deliberative imagination concern the well-being
35 The J. A. Smith translation is used throughout this chapter: Aristotle, De Anima,
trans. J. A. Smith, in Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon
(New York: Random House, 1941).
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of an animal, and are conducive to its end. Aristotle is insistent that
nothing in nature exists in vain, and so all natural faculties of an
animal exist (ultimately) for the sake of the animal’s ﬂourishing as the
kind of being that it is. Imagination, too, is part of the natural well-
being of living beings that possess it, and helps us to fulﬁl our needs.
Building upon this Aristotelian background, MacInytre in his
Dependent Rational Animals argues that practical rationality is closely
linked to our animal nature.36 While the tendency of much contem-
porary moral philosophy is to understand the human being in terms
of autonomy, or self-rule, MacIntyre suggests that our reasoning as
practical reasoners is linked to practical reasoning that is partly
shared even with animals. Even those elements of human practical
reasoning that exceed animal reasoning are grounded in precondi-
tions for reasoning that are essentially animal. In other words, there is
a whole range of conditions that make reasoning possible, and the
extent to which different creatures satisfy these conditions exists
across a graded spectrum across the animal world. Insofar as we are
rational and social animals, we have social obligations to one another,
based on our own need for care to become who we are, and our
possibility of imagining ourselves into situations where we might
need more care. That is, MacIntyre suggests that the vulnerability of
the sick, disabled, child, or elderly, is not detachable from our moral
status as practical reasoners or caregivers, but instead intricately
intertwined with our humanity as such.
If we then return to the Poetics with this purpose in mind, we can
see the mimetic arts function in part by drawing upon our animal
natures as beings that by nature need others. —
ÅØ (broadly
understood) is based on human need and lack. We imagine because
we are the kinds of creatures that ﬁnd ourselves in need of something,
and when we have need, or even want, of something, we tend to
imagine the object that we suppose might fulﬁl our desires. This is a
kind of explanation for the claim earlier discussed in Plato’s Sympo-
sium, namely, Diotima’s suggestion that human creativity and giving
birth takes place at the last stages on the ladder of love, when we are
yet incomplete, but moving toward completeness. Aristotle also gives
an account of creativity as activity that is born out of our being the
kinds of creatures that lack.
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 2001).
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Given the signiﬁcance of imagination for action, it is not surprising
that Aristotle locates the plot as more signiﬁcant than character in
tragedy: ‘For tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and
of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a
quality’ (Poetics 1450a). If imagination is a key part of human action,
then action on stage is one means by which we can effectively enter
into the world of others. That is, since the chain of causation
according to the account outlined above is the possession of an
appetite, its fulﬁlment in imagination, and possibly also deliberation
about how to achieve such ends and then action, then each of these
points in drama becomes an entryway into the experiences of those
different from us. We may not share their identical appetites, but can
easily imagine our way into different courses of action that stem from
the possession of such appetites, and so retrospectively understand
why various sorts of people choose particular actions—even those
that lead to suffering.
Human beings can imagine their way into others’ realities, and so
also gain a kind of understanding of their actions, appetites, and
practical reasoning through imagination. Thus, in watching the
Antigone, an audience member will do much more than note, intel-
lectually, that Antigone is caught between a civic and a religious duty.
She can understand Antigone’s action of burying her brother and
defying Creon because she can imagine the heroine’s thoughts, feel-
ings, appetites, and the origins of her movement in the play. Reading
Hegel or Nussbaum’s writings about Antigone and the philosophical
conﬂict between civic and familial duty is an entirely different experi-
ence from watching Antigone and Creon argue on stage. The latter
involves the engagement of one’s emotions and even body, as well as
one’s intellectual faculties, for the exercise of imagination unites these
faculties in us.
Of course, Aristotle carefully sets opinion apart from the imagin-
ation in De Anima: ‘For imagining lies within our own power when-
ever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of
mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions
we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth’
(427b). Unlike in opinion, where we must choose to assent to or to
dissent to a judgement (e.g. ‘Alcibiades ought not have been asked to
return to Athens’), in imagination, the mind can reign more freely.
Imagination is neither subject to the limitations of sense perception
nor to the limits of opinion: since in imagination the subject is not
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bound to the world as he has thus far known it, his capacity to think
of things other than how they have been up until now signiﬁcantly
expands his vision of himself, other human beings, and the commu-
nity. Tragedy draws upon both our sensory and our deliberative
faculties, and so can move us in a way that is more in tune with the
‘whole’ of the human being than either abstract argumentation, or
simple and direct encounters with the ordinary world, can.
Indeed, the imagination expands our sense of ontology, or ‘what is’.
In the Aristotelian view, we are the kinds of creatures that come to
understand the world primarily (though not exclusively) through
ºªØ. Our understanding of being is always mediated through the
words that we use to describe, categorize, and make sense of things.
Yet, Aristotle offers a concept of language in which things themselves
reveal a ºª to us. It is not simply the case that we use ºªØ of our
own invention to make sense of an otherwise unorganized or chaotic
world. Nor do we superimpose our order on a different order.
Instead, the structures of things themselves possess a ºª that
allows things to reveal themselves to us and to be articulated in
language. As Long phrases it, ‘For Aristotle, each attempt to articulate
something of the truth of things is already involved with the expres-
sion of the things encountered.’37 Long’s focus is on the whole of
nature, including the non-human world; not only ºª-centred
creatures, but all of being, shows and expresses itself to us, and in
response, human beings seek to articulate its nature. However, the
created world of the stage and its invented stories, performed with
the use of ŒÅ	 and mask, also seeks to reveal and to articulate the
nature of political realities that have not yet been realized. The
enactment of what is ‘possible’, but which only exists in its particu-
larity on the stage, also reveals the truth of realities.
Human beings are the sorts of creatures that come to know truth
through ºªØ, and live in a world in which realities reveal themselves
through ºªØ. However, the extent to which such things can and do
reveal the whole of truth to us depends very much upon our experi-
ence and openness as enquirers. Drama, although a created and
imagined world, can speak the truth to us precisely because it literally
enlarges the realm of being. That is, the actions and ºªØ of tragedy
do not merely invent new concepts, or create new characters that exist
37 Long, Nature of Truth, 55. Of course, defending such a view is well beyond the
scope of this paper, but Long offers a thorough argument.
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solely in a separable realm, apart from the ‘real’ social and political
world. Instead, its ºªØ and events reveal the nature of things, human
things, through expanding the realm of what is ‘possible’. To put it in
the strongest terms, the world of the Dionysian theatre expands the
being of the political world itself. New realities about Self and Other
emerge, and these realities possess a political and social reality for the
community that potentially changes its sense of its own identity. Such
a reality, however, like ordinary reality, must still be interpreted. In
order to be successful, a performance must resonate with some truth
that is still seeking to be revealed; that is, a play that does not reveal
anew something that ‘is’ will fail to have power over us. Additionally,
an audience must interpret the actions, characters, and events of the
theatrical world if that world is to emerge as an active part of the
social and political world when the performance is left behind.
A tragedy that can articulate in word or in performance more
generally a truth that we have so far not yet recognized, gives shape
to the truth, because what it performs or asserts in some sense already
existed. Thus, a character like Philoctetes has power over us because
at some level, we are already familiar with the vulnerability of the
marginalized and excluded, and already struggle with the question of
who is inside or outside the realm of the social group that matters.
Narrative reality is part and parcel of the social and political reality,
because human beings are logo-centric and imaginative creatures that
seek out ‘the possible’ by nature. But what constitutes a possibility that
can move and affect us, even transform us, depends already upon our
existent human reality. There is thus a productive tension between
theatre and ºØ, and between performance and ºª. These polar-
ities are brought together in the exercise of the imagination.
III
Finally, we come to the difﬁcult question of ŒŁÆæØ, better equipped
to describe its nature after examining the political nature of
performance for the Attic world, and Aristotle’s understanding of
the imagination and its relation to ºª. ˚ŁÆæØ often has been
interpreted as the experience of an individual in which an excess of
fear or pity builds up and must be released; at its most literal level the
term means a ‘purgation’ or ‘cleansing’. In ŒŁÆæØ, feelings are in
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some way puriﬁed or purged. However, Aristotle’s ambiguous use of
the term in the Poetics suggests at least three questions. First, are
feelings of pity and fear purged and removed, or are they puriﬁed?
Second, for what purpose ought such feelings undergo ŒŁÆæØ?
Third, how does the performative nature of tragedy inform what
might be intended by the idea of ŒŁÆæØ?
While the concept remains controversial, a number of commen-
tators favour a decidedly ethical approach as the aim of this release of
feeling. Janko, for example, understands ŒŁÆæØ as a form of ‘moral
puriﬁcation’, in which the emotions are aroused in such a way that
after they subside again, they are ‘retrained’ to be less volatile.38 Such
retraining results in the person’s character being closer to the mean
that constitutes virtue. By exercising fear and pity harmlessly, the
individual is better prepared to return to living his ordinary life, as
such emotions are less apt to control him. Janko’s theory relies upon a
particular understanding of medical ŒŁÆæØ as ‘homeopathic’, in
which a little experience of a problematic emotion allows one to
release it so that the power of the emotion over the individual is
lessened.
The difﬁculty with Janko’s theory is that it does not fully take into
account the positive value of experiencing pity and fear, not only in
the mediated world of the theatre, but also in ordinary life. Although
such emotions can be problematic in certain circumstances, Aristotle
also takes seriously their value for living well. To return to Book II of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric for a moment, we ﬁnd there that Aristotle does
not only offer a psychology of how pity takes place, but in doing so,
also connects its presence to justice and to friendship. A person feels
pity if he feels pain at the sight of an evil that may befall either oneself,
or a friend, when it is ‘undeserved’ (1385b). Among those more likely
to feel pity are individuals with education and long experience of the
world, as well as those who have living parents, children, or wives
(1385b). Moreover, only those who believe in the goodness of at least
some other people are capable of pity (1385b–1386a). This passage
makes clear that pity is not a negative emotion (although it is painful).
Indeed, its presence in those who are experienced, educated, and who
believe in the possibility of undeserved suffering suggests that there is
38 Aristotle, Poetics I with the Tractatus Coislinianus, a Hypothetical Reconstruc-
tion of Poetics II, the Fragments of On Poets, Book I, translated with an introduction by
Richard Janko (Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1987), ix–xxiv.
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a connection for Aristotle between pity and justice. Since only those
who believe that another’s suffering is undeserved feel pity, then
Aristotle implies that its presence in one who correctly understands
and can identify justice is proper and good, when he is confronted
with injustice. Similarly, the increased sensitivity of those who feel
pity in cases where their close family members are alive suggests that
çØº
Æ and pity are also interrelated.
While Aristotle does not spell out the nature of this relationship in
the Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics might illuminate their relation.
In friendship, a friend has genuine concern for the good of the other,
even for the good of the other as ‘another self ’, in the case of
friendships of virtue (N. Ethics 1166a). So, too, do parents feel for
their children as though the children are somewhat an extension of
themselves, for their being comes from themselves (1161b), although
they also take greater pleasure in loving their children than in being
loved (1159a). Pity reﬂects the reality of a self that is deeply connected
enough to others to feel the other’s suffering as if it is their own,
though at least sometimes in diminished intensity. Fear, too, is an
appropriate response to certain threats, and indeed courage is not the
absence of fear in every circumstance. Brave persons will not only fear
those dangers that are frightening for anyone sensible, but ‘even the
sorts of things that are not irresistible’ (1115b). However, ‘he will
stand ﬁrm against them, in the right way, as prescribed by reason, for
the sake of what is ﬁne, since this is the end aimed at by virtue’
(1115b). Indeed, part of what constitutes the courageous person’s
ability to respond rationally and properly to danger is a proper kind
of fear. Those who completely lack an appropriate emotional res-
ponse of fear to genuine danger are not virtuous. They are so rare,
because they are so far from the ordinary experience of being human,
that Aristotle says, ‘He would be some sort of madman, or incapable
of feeling distress, if he feared nothing, neither earthquake nor waves,
as they say about the Celts’ (1115b). While his characterizations of
Celtic people are rather fanciful, Aristotle’s point is that total fearless-
ness is barbaric. To be human means to possess the proper amount of
fear and pity, for both are necessary for proper care of the self and
beloved others.
If pity and fear are important emotions in the life of virtue, then
their simple purgation would be an insufﬁcient motivation for experi-
encing tragedy; even if human beings are more prone to excess than
deﬁciency in the case of fear, it is not at all clear that this is so in the
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case of pity. Indeed, their expulsion per se is not the aim of living well,
but rather their proper incorporation into a life lived in just relation-
ship with others.39 In the key passage in the Poetics, Aristotle’s phrase
reads as follows: ‘Ø Kºı ŒÆd çı æÆ
	ıÆ c	 Øø	
ÆŁÅø	 ŒŁÆæØ	’ (Poetics 1449b). In the light of Aristotle’s
other remarks on the value of pity, fear, and related emotions,
I suggest that we take Aristotle to mean by these lines ‘through pity
and fear it puriﬁes emotions of this type’. That is, an interpretation
that reads Aristotle as saying that the witnessing of tragedy removes
what is problematic about emotions, rather than removing them
altogether, is more consistent with his other remarks on the value
of both fear and pity. The question then remains as to the nature and
the purpose of such puriﬁcation.
I suggest that we examine ŒŁÆæØ as a kind of ‘puriﬁcation’ that
removes impurities in the emotions of a community for the sake of a
more balanced community that possesses greater self-knowledge and
can accommodate ideas previously excluded or marginalized from its
self-understanding. My argument proceeds in two fundamental steps.
First, in Aristotle’s use of the term ŒŁÆæØ in the Politics, I argue that
ŒŁÆæØ exists not as an end in itself, but as a means to restore
balance and harmony to the whole of a musical piece. Such a reading
of ŒŁÆæØ as a rebalancing is also consistent with the purpose of
purgation and puriﬁcation in Greek medicinal practice. Second,
I argue that the puriﬁcatory activity of ŒŁÆæØ in tragedy exists so
that the members of a community may stand with a more balanced
understanding of their own community and the appropriate way to
feel and to understand its members. While much of the discussion of
ŒŁÆæØ focuses on how individuals’ emotions are affected, the per-
formative nature of tragedy in the context of a political-religious festival
ought to lead us to consider the effects of ŒŁÆæØ on the community
as a whole. Just as the ŒŁÆæØ of medicine restores a wholeness
and balance in the body, and the ŒŁÆæØ of music is a puriﬁcation
of the entire melody, the ŒŁÆæØ of tragedy restores a kind of balance
in the community. The balance is not simply one of being purged of the
‘wrong’ feelings, where fear and pity are in need of expulsion, but also of
having the proper ‘right’ thoughts and feelings about the reality of one’s
39 Bowie, ‘Pity, Fear, and Citizenship’, 51–5 also shows the importance of pity and
fear for ethical deliberation, as well as the signiﬁcance of identiﬁcation with the
suffering hero in tragedy.
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fellow human beings. ˚ŁÆæØ enlarges our ﬁeld of vision by forcing
us to encounter and to process imaginatively and discursively our
feelings of fear and pity. Through the processing of these feelings in
both affective and rationally discursive ways, the spectator’s ethical
disposition toward his fellow citizens is brought back into a proper
balance. Such balancing includes a greater sense of pity and care for
one’s fellow citizens.
As argued above in the chapter on the Gorgias, medicine and
philosophy alike shared a strong ethical commitment to the well-
being of soul and body. Contemporary models of medicine that see
ŒŁÆæØ as ‘merely’ purgation of feeling distract from the ancient
concept of medical as linked to the ethical, in its seeking of restoration
of health to the soul as well as body.40 Health on the ancient Hippo-
cratic model is not the absence of a negative presence to the soul, but
rather its restoration to a proper and proportional state of health.
Purgation did not exist as a treatment that merely removed what was
negative from the body, but rather, as a treatment that in removing
the negative, thereby restored a positive balance natural to the body
and its component humours.
Aristotle’s Politics also uses ŒŁÆæØ as an image of the effect of
experiencing pity and fear in the context of music, in which the aim
here, too, is the development of a more balanced state of soul:
[F]or some persons are very liable to this form of emotion, and under the
inﬂuence of sacred music we see these people, when they use tunes that
violently arouse the soul, being thrown into a state as if they had received
medicinal treatment and taken a purge; the same experience then must come
also to the compassionate and the timid and the other emotional people
generally in such degree as befalls each individual of these classes, and all
must undergo a purgation (ŒŁÆæØ) and a pleasant feeling of relief; and
similarly also the purgative melodies afford harmless delight to people.
(Politics 1342a)
This passage has led some commentators to believe that the sole
purpose of ŒŁÆæØ is the relief from strong feelings, because of
Aristotle’s reference to pleasure and relief in conjunction with
40 Jacob Bernays is usually credited as being among the ﬁrst of contemporary
commentators to identify ŒŁÆæØ with medical purgation, in his Grundzüge der
verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles uver Wirkung der Tragödie. His work on
ŒÆŁæØ is available in Andrew Laird (ed.), Ancient Literary Criticism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
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ŒŁÆæØ. However, as Golden argues, here Aristotle is not making a
more general claim about ŒŁÆæØ, but rather uses the imagery of a
purge, of medical ŒŁÆæØ, in the larger context of comparing differ-
ent types of musical melodies and their effects on shaping the soul.41
Some melodies, he says, are cathartic, while others are educative.
Some calm, some delight, and others throw people into a terrible
frenzy. The larger point of this passage is to argue that, given the
tremendous power of music on the human soul, the right kind of
music must be used for the right educative purpose, keeping in mind
the temperament and character (as well as age) of those who listen to
music. Aristotle offers his remarks about ŒŁÆæØ here as part of a
theory about musical education.42 In making our interpretation of his
meaning here, this larger theoretical aim of education must be kept in
mind. Aristotle’s understanding of music in this context is for the soul
who listens to it to become virtuous. This aim is achieved through
balancing a soul that is out of balance, compensating for its deﬁcien-
cies through giving it whatever reshaping or reformulation it needs.
In this context, neither puriﬁcation nor purgation completely cap-
tures the larger sense of reshaping as the goal of musical education.
Rather, the ŒŁÆæØ of certain elements is one tool that allows one to
achieve such a balancing.
Halliwell helpfully relates Aristotle’s comment in the Politics about
the shaping of the soul’s Ł by music to mean that music literally
moulds character (Politics 1340a–1342a).43 Musical ŒŁÆæØ pro-
duces a kind of alleviation of pain and increase of pleasure, but not
simply through a mechanistic release valve of some kind. Instead,
ŒŁÆæØ effects a change in the soul through affecting its very Ł,
its disposition or character. Purgation, or the removal of a difﬁcult
element, is only one metaphor found in Aristotle’s general examin-
ation of the proper use of music. An increase in spiritedness at times
of war for the timid or calming of excessive enthusiasm might be
more appropriate for other souls. The educative theories of Damon
and similar ideas found in Book III of Plato’s Republic support the
prevalence of such a view of ıØŒ in classical Athens (Republic
41 Leon Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis (Atlanta: Scholars Press,
1992), 8–12.
42 Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis, 8–12.
43 Stephen Halliwell, ‘Learning from Suffering: Ancient Responses to Tragedy’, in
Gregory (ed.), Companion to Greek Tragedy, 404–5.
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398–403). However, ıØŒ does more than cause a corresponding
Ł in the soul. In fact, careful attention to the extended passage in
the Politics also reveals a strong connection between imitation and
sympathy. 
ÅØ also produces ıŁØÆ:
And moreover everybody when listening to imitations (Ø	) is thrown
into a corresponding state of feeling (ıÆŁE), even apart from the
rhythms and tunes themselves. And since it is the case that music is one of
the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to do with feeling delight
and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing that it is more needful
to learn and become habituated to than to judge correctly and to delight in
virtuous characters and noble actions. (Politics 8.1340a)
By ıŁØÆ here, Aristotle does not seem to have in mind speciﬁc-
ally compassion for the suffering, but rather experiencing feelings that
correspond strongly to whatever is being imitated. Nonetheless, the
passage is a rich one for deepening our understanding of sympathy in
audience experience of tragedy, for it states that sympathy is one
natural outcome of being affected by imitations, whether these imita-
tions are strictly musical or not.
Aristotle’s careful speciﬁcation is that it is not only melody and
rhythm, but the whole of the 
ÅØ taken in that causes the sympa-
thetic effect. That is, Aristotle avoids a reductive explanation of the
causal links between music and sympathy. Music does not simply
shape the soul the way that sound waves affect the eardrum,
i.e. mechanistically. Instead, imitation itself affects the soul because
‘pieces of music contain in themselves imitations of character’ (Politics
1340a). Music imitates life, and in turn the living are sympathetically
affected by themusic they hear; they becomemore like what they hear,
which is itself (in some undeﬁned way) already like the characters of
people.
A similar point might be made even more strongly about 
ÅØ
of character: tragic ﬁgures who overly imitate various types of human
beings produce a sympathetic response in those who listen to and
watch them; this is possible only because there is a ﬁt between the
mimetic reality and the reality being imitated (our earlier point about
‘likeness’ above). Indeed, the interlinking of music, dance, and
rhythm in ancient tragedy would only heighten the effect of such
mimetic power. ˚ŁÆæØ, then, shapes the soul not through provid-
ing a release valve, but instead through a kind of rebalancing of the
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soul so that the tragic viewer leaves the theatre with his soul having
been reshaped through 
ÅØ.
Golden connects the Eleatic Stranger’s use of ŒŁÆæØ in relation
to the art of making distinctions in Plato’s Sophist (230d–231a).
There, the Stranger compares the removal of ignorance through
cross-examination to the puriﬁcation or ŒŁÆæØ of the soul.44
Golden argues that insofar as the goal of 
ÅØ is intellectual
pleasure (Poetics 1448b), the ŒŁÆæØ achieved through 
ÅØ is
a kind of intellectual clariﬁcation. However, Golden limits the effects
of ŒŁÆæØ to the intellect since the 
ÅØ that causes it is ‘the
word, spoken or read’.45 As I have argued, however, the audience
experience of tragedy is primarily through being spectators at a
performance, and so the cathartic effect of imitation is not solely
verbal. Instead, the mimetic effect arises from the actions, words,
musical expression, iconic masks, scenery, and other dimensions of
performance that resonate with expressions, thoughts, ideas, actions,
and surroundings of the ordinary world. Indeed, the whole of the
tragic performance imitates the non-verbal along with the verbal—for
example, using colour, sound, and gesture—to reveal something
about the being of the world outside of the theatre. The verbal and
logical is central to our experience of tragedy, to be sure, but so too is
the sensory and non-verbal, in the theatre’s drawing upon the im-
agination’s occupation of a space between the purely intellectual and
sensorial dimensions of experience.46 
ÅØ cathartically reshapes
and puriﬁes the soul through its making use of the imagination’s
largesse, so to speak. Theatrical performances mimetically embody
multiple layers of human experience, in their attention to multiple
dimensions of soul. ˚ŁÆæØ, then, is the reshaping of the soul
through its mimesis effecting sympathetic responses in its audience.
In this sense, the theatrical world imitates the real world, but also the
44 Golden, Mimesis, 22–3.
45 Golden, Mimesis, 26.
46 Golden agrees with Nussbaum and Salkever that the affective as much as the
rational is part of audience experience of tragic reality, but argues that the audience’s
grappling with the justice or injustice of suffering takes place at a purely rational level,
as one ‘weighs the evidence’ (p. 33). However, as I have argued here, the point is that
rationality itself is strongly informed by affective experience; the movement from
imagination to practical reason does not leave behind the sensory, but rather the
experiential and affective inform how practical reasoning takes place. For more on the
relation between cognition and emotion, see W. W. Fortenbraugh, Aristotle on
Emotion (New York: Duckworth, 1975), 12–22.
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‘real’ social world of the audience, and in its sympathetic responsive-
ness to the mimetic, is itself transformed and enlarged through its
encounter with the dramatic.
˚ŁÆæØ, in this enlarged sense, as the soul’s rebalancing, might
be extended to being understood as the experience of the ºØ.47
While Aristotle himself focuses on the ŒŁÆæØ of individuals, we
might reasonably extend his analysis from the rebalancing of an
individual to the rebalancing of the larger community. Given the
overtly political nature of the Dionysian festival and the conversations
that surely must have ensued after the performances had ended, the
community itself might also undergo a kind of rebalancing and
readjustment in its response to witnessing a performed tragedy.
Timocles’ fourth-century comedy Women Celebrating the Dionysia
is revealing of the consolation and education that tragedy can provide.
As Halliwell demonstrates, Timocles’ speaker notes two elements to
audience experiences of tragedy: a łıåÆªøª
Æ or soul-leading that is
pleasurable while in the theatre; and the person who is now ‘educated’
(ÆØıŁØ) as he leaves the theatre. Timocles identiﬁes the beneﬁt of
tragedy as learning that one’s own sorrows are bearable, in the light of
even greater suffering.48 More narrowly, such ‘education’ could
simply mean understanding that one’s own daily sufferings are less
signiﬁcant than the possible scale of human suffering, through con-
trast of oneself to the tragic hero. However, Timocles’ sense of
education might also involve the łıåÆªøª
Æ of leading an audience
member to place in perspective her own suffering in comparison to
others in real, immediate community, through application of the
play’s insight to her own political situation. When Timocles speaks
of the audience’s engagement in the ‘suffering (ŁØ) of others’ (6),
the immediate ‘other’ may be the tragic hero, but in later consider-
ation the ‘other’ may grow to include the real sufferings of those
in one’s own city, or even other cities. The łıåÆªøª
Æ of tragedy
restores balance through restoring proper perspective on one’s own
suffering vis-à-vis the reality of others’ lives. Such restoration of
perspective on one’s own life not only leads to greater contentment
47 One of the few commentators to look at the political place of tragedy in
Aristotle’s psychology is Bowie, ‘Pity, Fear, and Citizenship’. Bowie focuses on the
role of practical wisdom and deliberation, whereas my own attention here is on
imagination and sympathy.
48 Halliwell, ‘Learning from Suffering’, 394–6.
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for oneself, but also potentially greater concern for others. This, too, is
a form of ŒŁÆæØ, as an audience member is led away from the
excesses of his self-absorption in his own narrower experiences of
suffering or sorrow to be more engaged in those of others.
Finally, I want to suggest that tragedy can lead souls through
enlarging a community’s vision of its own reality. Here, I am stepping
beyond Aristotle himself, but in a way that I hope is in keeping with
the spirit of Aristotle’s approach to tragedy. Tragedy asks members of
the community—especially its most powerful members—to encoun-
ter the reality of suffering that they might otherwise avoid, despite its
presence in the community. For example, Oedipus at Colonus envi-
sions the possibility that the ‘polluted one’ might be understood not
simply as the source of a city’s illness, but rather as its protection.
A Philoctetes who was excluded on the grounds of good piety
emerges as central to the community’s success. Analogues may also
be found in the contemporary city. To avoid the truth of one’s own
community, the suffering in its midst, and the causes of such suffering
is not merely to avoid controversial political opinions. To avoid truths
about ‘what is’, including ‘what is’ in one’s ºØ, is also to avoid one’s
own humanity. While Aristotle himself seems not to have extended
his analysis of tragedy this far, such a view is not distant from an
Aristotelian conception of ethics and epistemology. For Aristotle, not
to see what the world seeks to reveal to us is to avoid an ethical
responsibility we have both as knowers and as social beings for whom
political relationships are forms of çØº
Æ. Avoiding the reality of
suffering is both a violation of the moral order and the epistemo-
logical order. In Aristotle’s well-known words, ‘All human beings by
nature desire to know’ (Metaphysics 980a), and to know is a key part
of how we express and embody that nature. Not all of what needs to
be known and understood, however, is pleasant. Indeed, an Aristotel-
ian conception of PÆØ	
Æ, happiness, requires a proper respon-
siveness to what is ‘unhappy’ at the moment. The courageous man
does not avoid fearful or dangerous situations, but rather responds to
them properly, in the right manner at the right time. Friendship
requires vulnerability to one’s closest friends, even at the risk of
great loss. A virtuous man grieves appropriately for those he has
lost, rather than not grieving at all.
The community, too, has an obligation to understand the truth of
its own vulnerabilities, suffering, even ﬂaws. Any self-understanding
of a community that can see only its strengths is unbalanced.
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Consider some of the well-known adulatory remarks Pericles de-
livered in his funeral oration, as reported by Thucydides:
We cultivate reﬁnement without extravagance and knowledge without
effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and place the
real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle
against it. Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend
to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry,
are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding
him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we
Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead
of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think
it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our
enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation,
each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons;
although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reﬂection.
But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best
know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never
tempted to shrink from danger.49
Pericles’ speech at the time provided an important balance to the
losses of war. As their leader, he reminds them that grief and hardship
are not the whole of the city. To see only loss in the community is to
take an unbalanced view of its own reality. Pericles seeks to reveal
the things themselves to the Athenians, that is, to remind them of
the realities that they may not currently be able to access, through
ºªØ that can again reveal what is good in the community to those
who suffer.
But to take such comments as the ﬁnal word on Athens would also
be a misunderstanding of the truth of the ºØ. Tragedy provides a
counterbalance to the community that praises itself too highly, or
believes in the totality of its own virtue to the exclusion of suffering,
conﬂicting obligations, marginalization, powerlessness, and like
themes of tragedy. In a sense, then, tragedy can ‘purge’ a city of its
excesses, through serving as a reminder of what is. Such purgation or
rebalancing should not be understood to be ‘merely’ psychological,
for the psychological and logical, the mental and the ontological,
are closely linked for Aristotle. Tragedy, if engaged with responsively,
can restore epistemological honesty to the community while
49 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin, 1972),
translated by Warner, Book 2, 34–46.
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simultaneously expanding its self-understanding to include greater
wholeness, greater inclusion of what is already in its midst. Tragedy
and philosophy, too, achieve this through a kind of transcendence of
one’s current circumstance, not as an escape, but rather so that we
might return again to community ever more engaged with the truth
of our own community, better prepared to be responsive to it.
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8Conclusion
In this work, I have argued that human vulnerability is central to a
proper self-understanding of human individuals and the commu-
nities in which they live. Vulnerability—understood not only as the
capacity to be wounded, but also as self-awareness and acceptance of
being subject to harm—is not reducible to weakness or the absence of
virtue. Instead, the right appropriation of vulnerability proves to be
central to genuine self-knowledge and to the exercise of political
virtue. The works of philosophy, epic, and tragedy in the previous
chapters offer a variety of perspectives, both on the nature of vulner-
ability and the best ways in which to be responsive to its presence in
communities. Achilles and Alcibiades, for example, have distinct
struggles with different forms of moral weakness. However, in each
case a certain acceptance or even embrace of vulnerability becomes
crucial to virtuous living. Characters within these literary and philo-
sophical works struggle with the right appropriation of their vulner-
able condition, and their capacity to do so well or badly is deeply
affected by the responses of their friends, families, comrades in arms,
or partners in dialogue. The audience’s encounter with such struggles
with vulnerability in performed tragedy, epic, or philosophy invites
the political community to witness and so more fully to incorporate
the vulnerable into the body politic.
This book begins and ends with two works, the Iliad and the
Poetics, which place the construction of narrative accounts at the
centre of the appropriation of vulnerability. The Iliad links vulner-
ability to wounds and death to the very possibility of a teleological
narrative of human existence, that is, to the development of a mean-
ingful life story. In part, such meaning is made possible because the
suffering of warriors is not solely an individual experience. Homer’s
descriptions of the many men who are wounded or die on the
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battleﬁeld serve not only as an expression of the genuine loss inherent
in human mortality, but also as the well-spring of the possibility of
meaningful existence through narrative accounts that integrate the
‘end’ of life into a larger whole. Narrative ties together the experience
of difﬁcult events, such as impending death or the loss of a friend,
with noble actions, or to instances of growth in understanding one’s
own humanity. Agamemnon’s self-understanding is informed by
Menelaos’ wound; he suffers along with his brother, and brings his
brother’s suffering to bear upon his own attitude about the war and
the meaning of its gains and losses. Achilles’ ability to live and to die
well arises from his successful integration of the death of his beloved
friend, Patroklos. Paradoxically, that ability to assimilate loss takes
place through his shared meal with Priam, his enemy’s father, and his
deepening of sympathy for Priam’s loss. Not only pity for the
suffering but, even more intimately, a shared sense of mortality
makes possible the deepening of human friendship and political
commitments. Indeed, the renewal of such commitments to the
living, in the light of loss, helps to provide for the forward motion
of life in a world subject to ﬂux and to decay.
Oedipus at Colonus provides its audience with a vision of the
incorporation and integration of the suffering and ‘polluted’ man
into the body politic. While in the Oedipus Rex Oedipus’ identity is
that of a polluted man who must be excluded from the city, since he is
the cause of its sickness, in Colonus he serves as the  who
protects the city’s wholeness and integrity. Sophocles uses the plot
device of æØ	ØÆ, or sudden reversal, to explore both vulnerability
and its incorporation into the body politic. Oedipus becomes the
welcomed stranger whose presence in Athens promises to provide
the city with blessing instead of a curse. While moral blindness and
ignorance are key vulnerabilities in human living, their reversal and
resolution demand more than simply ‘seeing’ or knowing the truth.
For Oedipus, only to know that he is the ‘polluted one’ is insufﬁcient
to solve the political problem he presents; even his exile does not solve
the ensuing familial and political conﬂict that results for Thebes.
Instead, a model of knowledge based on the faculty of touch—a
mutual knowing and being known—and not vision as a one-way
mastery of a distant object, guides Oedipus at Colonus. Moreover,
Theseus’ own ability to identify as a  and to welcome Oedipus
with hospitality as a result of his own appropriation of woundedness
and exclusion allows for Athens’ protection. In the play’s action, this
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takes place with Oedipus’ burial at the city’s edge, but that literary
incorporation of his body also signiﬁes Athens’ incorporation of
vulnerability, the stranger, and even its accommodation of moral
blindness and weakness. Through the ﬁgure of Theseus as the founder
of democracy, the play expresses the centrality of the incorporation
of the vulnerable and morally blind for Athens’ retention of a demo-
cratic political identity that includes a wide sense of the 
.
Democracies, by their very nature in the inclusion of many people
of varied characters and talents, must grapple with the inclusion of
those at the margins in a way that oligarchies or aristocracies need
not. Oedipus at Colonus suggests that a city’s willingness to so include
strangers, outsiders, and even the morally impure constitutes part of
its democratic strength.
The Philoctetes further extends this political argument insofar as
the character of Philoctetes exempliﬁes a dual value found in human
vulnerability. First, through existing at the marginal space between
society and isolation, between rejection and rejoining the war, Phi-
loctetes has access to understanding his own humanity and especially
his need of others in a way that more comfortable characters in the
play do not. Experiencing a lack of what he needs gives him deep
insight into the nature of human desire in a way that Oedipus seems to
lack; vulnerability thus has an epistemological andmoral value. Second,
Neoptolemus’ encounter with Philoctetes develops the youth’s political
virtue, especially his growth in the value of compassion and the ability
to accommodate unjust harm. Both Neoptolemus and Philoctetes in
their own ways must learn to reconcile themselves to imperfection and
injustice in the political community, not through rhetorical manipula-
tion (as Odysseus prefers), but rather through genuinely communi-
cative speech and the development of a form of sympathy that can
incorporate political reality. Philoctetes’ future possibilities for friend-
ship after betrayal require an acceptance of injustice and the risk of
further injustice, not through meek acceptance, but rather through the
active development of reconciliation with political imperfection. The
permanence of some degree of injustice in the community presents
signiﬁcant challenges for political communities, and requires both a
realistic understanding of one’s community’s limits and the develop-
ment of political and personal sympathy to bridge differences.
In Plato’s Gorgias, we turn to the consideration of self-wounding,
and Socrates’ philosophical engagement of his interlocutor as a
form of ŁæÆÆ. Rather than reading philosophical questioning
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as identical to the development of an argument for a particular moral
or intellectual stance, a more expansive understanding of Socratic
questioning includes how it becomes a ŁæÆÆ for the soul. Self-
knowledge requires a certain nakedness of the self to judgement. So
does the ability to judge and to address the needs of another justly: in
the myth of the judged man, those who judge are, like Socrates, aware
of their own limits and may even themselves have had to live with
their own past self-wounding choices. Myth itself serves as an effect-
ive species of argument for producing greater self-awareness, since it
engages the entirety of the soul, not only intellect or the passions
alone. Through posing multiple images in argument to Callicles,
Socrates attempts to reframe and to recontextualize the sort of life
that Callicles values into a greater, cosmic whole. That greater per-
spective includes a recognition of the limits of human life, both the
limits of death and the limits of freedom for the man who lives an
unjust and unrestrained life. We are vulnerable not only to the loss of
status, wealth, or life itself, but also to our own moral weakness and
ignorance of our own nature. Such ignorance has political conse-
quences, as those who avoid such vulnerabilities, like Callicles, treat
politics as a means only to appetitive fulﬁlment at the city’s expense.
But Socratic questioning serves as a kind of treatment of the soul, one
that at times functions to uncovers the soul’s wounds and weaknesses
in order that the soul might be healed and restored to balance. In this
way, care of the soul and awareness of limit can prevent or repair
harm to the city as well.
In the Symposium, attentiveness to vulnerability is crucial for the
possibility of eros, widely construed. Love’s relationality and expan-
sion from the relatively narrow love of one lover for a single beloved
body or soul to the love of the larger community’s laws and insti-
tutions, and the creativity engendered through a more expansive love,
requires vulnerability. Eros, in its highest forms, is not only about a
lover and his or her object of love, but always about a lover, a beloved,
and the creative acts that result from the encounter between lover and
beloved. The source of this creativity, however, is in incompleteness
and need, and a striving to be responsive to that need. While Diotima
presents an idealistic notion of how eros can become increasingly
creative in its responsiveness to incompleteness and need, Alcibi-
ades represents a ﬁgure unable to reconcile to the vulnerabilities of
aging, shame, and especially interpersonal need. His inability to
recognize and to embrace his own limit also makes him unaffected
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by Socrates’ attempts at a therapeutic care for Alcibiades’ soul.
Instead, Alcibiades remains frustrated with his own limits, retreat-
ing into ever-greater attempts to assert political power, and so loses
the capacity to deepen his own moral virtue, care for the city, and
for genuine friendship.
Aristotle also suggests that vulnerability is needed for friendship,
even with the possession of the moral virtues. While the possession of
the moral virtues indicates a kind of development of positive capaci-
ties in a person, and so a degree of self-sufﬁciency, the virtues have
political value precisely because communities are built upon need.
The virtuous man is self-sufﬁcient in a sense, but still needs other
persons with whom to exercise the virtues and with whom to develop
one’s most signiﬁcant moral and political capacities. However, even
more deeply, Aristotle’s account of the loss of a friend who has
become morally bad shows that he understands the friend also to be
valuable as a particular, irreplaceable individual. A friend is ‘another
self ’. While memory and narrative can continue to make a lost friend
available in new and mediated ways, Aristotle displays sensitivity to
the tragic in his admission that such memory is no substitute for a
relationship with the friend himself. Moreover, those who lack moral
virtue can only become better through the participation of the wider
community in its educative functions, but no single friend, family, or
political entity can fully satisfy this function. Political life, then,
requires a complex set of interrelating social spheres of inﬂuence,
from family and friends to political institutions that imperfectly
address the needs of the vulnerable.
Tragic theatre is one such political institution: through the witness-
ing of suffering, audiences can become more aware of their own
vulnerability and limits and more responsive to vulnerability in
themselves and others. To this end, ŒŁÆæØ need not be understood
as the mere puriﬁcation of pity and fear as an end in itself, but rather
as a kind of ‘re-balancing’ of the individual and also the community.
Tragedy provides for a re-imagining of one’s own social and political
reality and the place of those normally at the margins within it.
Aristotle’s understanding of the imagination as a signiﬁcant element
in bringing thought to action suggests a powerful political role for
performative art. Tragic theatre serves not only as entertainment, but
also as a mode of mediating social and political relationships and
reorienting the community’s epistemological and affective attitudes
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to the vulnerable. Good political action depends on a certain under-
standing of human limit and vulnerability. Our own political commu-
nities would do well to respond in a similar fashion, not marginalizing
the vulnerable, but instead recognizing a common bond between ‘the
vulnerable’ and oneself.
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